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Traditional International Relations (IR) theories consign small states to the 
reactive roles of “bargaining, bandwagoning or buffering.” Small states are deemed to be 
inherently vulnerable, forever concerned with their mere survival. However, the present 
global system o f states is characterized by numerous smaller states, many of which are 
not only surviving but also thriving in both economically and politically spheres.
To unravel this anomaly, this study proposes a theory of wedge states as a 
separate category of small states, which are compelled to deep engagement with two or 
more rival powers simultaneously. The study analyzes a case o f a typical wedge state 
using the interaction between Nepal and its neighbors China and India to inquire if the 
“wedge” situation of Nepal being located between two rival powers provides it any 
strategic agency or autonomy. To understand such outcomes, the study uses material 
gains as the proxy for strategic autonomy.
The analysis of three cases of Nepal’s tripartite interaction—policies on Tibetan 
exiles and refugees; competitive Chinese and Indian investments in the hydropower 
sector in Nepal; and environmental cooperation along the fragile ecosystem of the shared 
Himalayan region—finds that Nepal has often enjoyed significant agency and generated 
material gains due to the rivalry between its two larger neighbors. Nepal’s strategic 
options and material gains, especially in economic and environmental realms, contradict 
the conventional IR theories and point to increasing autonomy of similar cases of small 
wedge states in the global system.
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INTRODUCTION: W EDGE STATES IN W ORLD POLITICS
One might as well begin with Thucydides’ narration o f the Melian Dialogue 
during the Peloponnesian War. For Athens, the superpower rival of Sparta, the small 
neutral island of Melos offered nothing more than a target to demonstrate its power and 
to make an example of by intimidation. The Melians resisted Athenian demands of 
submission and requested to remain independent from the Delian League. But the 
powerful Athens would not budge. Since then the fate of weak states in world politics 
was sealed by the response of the Athenians: “The strong do what they will, and the weak 
suffer what they must.”1 The devastating meaning derived from this episode has been that 
in the matters of interstate relations only the behavior and choice o f great powers are 
decisive.
Fast-forward 2500 years and another island nation found itself in the midst o f a 
tug-of-war between two relatively superior powers. In 2004, Taiwan and the People’s 
Republic of China openly competed for recognition by the pacific island state of 
Vanuatu. Each state made competing declarations of monetary aid amounting to millions 
of dollars for Vanuatu’s recognition and loyalty. For Vanuatu, although the stakes were 
not as dire as those faced by Melos, it was a delicate decision as evidenced by the 
vacillations and recurrent change of hearts among its leaders. After initially recognizing 
Taiwan as a legitimate sovereign, Vanuatu seemed to have changed its mind and then 
reverted to Taiwan before doing another about face. The internal dynamics of Vanuatu’s 
competing politicians and ministers surely played a part in such open demonstration of 
what has been termed “bribery diplomacy.”2 The bidding war for recognition between 
China and Taiwan is not just limited to this one instance of Vanuatu but includes many
1 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: Modem 
Library, 1982), 269.
2 Mark Magnier, "China, Taiwan Wooing Vanuatu in Dollar Dance," The Los Angeles 
77mes(November 13 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2004/nov/13/world/fg- 
vanuatu 13.(accessed on April 18, 2013).
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other small states in Latin America, Africa and the Pacific.3 This contemporary example 
suggests a phenomenon different from the one of coercive bargaining involving Athens, 
Sparta and Melos. The weaker state seems to have accrued some choice, a form of power 
so that the role, function and fate of small states in international relations (IR) are in dire 
need of updating. Today, states that are unequal in relative power seem to have more 
space for negotiation and bargaining than in earlier eras when such matters would simply 
be decided by force alone.
In the flowering of the post-Westphalian interstate system to its present day 
maturity, the signal transformation has been in the calcification of the notion of 
statehood, sovereignty and respect for territorial boundaries. The defining notions of 
sovereignty and non-intervention, pioneered in Western Europe in the eighteenth and the 
nineteenth centuries—which spread across the world in due time by the so-called process 
of “globalization of the state system” by the twentieth century—have largely become the 
backbone of the modem state system.4 In the post-War period, as decolonization 
progressed through the continents and as the liberal world order took root under the 
admittedly tenuous sanctuary of United Nations and myriad inter-state organizations, 
boundaries between states have been normalized to an extent that seems unprecedented in 
history. Wars fought strictly for empire and territory have become quite rare indeed. 
Although there have been major redrawing of the map—due to breakup of the USSR, for 
instance, or that of Yugoslavia—most states perceive high degree of certainty about their 
boundary relative previous eras in history. Of course, it would be premature to assume 
that the superpowers are automatically thwarted in their ambitions by boundaries fixed on 
paper—cases in point, U.S. in Iraq & Russia in Ukraine. Yet, the superpowers have also 
used their power to affirm the sanctity of the international boundaries to aid weak 
states—liberation of Kuwait being a prime example o f war waged to, among many other
3 See, among others: Daniel P Erickson and Janice Chen, "China, Taiwan, and the Battle 
for Latin America," The Fletcher Forum o f  World Affairs 31(2007); Timothy S Rich, 
"Status for Sale: Taiwan and the Competition for Diplomatic Recognition," Issues & 
Studies 45, no. 4 (2009); Joel Atkinson, "China-Taiwan Diplomatic Competition and the 
Pacific Islands," The Pacific Review 23, no. 4 (2010).
4 Robert H. Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations : 
Theories and Approaches (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 17-18.
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reasons, uphold the sovereignty of a small state. Thus, it is not erroneous to state that the 
emerging interstate system places a high value on the adherence to international law, 
observance to the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, and allowance to self- 
determination. This is a qualitatively and temporally novel development.
For the subject matter o f this research project—the smaller and weaker members 
of the state system and the factors, patterns and outcomes of their interactions with major 
powers—the emergent international system of states with almost-fixed boundaries is 
essential. If, in fact, this system is able to protect the weakest against arbitrary aggression 
for territory or coercion, the implications are substantial. It would fundamentally change 
that dictum of Thucydides so that the strong would hesitate from doing what they will, 
and the weak would not compliantly suffer what they must. It would mean the minnows, 
secure at least in the sturdiness of their borders, do not need to fear their mere survival as 
much as they had to in earlier eras of territorial expansionism, imperial encroachment, 
and recurrent modification of boundaries. Today’s weak states might thus feel relatively 
less vulnerable, but by no means entirely secure, at least in regards to their basic survival.
In most other spheres—political, economic, social and environmental—the 
smaller and weaker states also face ample vulnerabilities. They may routinely buckle 
under political pressure to adhere to the demands of greater powers. It has become a well- 
established proposition that as the so-called “price takers” in the international system of 
behemoth economic powers, the small states are unable to compete and remain inherently 
vulnerable. Their voices and concerns on social and environmental issues usually fall on 
deaf ears of the greater powers. For the majority of small/weak states, especially those in 
the global South, independence and autonomy of strategic policy choices are unusual.
THE PUZZLE: STRATEGIC AUTONOMY OF SMALL STATES
Traditional IR theory presumes small states to be entirely structurally constrained 
and irrelevant to the major global issues. The major powers would rather pigeonhole 
small states into their traditional roles of “balancing, bandwagoning or buffering” than 
negotiate with them as sovereign equals. Their newfound relative freedom from 
existential worry stands uneasily with the continued political, economic and social
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vulnerabilities o f most small states vis-a-vis major powers. This offers a striking puzzle 
in world politics. Do small states possess “strategic autonomy” in their interactions with 
greater powers?
The number of small states—whatever definitional criteria is used, the variation 
of which we will tackle in the next chapter—has risen dramatically in the post-Cold War 
world. Along with the rise in numbers, there has been a small but burgeoning scholarship 
on the topic of small states research, which in direct contradiction to the mainstream IR 
theory, seek to understand and explain the myriad ways in which smaller, weaker states 
of the international system have managed to not just survive but thrive, economically and 
politically, while tangling with the structural constraints of major power politics.
This puzzle of the acutely vulnerable small states that may nonetheless exhibit the 
curious pattern of autonomy and resilience in varying degrees raises questions that are 
both theoretically interesting as well as empirically substantive. Do the weaker states now 
enjoy uniform autonomy of strategic action? Has their role as the pawns of the rival great 
powers changed significantly? Under what conditions do the weaker state benefit 
materially from their inherent position? How have some of them managed to overcome 
the presumed inherent vulnerability owing to their position in the structure of IR? In the 
last few decades, many bodies of literature in international relations, international 
political economy and related fields have addressed this puzzle of the small state 
problematic.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SMALL STATES
Foremost, the scholarship is divided by the theoretical and practical inability to 
find a common and widely acceptable definition of what could be termed “small state.” 
Reflecting these definitional squabbles, observers have employed various objective and 
subjective criteria to delimit the type of state that is being discussed under such 
contending labels as “small states,” “small powers,” “weak states,” and “micro states,” 
etc., a process that has managed to further muddy the analytical waters. The next chapter 
begins with a section tabulating and sorting out the various definitional issues and
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detailing the conceptualization of the terms to be used in this research. A brief 
observation of the core standoff should suffice here.
Robert Keohane, in a widely cited review article published in 1969, highlighted 
the empirical and conceptual difficulty in categorizing the group of small states.5 He 
found two principal criteria: empirical based on material elements, or conceptual based 
on subjective, psychological criteria. Some scholars at the that time had either used 
strictly material criteria such as population or geographic size with somewhat arbitrary 
cutoff points to separate the category of small states from middle or great powers. Others 
favored a conceptual definition using level of perceived security and self-reliance a state 
could count on. Another long-time popular approach involved setting aside the 
superpowers and the major powers, and then treating the “residual category” as small 
states, which were mostly deemed unnecessary to explain a whole lot in world politics.6
Moving beyond the definitional squabbles, observers from contending traditions 
have grappled with the small state problematic is diverse ways. In a survey of small state 
scholarship, Matthew Louis Bishop identifies three competing approaches to the analysis 
of small state: mainstream IR theory; economic and development studies; and 
international political economy approaches.7 To Bishop’s approaches, one could add a 
couple complementary perspectives: “emerging state system and norms” and “societal 
actors” perspectives. The former is contingent on the larger concerns of state systems 
suitable for the emergence and survival of small states, and the later focuses on the 
factors emanating from within the small states in producing their behavioral outcomes 
vis-a-vis greater powers. These groupings of scholarship will form the basis of the 
theoretical literature review in chapter two. Here I provide a brief introduction to show 
the scope of each approach.
5 Robert O. Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics," 
International Organization 23, no. 2 (1969).
6 Christine Ingebritsen et al., eds., Small States in International Relations (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2006).
7 Matthew Louis Bishop, "The Political Economy of Small States: Enduring 
Vulnerability?," Review o f  International Political Economy 19, no. 5 (2012).
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Traditional IR theorists concerned as they are with the major powers and global 
issues, have given less attention to small states. Yet, their implicit position is 
deterministic on the structure of international system and the distribution of power, which 
places the small states in the system as inherently powerless and lacking agency. From 
the economist and developmental studies approach the core concern states has been in 
trying to quantify those states’ levels of vulnerability to internal and external shocks and, 
more recently, in trying to forge ways of “nurturing resilience” against those immutable 
shocks. Relatedly, the recent strain o f critical IPE scholarship has been concerned with 
the idea of “agency” that the small states possess in the face of structural constraints. By 
participating in niche market areas or by activating particularistic norms, many small 
states have been able to overcome their vulnerabilities. The societal actors approach takes 
a more traditional view in identifying the important unit-level, societal and individual 
determinants, of foreign policy behavior of small states.
However, I show that the extant theories do not sufficiently take into account the 
varieties of small states and the variation of the outcomes in interaction with greater 
powers. Rather than uniformly denying strategic autonomy and gains from interaction for 
all small states, I argue that we have to allow for specific contextual, temporal and issue- 
related consideration. The point o f departure of this research is to begin and unravel the 
“power of the small” puzzle by enumerating the empirical ways in which small states 
have managed to overcome their supposed vulnerability. We can then analyze the 
specific assumptions of smallness, vulnerability and resilience of small states.
WEDGE STATES: THEORY AND APPROACH
To adjust the limitation in these theoretical perspectives, I propose, theorize and 
analyze a special class of small states, what I call the “wedge states.” Wedge states are 
defined as those small states that are able to enlarge their strategic autonomy and accrue 
material benefits from the two rival great powers, due primarily to their geographic 
location, ideological inclination or strategic self-interest. With the help o f the typology of 
small states, I distinguish wedge states as a sub-category within the population of 
small/weak states and differentiate them from others historical usage, such as the concept
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of “buffer states.” The theoretical expectation is that wedge states are able to expand their 
strategic autonomy, which means ability to accrue higher gains from interaction.
As explained in detail in chapter II, the concept o f wedge states denotes those 
small states that are forced to interact with two rival greater powers. And because of their 
interaction with each of the competing rival powers, there is theoretical possibility they 
might enlarge their space for strategic autonomy, which in practice leads to greater share 
of gains from interaction in any of the myriad interactions they are involved in. It is in 
this context that I apply the insights from the extant theoretical perspectives to the context 
of wedge states. The goal is to explain the dependent variable, namely “gains from 
interaction” in a specific case and attempt to explain the variation in gains.
In Chapter III, I present the theoretical model of the wedge state along with the 
specification of independent variables that might explain the variation in the level of 
gains. The leading variables identified are: the type of state system; extent o f sovereignty 
norms; distribution of power; level of institutionalization; level of interdependence; type 
of the domestic political system; level of political stability; level of economic 
dependence; level of economic development. From these leading variables, I draw three 
relevant hypotheses to explain the behavior and outcomes of interaction by wedge states.
To test those hypotheses and to help in building the theory of wedge states, I 
present a qualitative research design based on a single-unit o f analysis. Using the 
qualitative methodology of process-tracing and within-case analysis over time, I propose 
to study the factors that impact the level of gains from interaction accrued by a typical 
wedge state. The goal is theory building and generation of testable implications of the 
proposed theory of wedge states, in regards to the primary research question, which is the 
level o f gains from interaction enjoyed by the wedge state in various issues areas.
EMPIRICAL CASE AND EVIDENCE
For empirical analysis, this research will rely on the case of the small South Asian 
state of Nepal, which is landlocked between the rising superpowers, India and China. The 
historical rivalry and current competition between the regional and global players 
provides a perfect wedge opportunity for substantial but relatively tiny Nepal. Thus,
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analyzing Nepal as my unit of analysis allows for testing the hypotheses on wedge states 
in its interaction with rival powers.
In presenting the evidence from this geo-political unit to analyze the theoretical 
issues raised, I shall examine three distinct cases to collect evidence of how this “wedge” 
state negotiates from a position of weakness. The three issue-areas discussed in detail, 
which provide the bulk of evidence in chapters IV to VI are:
1. The first case involves political, social and cultural issues. For more than half a 
century, the three states of Nepal, India and China have been involved in a delicate 
balancing act to manage each other’s expectations in dealing with the issue of Tibet and 
Tibetan refugees. The long-running strategic interaction between the three countries on 
their individual positions on this delicate issue and their actions vis-a-vis Tibetan 
refugees provides a suitable case to determine the degree of autonomy or independence 
that a weak state might possess when interacting with major powers. This case is 
analyzed in detail in chapter IV and provides the evolving situation of three-player 
strategic interaction over time.
2. The second case is of the economic interaction in foreign investment into 
Nepal’s hydropower sector from its rival neighbors. As one o f the poorest countries of 
the world, Nepal has relied in economic aid and investments from outside, primarily from 
India and China to maintain its economic positions. Chapter V will examine the historical 
pattern of state investment in hydropower projects made by India and China into Nepal 
and interrogate if the investment decisions have exhibited any discernible patterns of 
strategic interactions between the three actors. Review of specific hydropower projects 
analyses if Nepal’s wedge is able to gamer higher gains from one or both of the rival 
powers.
3. The third case covers the problem of global climate change and environmental 
cooperation in the high Himalayan region. This issue is of utmost strategic importance to 
all three nations under consideration. The Himalayan range, which forms the natural 
barrier between Nepal, China and India is the source of the major river systems in South 
Asia. As the global temperatures rise, the fragile ecosystems of the high Himalayas are
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said to be under threat and require close coordination and cooperation between the all the 
national stakeholders in the region for any meaningful success in combating the 
dangerous effects. Chapter VI reviews the strategic interaction between the three states 
regarding climate change and its effects on the region and the joint efforts to mitigate the 
impending disaster.
The chapters on the three cases provides crucial evidence used to analyze the 
pertinent research questions and test hypotheses about the role, function and ability of 
small, wedge states to manage their affairs and interactions with their powerful partners. 
Chapter VII presents the comparative cases summary findings, implications and 
conclusions.
As for the method and process of data collection and evidence testing, this study 
relies on the method of “systematic process tracing” to outline the causal mechanisms of 
Nepal’s interaction and choices in those three issue areas of interaction with India and 
China. This project draws as much as possible on primary sources of data, in the form of 
government declarations, treaties, official agreements as well as official figures and 
statements collected from official sources. Significant data also come from secondary 
sources as well in the form of newspaper accounts of developments, journal articles, 
books of historical records and major international databases for data. Due to the inability 
of the author to travel for data collection, the research compensates by using sources 
available in the Internet and library research.
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CHAPTER II 
SM ALL AND W EDGE STATES IN THEORY
An explosion in the number of new independent states characterized the second 
half of the twentieth century, and the majority of the emergent states were “small.” Lake 
and O’Mahony have shown that, after rising in the previous century, the average size of 
the states steadily shrunk in the twentieth centuiy.1 Each new state was welcomed to the 
community of nations as evidenced by its membership in the United Nations and other 
international and regional bodies. The membership in the United Nations almost 
quadrupled from the original 51 members in 1945 to 193 in 2011.2 This phenomenon of a 
growing number of sovereign and formally equal, but empirically smaller and weaker 
states has spawned contending theoretical and policy questions.
Smaller geographic units, principalities and duchies had long been a historic 
feature of European state system and geopolitics. Yet, the classificatory rubric o f dividing 
Europe into the “great powers” and the rest—made up of “middle powers” and what has 
been called the ‘'‘'residual category” o f “small powers”—only came into usage after the 
Congress of Vienna, during which the five major powers began formalizing the 
interactions among themselves and with the rest of Europe by setting the traditional rules 
of the diplomatic game.3 Those states that did not have a seat at the table were small 
powers. The period after World War I saw the breakup of the empires into smaller units; 
after World War II came the accelerating pace of nationalism and decolonization, 
creating numerous new states which joined the international system. Thus began the 
intellectual curiosity and a budding literature on small states in the disciplines of
1 David A Lake and Angela O'Mahony, "The Incredible Shrinking State: Explaining 
Change in the Territorial Size of Countries," Journal o f  Conflict Resolution (2004).
2 United Nations, "Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-Present," 
http://www.un.org/ en/members/growth. shtml.
3 Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstohl, "Introduction: Lilliputians in Gulliver's 
World?," in Small States in International Relations, ed. Christine Ingebritsen, et al. 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 4.
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international relations, foreign policy analysis, economics and development studies, and 
international political economy. Enquiry on small states has centered on such research 
problems as: their political and economic viability and survivability; their internal 
circumstances and external behavior with neighboring states; and their role in the 
international political and economic system dominated by the Western powers.
The early scholarly concern on small states focused squarely on their economic 
and political “viability” and doubted their prolonged survival as independent entities. The 
departing empires attempted to patch together the largest configuration o f territory— 
successful examples included multiethnic conglomerates of India and Indonesia—so that 
the newly independent area would have a chance at survival. Vaughan Lewis alludes to 
such traditional colonial view, which believed that “the construction of large-scale 
sovereign political entities, even of multiple ethnicities and cultures, was more likely to 
permit long-term stability in the modem world.” 4 He cites the failure of other creation 
attempts as the Federation of Malaysia, the Caribbean confederation, and in East Africa, 
which ended up creating many independent small, and thus presumably vulnerable, states 
around the globe.
As the Cold War intensified, many of those frail small states seemed to discard 
their dire vulnerability and acquire some sort of international presence. Analysis shifted 
focus from mere survival to investigate: their alliance decisions; their purported use 
(some would say abuse) of their power in numbers at the United Nations and other 
international organizations; and the practicability of non-alignment as their foreign policy 
strategy.5 Cooper and Shaw classify that era’s research concerns on small states, 
conducted under the shadow of the bipolar world, in the “pre-globalization” group, which
4 Vaughan A. Lewis, "Foreword: Studying Small States over the Twentieth into the 
Twenty-First Centuries," in The Diplomacies o f  Small States : Between Vulnerability and 
Resilience, ed. Andrew Fenton Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009).
5 David Vital, The Inequality o f  States: A Study o f the Small Power in International 
Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967). Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small 
Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). Keohane, "Lilliputians' 
Dilemmas." Annette Baker Fox, "The Small States in the International System, 1919- 
1969," International Journal 24, no. 4 (1969).
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they argue was rooted in conflictual bipolarity and is distinct from the concerns o f small 
states in the present post-Cold War globalized era.6
In the contemporary era of globalization and complex interdependence, when it is 
argued that security is no longer the only or the top issue in the hierarchy o f issues,7 the 
age-old small state problematic regarding their survival and independence seems to have 
given way to much finer concerns. The evolving post-war international system of states 
has enhanced to a considerable degree the chances for small state independence and 
continued survival, so that there are more “small” states now in existence than ever 
before in history.8 Most post-WWII and post-Cold War small states have survived with 
their independence intact. Yet, major ecological and economical vulnerabilities in a 
globalized world beset many small states, which seek to build resilience and nurture 
maturity in their diplomacies in our post-globalized era.9 At the same time, contrary to 
early concerns, many small states, especially the Northern European ones and a few 
others such as Singapore or Qatar, have actually managed to thrive as well-managed units 
domestically, and are even able harness globalization to project economical and 
ideational influence externally.10 Indeed, major institutional and ideational changes have 
given new options for small state in the international and interstate relations. No longer 
are they doomed just to “bandwagon” with regional and global powers or face probable 
extinction.
The primary research question of this research concerns the strategic autonomy, 
agency and influence of certain types of small states, those that I call wedge states, in
6 Andrew Fenton Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., The Diplomacies o f  Small States : 
Between Vulnerability and Resilience (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 3.
7 Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (New York:
Longman, 2001).
8 Lake and O'Mahony, "The Incredible Shrinking State: Explaining Change in the 
Territorial Size o f Countries."
9 Cooper and Shaw, The Diplomacies o f  Small States : Between Vulnerability and 
Resilience, 4.
10 Alan Chong, "Small State Soft Power Strategies: Virtual Enlargement in the Cases of 
the Vatican City State and Singapore," Cambridge Review o f International Affairs 23, no. 
3 (2010); JE Peterson, "Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State," The Middle 
East Journal (2006).
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contemporary interstate relations characterized by overarching globalization. To begin to 
unravel that complex problem, this literature review chapter evaluates the intellectual 
journey on small state scholarship beginning with a critique of the interdisciplinary 
muddle on defining “small states,” which I show to be quite unsatisfactory. Instead I 
propose grouping the smaller states of the globe into typical subclasses, including the 
subject matter of this research, which I introduce as wedge states. The chapter then 
progresses by reviewing the major disciplinary and theoretical perspectives, each of 
which highlights specific independent causal factors to try to explain the behavior of 
small states’ interrelationship with greater powers.
WHAT ARE SMALL STATES?
Evidently, how one defines a small state determines largely the answers to related 
questions of agency or autonomy. The definition of small states, may lead us to either 
ascribe them autonomy or not, which, in turn, determines their role in the international 
political and economic interrelationships. But there are gaping differences of opinion and 
analytical preferences on the matter of definitions and on which values and attributes 
should be considered fundamental to define this category and their constituents. One such 
constituent subclass of small states is wedge states. Therefore, I begin by reviewing the 
definitional heterogeneity o f “small states” to show their inadequacy and the need for 
disparate subclasses, after which we can delve into the disparate theoretical perspectives 
on their behavior.
In order to delimit “small states” as a discrete category one must begin with a 
classification scheme of all the states of the world based on certain defining criteria and 
using specific principles of categorization. Aristotle pioneered comparative studies by 
classifying the city-states o f Greece using the defining criteria of the states’ political 
system as either true or deviant types based on their commitment to the common good. In 
the modem disciplines of political science, international studies and development 
economics the complexity in classifying states in general, and the ostensible lack of a 
commonly agreed-upon definition of “small states” in particular, even after decades of
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enterprise, have been duly and periodically noted in the literature." Most books and 
articles on small states begin by first discussing the lack of definitional consensus.
Surveying the literature yields that the classification schemes of all states can be 
grouped into two varieties: Material (or Quantitative) and Conceptual (or Qualitative).12 
Material schemes are based on such objective defining criteria as size (of landmass, 
population or economy) or relative capabilities and power. Conceptual schemes, on the 
other hand, favor such defining criteria as a state’s level o f systemic influence or role, or 
ability to provide self-help and security. A sub-class of conceptual definitions is based 
entirely on a psychological categorizing principle by which “perceptual” notions of 
“smallness” as perceived by a state or others, defines it as such.13
Material classification schemes using quantitative defining criteria, such as 
geographic size, population, and the size of the economy, singly or in combination, seem 
to make intuitive sense and have been the most prevalent method of states classification. 
In his pioneering research on small states in IR, David Vital used a strictly quantitative 
criteria, famously stating that small states are those states that have “a) a population of 
10-15 million in the case of economically advanced countries; and (b) a population of 
20- 30 million in the case o f underdeveloped countries.”14 When many thinly populated 
former colonies, mostly islands in the Pacific or the Caribbean, gained and survived 
independence by the 1970s, observers of international politics used population size to 
delimit what they called “micro” (population less than 100,000) or “mini” (population 
less than 300,000) states, and questioned if these polities could participate in the 
international diplomacy adequately and whether they might pose a problem in the
11 Matthias Maass, "The Elusive Definition of the Small State," International Politics 46, 
no. 1 (2009); Tom Crowards, "Defining the Category of ‘Small’ States," Journal o f  
International Development 14, no. 2 (2002).
12 This distinction is adapted from Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas," 292-97.
13 Jeanne A. K. Hey, ed. Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy 
Behavior (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 3.
14 Vital, The Inequality o f  States, 8.
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efficient function of international fora such as the UN.15 Quantitative classification 
schemes have been especially pervasive in economics and development studies. In 1957, 
the International Economics Association held a conference to discuss the “Economic 
Consequences of the Size of Nations,” where Simon Kuznets suggested that small states 
are those with less than 10 million population16—many others have carried on research in 
that line of inquiry.17 Subsequently economists, and primarily development economists, 
have attempted a variety o f statistical techniques and methodological approaches to arrive 
at a scientifically valid classification scheme using distinct cut-off points to classify states 
in terms o f population, the size of arable landmass, and GNP.18
These studies suffered from the bane of all material-quantitative classification 
schemes—where to set the cut-offpoints to categorize states? As Tom Crowards 
incisively points out, the cut-off population threshold for small states have “varied, very 
generally, from around 10 million or 15 million in the 1950s and 1960s, to 5 million in 
the 1970s and 1980s, and to around 1 million or 1.5 million in the 1990s.”19 As a 
corrective, Crowards combined the variation in population, land area and total income of 
the 190 states in the world to derive a classification scheme based on “non-hierarchical 
cluster analysis,” which generated “four clusters (micro, small, medium, large and very 
large states) from equally spaced initial cluster-centers” out of which 79 countries were 
classified in the “small and micro” category.
The Commonwealth Secretariat, an association of the former British colonies 
based in London, has successfully led the most widespread policy and academic 
application of the term “small states,” which is based on strictly material-quantitative 
criteria. In 1985, the Commonwealth published a pioneering report, which classified
15 Tony Thorndike, "Review of "Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and 
Options." By Elmer Plischke; "Mini-Nations and Macro-Cooperation: The Caribbean and 
the South Pacific." By Herbert Corkran.," International Affairs 54, no. 1 (1978).
16 Quoted in Paul Sutton, "The Concept of Small States in the International Political 
Economy," Round Table 100, no. 413 (2011): 142.
17 A recent review is provided in Alberto Alesina, "The Size of Countries: Does It 
Matter?," Journal o f  the European Economic Association 1, no. 2 - 3 (2003).
18 Sutton, "The Concept of Small States in the International Political Economy," 143.
19 Crowards, "Defining the Category o f ‘Small’ States," 145.
20 Ibid., 162-70.
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states with population less than 1 million as “small states.”21 Researchers working on this 
framework argued that population size correlated well with other material size- 
descriptors and could be used as proxy of all quantitative criteria. In 1997, the 
Commonwealth updated and revised the criteria in a new report so that the upper 
population limit of “small states” was raised to 1.5 million. Some states with more than 
the threshold population—Jamaica, Lesotho, Namibia, etc.—were included into the 
group as exceptions. These definitions have been accepted to a large degree by the policy 
advocacy networks and international organizations in that area including the World Bank. 
Thus, in this institutional policy-area, the definition of small states and its implications 
have largely been institutionalized across policy and academic worlds to mean states with 
population of 1.5 million or less (a cut-off point or criteria that might have used for to 
group “micro-states” in an earlier era), an admittedly arbitrary, and sometimes even 
political, decision, according to one of the authors of the 1997 report.24
Scholars in other disciplinary and theoretical traditions have qualms about 
classification schemes based on entirely absolutist and arbitrary cut-off points of the 
quantitative criteria such as the one promoted by the Commonwealth. Those scholars 
concerned with the relative positioning of states in the international hierarchy argue that a 
superior classifying scheme is the use of “relative capabilities,” using composite 
measures of the states’ economic resources and level of development, population and 
human capital, and military power including possession of nuclear weapons. In the field 
of international relations (IR), Michael Handel employed such material-capabilities 
approach in his classic study Weak States in the International System (1981), in which he 
categorizes the states of the world into three groups: great powers, middle powers, and 
weak states (not weak powers), explaining the salient implication that the latter are
21 Commonwealth Secretariat, "Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society. Report 
of a Commonwealth Consultative Group," (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985).
22 Ibid., 8.
23 "A Future for Small States : Overcoming Vulnerability : Report by a Commonwealth 
Advisory Group," (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997).
24 Sutton, "The Concept of Small States in the International Political Economy," 141-42.
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characterized by their need to be “continually preoccupied with their survival.”25 Handel 
uses the defining criteria of “relative capabilities” to classify weak states into that 
category.
In contrast to these material-quantitative classification schemes, the other variety 
of classification schemes uses “conceptual” terms, often paired with “perceptual” metrics. 
What function is served by conceptual definitions that cannot be provided by merely 
material-quantitative ones, which are after all more intuitive? In a trenchant critique 
against strictly material-based definitions, Keohane argued in favor of “precise analytical 
definitions,” which could “facilitate behavioral comparison.”26 Thus conceptual 
definitions and classificatory systems might provide more leverage for analytical and 
comparative analysis o f small states based on their characteristic behavior in the 
international system, rather than the merely descriptive purposes o f strictly quantitative- 
based classifications.
The conceptual definitions of small states have been extended to ascribe those 
states with group-specific behavior, which separate them from other states. While great 
powers have global impacts and aspirations, the small states are expected to have limited, 
local and regional foreign policy footprint; they are seen to be more reliant on 
international institutions and international law and economically and politically 
dependent on great and regional powers; they exhibit more communal behavior and make 
decisions identified with the group as a whole; finally, their internal behaviors are also 
constrained by the structure to seek “domestic strategies such as consociational 
democracy, corporatism, or federalism,” all behaviors consistent with the desire of small 
states as a group to “mitigate the effects of structural constraints.”27 However, this line of 
reasoning has been challenged because scholars disagree if these unique behaviors are
25 Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System, 3rd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 
2005(1981)), 10-11.
26 Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas," 294.
27 Neumann and Gstohl, "Introduction: Lilliputians in Gulliver's World?," 10-12.
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inherent causes of these states’ “smallness” or if they are indeed the effects, causing 
problems of circular reasoning.28
Keohane himself provided an example of a “conceptual” definition when he 
categorized the states of the world based on the defining criteria of their “systemic role,” 
based on which states can range from “system-determining,” “system-influencing,” 
“system-affecting” and “system-ineffectual” states. Adding a component o f the level of 
perception o f a state’s systemic role by its leaders, he then proposed four groups of states: 
great powers, secondary powers, middle powers and small powers, which show variance
in their behavior in international affairs based on the perception of their ability to effect
* 20 the system.
The pioneering scholar of small states in IR, Annette Baker Fox in her 1959 book, 
The Power o f  Small States: Diplomacy in World War II, used conceptual groups of “great 
powers” and “small powers” based on the simple criteria of which states were engaged in 
struggle for dominance and which merely wanted to get out of the way to survive. Fox’s 
evidence included such “small states” during WWII as Spain, Turkey, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Ireland and Portugal, which endeavored to remain uninvolved in the destructive 
path of war to varying degrees of success.30 Reflecting the post-war era concerns of 
alliance behavior of small states, Robert Rothstein used the conceptual-perceptive 
defining criteria of the “self-sufficiency to provide for one’s own security” and 
categorized states into groups of those that are able to provide their own security, and 
others that aren’t able to and are forced to rely on others through alliances.31
Other scholars have extended the conceptual definitions to imbue them with 
purely psychological notions of “perception of smallness” held by a particular state and 
others in the system. The most prominent example of this position is Jeanne A.K. Hey, 
who dismisses attempts to categorize small states on quantitative attributes such as 
geographic size, population or GNP, as “rigid definitions,” which necessitate
28 Maass, "The Elusive Definition of the Small State," 78.
29 Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas," 295-96.
30 Annette Baker Fox, The Power o f  Small States: Diplomacy in World War Two 
(University of Chicago Press, 1959).
31 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers.
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“exceptions”; instead, she and the authors in her edited volume of small state foreign 
policy analysis rely on the conceptual notion of the perception of smallness—so that “if a 
state’s people and institutions generally perceive themselves to be small, of if other 
states’ people and institutions perceive that state as small, it shall be so considered.”32 
Thus, the case studies found in that volume on small states’ foreign policy analysis 
include countries ranging from Luxembourg, Caribbean islands, Paraguay, Gambia, 
Jordan and Laos. Hey’s approach has been criticized as problematic because there ample 
chances for ambiguity on perceptions about “smallness” based on differing empirical 
criteria, and also possibility of “skewed” self-classification, such as that leaders of South 
Korea, which despite its military and economic power, perceive their country as a 
“small” state based on its sensitive geographic location and existential qualms.33
In international political economy (IPE), the most notable application of the 
small state label and its domestic and structural implications is Peter Katzenstein’s study 
of the industrial policy of the “seven small European states” published in 1985 in Small 
States in World Markets.34 In that pioneering volume Katzenstein treats advanced 
European states, such as Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Netherlands as representative 
small states, a classification that would be in direct contradiction to a number of criteria 
of some o f the material definitions reviewed above. In a 2003 retrospective review of his 
research on small states, Katzenstein argued that the most important factor in his 
consideration of those states was that “small size was a code for something more 
important,” namely their “perception of vulnerability, economic and otherwise.”35 He 
found that a myriad of behavioral outcomes in the European small states, including social 
cohesion and economic corporatism characterized by flexibility, derived directly from 
this perception o f  external vulnerability, which was the “first and most important
32 Hey, Small States in World Politics, 2-3.
33 Maass, "The Elusive Definition of the Small State," 79.
34 Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).
35 Peter Katzenstein, "Small States and Small States Revisited," New Political Economy 
8, no. 1 (2003): 11.
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explanatory variable.”36 Definitions and implications of small states based on perceptions 
should thus be accorded needed attention.
VARIETIES OF SMALL STATES AND WEDGE STATES
The study of “small states” suffers from a fundamental lack of consensus on the 
matter of definition. Acknowledging the clutter on this topic and the empirical reality of 
numerous “small states,” one reviewer has called for definitional and conceptual 
“flexibility” in studying small states.37 The preceding section attests to the need for 
flexibility amid the varieties of definitions, classifications and approaches to the study of 
what are all termed “small states.” The best possible solution of the analytical tangle 
might be to accept that there are varieties of small states and to acknowledge the 
definitional flexibility among researchers.
This relative view of “small states” is not novel. Jeanne Hey suggests that it might 
be useful to consider the fact that when scholars in the various disciplines speak of “small 
states,” they are talking about three specific groups of mutually exclusive states: 1) The 
group of states, many of them islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific, with a population 
of less than 1 million (or 1.5 million according the updated Commonwealth criteria); 2) 
The group of small, advanced and wealthy small states in Europe, varying in size from 
the Netherlands to Luxembourg; 3) The group of the small states in the rest of the world, 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America, most of which are larger in size relative to the other 
two groups and also economically backwards.38 The first and the last group includes a 
majority of states that have also generated sustained research interest under the rubric of 
the least developed countries (LDCs) by the international aid communities.
The thriving research program on European small states is contextual of the roles 
and functions those states play in the European Union integration processes, and the 
resulting problems and prospects.39 As noted in the previous section, the Commonwealth
36 Ibid.
37 Maass, "The Elusive Definition of the Small State," 65-66.
38 Hey, Small States in World Politics, 2.
39 See inter alia: Laurent Goetschel, Small States inside and Outside the European Union 
Interests and Policies (Springer, 1998); Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp, Adapting to
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Secretariat has led the academic and policy research on those small states with 
populations less than 1.5 million, based on that criteria, small states comprised a third of 
the Commonwealth member nations, many of them island states.40 In terms of outward 
material features, such as GDP or population size, there is not a whole lot that is in 
common between Nauru and Netherlands. Yet, different scholars study both as part of 
“small states” in their particular context.
One approach to analytically contextualize similar small states into a group is 
shown by two scholars working on the European small states. To characterize small states 
in EU, Thorhallsson and Wivel propose using the “relational definition of small states,” 
which stresses the value of the “spatio-temporal context” o f small state behavior.41 This 
approach basically suggests that “being a small state is tied to a specific spatio-temporal 
context, not a general characteristic of the state; a state may be weak in one relation, but 
simultaneously powerful in another,” so that we are compelled to “change our focus from 
the possession of power to the exercise of influence.”42 Using this flexible and contextual 
definitional approach, the authors are able to show that the differences in foreign policy 
behavior of different small European states towards EU integration processes could be 
explained by the various systemic, domestic and ideational spatio-temporal contexts in 
which those states found themselves. This contextual definitional approach, although 
European-centric in their application, might be applied fruitfully in analyzing other 
varieties of small states in other parts of the world.
European Integration: Small States and the European Union (New York: Longman, 
1998); Baldur Thorhallsson, The Role o f  Small States in the European Union (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2000); Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel, eds., Small States in Europe: 
Challenges and Opportunities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010).
40 Commonwealth Secretariat, "A Future for Small States : Overcoming Vulnerability : 
Report by a Commonwealth Advisory Group."
41 Baldur Thorhallsson and Anders Wivel, "Small States in the European Union: What 
Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?," Cambridge Review o f  International 
Affairs 19, no. 4 (2006): 654. Thorhallsson and Wivel adapt this concept fromAnders 
Wivel and Hans Mouritzen, The Geopolitics o f  Euro-Atlantic Integration (London: 
Routledge, 2005).
42 Thorhallsson and Wivel, "Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and 
What Would We Like to Know?," 654-55.
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Wedge States
Such flexibility of classification and the consideration of “spatio-temporal 
context” is one of the goals of this present study as well, which attempts to bypass the 
“imprecision” and conceptual mess to argue for a categorization of small states based on 
the latent understanding of their real power relations. The point o f departure here is that 
there is an undeniable gap in material capabilities, power and influence between the 
major powers and many smaller states that they regularly interact with. I argue that we 
can fruitfully study groups of those smaller states that share common concerns in their 
interrelations with greater powers.
The specific group that this study analyzes is comprised of those small states, 
which exist in the sphere of influence of two competing major powers. I propose this sub­
class of small states be called “wedge states.” Having solved the dilemma of survival 
because of the emergent international system of calcified sovereignty (which I review in 
the next section), this sub-class of small states, theoretically, could seek benefits and 
influence from their competing benefactors. Let me briefly outline the working 
definition, assumptions, and the predicted interstate strategies of wedge states.
Wedge states are defined as those smaller and weaker members of the current 
global system of states, which are characterized by their practically equal affinity with 
two major, competitive powers. In the “spatio-temporal context,” the wedge states are so 
ideally situated—geographically, ideologically, influentially—that they must navigate 
between the diplomatic, security and economic pull from the two rival power patrons. In 
other words, these states are “wedged” between two the rival powers. It is easy to 
understand that many major powers are in a state of competition if not in conflict. For the 
wedge states, the motivation of trying to play coy between two immeasurably powerful 
powers is evidently self-interest in the form of monetary transfers, economic aid, and 
diplomatic prestige, in addition to survival. For the rival powers, the motivation of 
bargaining for access and influence may be strategic, material or simply related to 
prestige, influence and recognition, as is the case of PRC, Taiwan and Vanuatu. In that 
case, then, Vanuatu would be the “wedge state” and the relatively powerful states of PRC 
and Taiwan are the rival powers.
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The main assumptions for the wedge states to exist as I propose them are as 
follows. First, by definition the power differential between the wedge state and the two 
rival powers is assumed insurmountable and readily visible. There is no prospect of the 
power gap being bridged; the wedge state always remains relatively less powerful that 
either of the rival powers. The second assumption is that the overarching system of states 
allows for predictable norms of “sovereign equality” to all states in the system and there 
are functioning interstate institutions for coordination and cooperation. This assumption 
allows for the mere independent survival o f the weak wedge state among major powers 
that could as easily annex the wedge but do not. The third assumption is lack of actual 
war between the two or more rival powers, which just means that it is assumed that the 
existence of wedge state as an independent, non-aligned state would signify periods of 
peace between the powers. During periods of all out war, most if not all small and weak 
states are forced to either choose sides of the warring powers or to be gobbled up by 
them. Therefore, in a specific “spatio-temporal” context of an international system of 
formal, sovereign equality among states of all power levels, and during times o f peace, I 
argue that wedge states are expected to formally maintain interstate relations with two 
rival powers to generate benefits from each power.
In the current international state system, there are many avenues for weaker states 
to receive benefits and ensure their survival and well-being. Different theoretical 
perspectives, as I shall review them below, have identified many different paths: 1. 
Joining an international organization, where even the least powerful states generally have 
some rights. 2. Banding together to form supra-state bodies. 3. Join an alliance with the 
hegemon. 4. Bandwagon with a protector to receive security guarantee in exchange for 
loyalty. However, in the proposed theoretical model of the “wedge states,” certain weak 
states under specific conditions might pursue any of the above paths in conjunction with 
“wedging strategies” to receive benefits from two rival powers.
When it comes to the strategy of “wedging,” similar strategies might be used by 
greater powers in their interaction with other powers. Actually, major powers have 
historically been able to wedge between other powers to accrue gains. But the way 
wedging is used in this study is specifically applied to small or weak states because they
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do not have many other avenues of accruing gains. In short, greater powers have other 
choices if the wedging strategies fail, while the small states might be inherently reliant on 
gains from wedging to realize strategic autonomy. As such wedging is the relatively 
exclusive strategy of the powerless.
Historically, weak states caught between the competitive forces of rival powers— 
“wedge states”—have used a variety o f wedging strategies. Of course, the original 
strategy was the one tried by the Melians, which was to attempt to persuade the 
Athenians to let them remain “neutral.” The fact that Melos’ dilemma presented itself 
during an all-out war, which happens to be an unyielding security realm and not 
peacetime economic and social competition, made the offer o f neutrality not a successful 
wedging strategy. Subsequent weaker states in history have tried to play the neutrality 
strategy. Neutrality as a diplomatic tool has a long and deep history.43 Switzerland in 
modem European history and other states, microstates and principalities (for example, 
Luxembourg, Liechtenstein) have been successful in maintaining their precarious 
independence by remaining neutral against all powerful forces. But mere declaration of 
neutrality doesn’t guarantee safe passage, especially through a period of major power 
war, as many of the weaker European states found out during the 20th century world wars.
When great powers are not engaged in war, such peacetime situation offers wedge 
states better alternatives to uncertain, unsafe neutrality. One such strategy employed by 
the weaker, wedge states caught between rival superior powers is what is termed 
“pendulum politics.”44 This term has been used to describe behaviors of smaller South 
American states in their relationship to Brazil and Argentina, when a new leader might 
sway country’s loyalty and closeness to one side or the other. During peacetime or during 
periods of cold war, the wedge states might pursue another policy, which can be referred 
to “equidistance.” In this strategy, the wedge state maintains cordial relationship with 
both rival powers while seeking to remain in the good graces of both. This strategy is 
different than the neutrality option in that the wedge state endeavors to receive benefits,
43 Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States (London: Routledge, 2010 (1988)).
44 Frank O. Mara, "Paraguay: From the Stronato to the Democratic Transition," in Small 
States in World Politics : Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, ed. Jeanne A. K. Hey 
(Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).
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which necessarily entangles them in the interactions between the powers. Of course, 
when the rival powers actually begin wars, they suffer no waffling and demand loyalty, 
one-way or the other, from the wedge states.
Some empirical cases of small states that behave in patterns close to that of the 
proposed wedge state model might now be specified. It is well known that many “non- 
aligned” small states dining the Cold War exploited both sides for economic gain.45 In 
the post-Cold War era, many Eastern European states have tried to apply wedging 
strategies between the rival powers of Russia and the United States or the European 
Union. In that particular area, for example, Ukraine seemed to be a prime candidate to 
find itself between the powers. However, more recently the success of its approach has 
come increasingly under question. In South America, Uruguay, a natural and 
geographical wedge state, and other smaller states such as Paraguay and Bolivia, have 
historically tried to play the wedging role between the regional rival powers of Argentina 
and Brazil. In Southeast Asia in the last decade, relatively weaker states such as 
Myanmar, and others to a lesser degree, have responded to China’s rise with possible 
wedging against the United States or India. The country of Laos seemed wedged between 
the local powers of China and Vietnam. Even a significant economic power such as 
Australia, increasingly finds itself to maintain equal distance between both China and the 
US for the foreseeable future. Countries in South Asia, either bandwagon with one of the 
regional powers, Pakistan with China or Bhutan with India, or seem to attempt a wedging 
strategy.
The empirical case study of this study, Nepal, forms a natural and geographical 
wedge, between the rival powers of China and India. Nepal has historically maintained 
close relationship with both its rival neighbors; the power gap between Nepal and either 
China or India is so huge as to be never surmountable; both India and China have treaties 
recognizing Nepal’s independence, hence obviating the problematic of mere survival; and 
both China and India seem to be historical and natural rivals in security, economic and 
global sphere, considerations of which might spill over into their relationship with their 
immediate neighbors, including Nepal. So there is ample room to test the proposed theory
45 Fox, "The Small States in the International System, 1919-1969."
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of wedge state in this tripartite relation, especially when the analysis proceeds into 
specific cases where possibility of Nepal’s use of wedging strategies might be 
anticipated. The next chapter presents the design of the research to investigate those 
questions.
It would be a fair criticism, at this point, to question if the above definitional 
discussion and empirical examples warrant the proposed theoretical category o f wedge 
states as a sub-class from the considerable number o f smaller and weaker states in the 
global system, and also if those states actually are able to use wedging strategies to 
accomplish any of their foreign policy goals. With an eye towards answering those 
concerns and setting the context of the theoretical discussion, the next section of this 
chapter presents the literature on the nature, role and behavior of small states in the 
international system. The review shows that there are significant disagreements and gaps 
in extant theoretical perspectives on small states. For now, let us note that the notion of 
“wedge states” might fruitfully solve some of the disagreements and attempt to fill the 
analytical gaps apparent in the literature.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SMALL STATES
From issues of classification, definition and the varieties of small states, let us 
now discuss the matters of “implications” of being a small state as viewed from various 
theoretical lenses. We find that many of the smaller members of the international political 
and economic system experience similar constraints and opportunities across regions and 
definitional groupings. Analysts have used different theoretical perspectives to analyze 
and explain the behavioral actions and outcomes of small states in international relations.
I review and summarize what the major theoretical and disciplinary perspectives have to 
say about the implications for small states.
The first perspective view small states in the historical context of evolving system 
o f states perspective and argues that the international state system has evolved to allow 
small states to survive, and also given rise to certain norms, which are argued as 
necessary to understand current small state outcomes and behavior. The second approach 
takes a structural perspective and sees small states behavior and action being inherently
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circumscribed by structural, systemic forces. Another approach, which I call societal 
actors perspective, argues the opposite and sees room for internal processes and actors 
within small states influencing the level of autonomy and independence enjoyed by them. 
The fourth and final approach is the economic and developmental perspective, which sees 
unique economic features of small states resulting in their inexorable vulnerability 
against which they must endeavor in cultivating resilience. Each of these theoretical and 
disciplinary angles highlights unique factors or major variables that explain the behavior 
of small states in world politics. These explanations are offered generally for the class of 
small states, such that the sub-groups and classes, including wedge states, are usually 
covered.
Evolving System o f  States and Norms Perspective
In his influential volume on weak states in the international system, Michael 
Handel argues that two crucial factors underlie small state outcomes: one is geographic 
location, and the other is the specific historical period and the international system 
specific to that period, which determine greatly the “position and relative security of any 
weak state.”46 The second factor is the topic of this perspective, which emphasizes the 
idea that the international system of states had evolved by the second half of twentieth 
century to become more conducive to the emergence and survival of newly independent 
smaller states. Such proposition rests on the assumption that “the system of states” can be 
differentiated according to some intrinsic features and that it can change and evolve. In 
short, this view is the ultimate “spatio-temporal context,” that of the changing 
international system itself.
Adapting and expanding from Adam Watson’s seminal study of international state 
systems47, Viotti and Kauppi present the four ideal types of international state systems: 
independent state system; hegemonic state system; imperial state system; feudal state 
system.48 Unlike the ancient imperial systems such as in the Roman or the Persian zenith,
46 Handel, Weak States in the International System, 5.
47 Adam Watson, The Evolution o f  International Society: A Comparative Historical 
Analysis (London; New York: Routledge, 1992).
48 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism,
Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2007), 44-48.
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and the feudal system as was the case during the medieval dark ages in Europe, modem 
world politics has seen the prominence of the hegemonic state system, which began in 
Europe in after the Peace of Westphalia. Once rulers, such as Napoleon or Louis XIV, 
became the sole sovereign within their boundaries and accumulated enough power, they 
wanted to expand their state so that they turned into hegemons. Although not in the 
territorial expansion sense, the dual-hegemons of the Cold War behaved much like their 
predecessors from earlier centuries. The US preponderance of power remains in the 
present era but a semblance of the “independent state system” has come into existence, 
which might be argued to be more conducive to the existence and survival of small 
independent states.
Scholars share a consensus that The Thirty Years War and the 1648 Peace of 
Westphalia sowed the seeds of an independent state system—one that was based on the 
ideas of mutual recognition of sovereigns, non-intervention, diplomatic practice, and 
international law.49 Early European monarchies moved away from the Hobbesian “state 
of nature” toward one dominated by strong, domestic authority via a process of 
centralizing control achieved by the economic and cultural unification of elites and 
increasing incorporation of the periphery to the centralized authority o f national armies 
and bureaucracies built for and by the purposes of revenue extraction and services 
provisions.
Yet, even in the supposed new era of central control and sovereign recognition, 
the fate of the powerless smaller states remained dire in the face of unbridled territorial
49 For the extensive literature of state formation, and development and evolution of states 
and state systems, see Charles Tilly and Gabriel Ardant, eds., The Formation o f  National 
States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press & Social Science 
Research Council, Committee on Comparative Politics, 1975).; Martin Wight, Systems o f  
States (Leicester Univ Pr, 1977).; Watson, The Evolution o f  International Society.', 
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990 - 1992 (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell, 1992). Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building: A 
Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe.," in The Formation o f  
National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1975). For critical perspectives on state theory, a basic review is given in C.W. 
Barrow, Critical Theories o f  the State: Marxist, Neomarxist, Postmarxist (University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1993).
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expansionism. Equally salient is the fact that the valuable commodity of state sovereignty 
was certainly not to be shared outside of the Western European states so that the major 
European powers used superior arms and power to subjugate all outsiders into their 
imperial rule. Peace o f Westphalia did not immediately (or ever) create a system of fixed 
boundaries respected by invaders; rather territories changed hands frequently outside 
Europe and within. Early Westphalian system was characterized by regular and periodic 
wars for territorial expansion, resource accumulation, and princely hunger for power. The 
sovereignty ideal was young; the sanctity of borders was routinely punctured and 
disregarded.
To go from such initial system of willful disregard for sovereignty to one with a 
modicum of restraint, European states devised various diplomatic processes, systems and 
traditions to moderate and restrain the powerful, which they were able to achieve in a few 
occasions. The most successful historical example was the “Concert of Europe” system 
with balance of power as the guiding principle, which was able to secure prolonged 
peace, at least amongst the major powers of Europe. The essential condition for balance 
of power was existence of the state system with independent states. By the early 1800s, 
Europe had achieved a defined state system encompassing the territories from the 
Atlantic in the west to the Urals in the east and the Mediterranean in the south. Also, 
unique to Europe were the proximity of powers with a common history and the feeling of 
shared destiny. According to Edward Gulick’s popular study of the subject, the survival 
o f the independent states and the state system itself was the primary aims of the balance 
of power system, and not, as Gulick emphasizes, securing peace. Indeed, the statesmen 
believed that war was frequently necessary to stop any one actor from gaining too much 
power and disrupting the power equilibrium among the independent states but the state 
system had to survive.50 To achieve those aims, the Concert of Europe pioneered a whole 
host of innovative interstate diplomatic traditions in behavior, expectations and norms. 
Though it was narrowly applied among the great powers of the time, the concept of 
sovereignty found nurturing environment in the experimental lab of Western Europe.
50 Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance o f  Power; a Case History o f  the 
Theory and Practice o f  One o f  the Great Concepts o f  European Statecraft (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press for the American Historical Association, 1967).
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Modified versions of these interrelated diplomatic concepts eventually traveled with the 
Europeans via their colonial adventures to the rest of the world. In the twentieth century, 
the emergent notions of “collective security” organizations replaced the balance-of-power 
system of the earlier century. Interstate institutions were formed that eventually enshrined 
the notions o f sovereignty and formal equality o f different states.
For our concern of small states, another significant innovation among the rapidly 
codifying standards o f conduct was the idea of “neutrality.” The major European powers 
accorded the tiny state of Switzerland neutrality that has never ever been entirely 
breached.51 It can be assumed that of the many determined, militaristic and powerful 
European sovereigns, one could easily have annexed Switzerland despite the geographic 
fortress of the Alps. The fact that such outcome never occurred and Switzerland to this 
day enjoys unblemished neutrality has major implications regarding the effects of 
particular forms of interstate codes of conduct and the survival of small states. There 
were other less fortunate “neutrals” in history, such as Norway or Finland, and other 
successful ones, including a few that were effectual in keeping their states from harm’s 
way during the Second World War, including Sweden, Spain, and Ireland.52 Relatedly, 
another diplomatic and geopolitical innovation concerning small states is the idea and 
practice of “buffer states.”53 When major European powers came face to face, they found 
it prudent to leave a strip of land as buffer. Such buffer states served an important 
purpose of keeping the belligerents from having to wage constant war. Although created 
for geopolitical strategy by outside major powers, the buffers themselves highlight the 
fact that small states served a purpose. Undeniably, history is littered with examples of 
supposedly neutral and/or buffer states periodically and repeatedly crumbling on the 
warpath of marauding armies. Poland, and Belgium are as prime examples from 
European history. The unique and long-observed Swiss neutrality may be the one 
exception that proves the rule o f easily punctured boundaries of the weak states.
However, the fact bears highlighting that the evolving diplomatic codes of conduct and
51 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States.
52 Fox, The Power o f Small States.
53 Trygve Mathisen, The Functions o f  Small States in the Strategies o f  the Great Powers 
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971).
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norms of sovereignty has been—not always but on many situations and occasions— 
conducive to the existence, survival, specialized function, and autonomy of the smaller 
and weaker states in the evolving international system of states.
In this regard, special reference has to be made of the concept of sovereignty. In 
the Westphalian sense, sovereignty of states is characterized by the recognition of 
domestic self-determination by the community of nations.54 It is with the evolution of the 
system of states and the norms defining it, that we see increasing legal restrictions, 
procedural constraints and normative principles, which have slowly begun to calcify the 
sanctity of state boundaries to protect real sovereignty. Seen from the constructivist 
perspective sovereignty is now an “international institution and an discourse,” which is 
constantly seen to be evolving.55 In a long and tumultuous process beginning with 
European imperialism, and propagating in the subsequent development of nationalist 
awakening, to finally decolonization and independence, the institution of sovereignty was 
spread in the decades after the Second World War to incorporate the farthest reaches of 
geography—a process which has been called “the globalization o f the state.”56 Certainly, 
the number of United Nations’ current membership would indicate the expression of 
sovereignty at its historical peak. Nowadays, theorists actually talk about intensifying 
challenges to the notion of sovereignty from within and without, in the form of civil 
society and international institutions, and the malign effect of multinational corporations 
that control the flow of labor and capital across borders and spreading global production 
networks.57
54 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1999). A basic introduction of the concept from the international 
society perspective is: Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis o f  International 
Society (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986).
55 Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, State Sovereignty as Social Construct 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 11.
6 Jackson and Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations : Theories and 
Approaches, 17-18.
Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? : Sovereignty in an Age o f  Globalization (New York: 
Columbia Univ. Press, 1996). Gordon Smith and Moises Naim, Altered States: 
Globalization, Sovereignty and Governance (Ottawa: International Development 
Research Centre, 2000).
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In summary, since its inception in Westphalia to the present day the number of 
formally sovereign states has skyrocketed to 191; their average relative size has 
decreased; and most importantly, the increasingly codified rules, laws, and norms of 
sovereignty in interstate interactions has become the defining feature of the current state 
system. This perspective argues that today’s small states, in fact, can count on 
unprecedented levels of physical security and survivability, thus solving, to a vast extent, 
the major knot of the small state problematic.
Structural IR Perspective
The dominant debates in the field of international relations have been conflict and 
cooperation in world politics writ large. Owing to this preoccupation with global war and 
peace in the mainstream scholarship in IR, most of its research programs and insights 
focused on major powers and their interactions. The major powers were clearly important 
and their influence obviously predominant, which meant that the rest were consigned to 
the sidelines. In considering the major assumptions and considerations of the structural 
IR perspective, it can be seen that certain behavioral outcomes and predictions are 
ascribed to the smaller and the weaker members o f the international system. The 
traditional structural perspective argues that the purposes and functions of the small states 
in world politics can be summarized as bandwagoning, balancing or buffering.
The anarchic structure of the international state system is argued to have decisive 
implications for the existence and range of behavior available for all states, including 
major powers as well as the smaller and weaker states, under a particular system in time. 
The bedrock of the structural realist perspective is that the distribution o f power among 
the units of the structure determines the hierarchical level of autonomy and independence 
experienced by individual states, which are forced to seek self-help.58 Lacking the ability 
to self-help small states, postulating from these basic structural IR assertions, would be 
denied all autonomy and independence and be forced to be entirely dependent 
economically with a more powerful benefactor and “bandwagon” with a major protector
58 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 
1979).
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power.59 Additionally, their dependent and constrained nature means that the 
explanations for small state behavior are found in the structure and not within them. Due 
to their lack of capacity and influence, small states’ foreign policy and behavior have 
necessarily narrow and local focus, unlike the more regional and global attention of the 
major powers.60 These assumptions and considerations coalesce into the basis of the 
traditional structural perspective, encapsulated in the unequivocal observation by 
Barrington Moore: “The fact that the smaller countries depend economically and 
politically on big and powerful ones mean that the decisive causes of their politics lie 
outside their own boundaries.”61
It could be argued that the strongest would not be easily constrained in any 
system, with the implication for the wedge states because wedging is merely a transient 
state until they are forced to bandwagon with a patron power. So structuralist theorists 
may argue that bandwagoning is inevitable for wedge states. However, that prediction 
implies that the structure of the system is qualitatively no different that basic anarchic 
model, despite the claims of expanding sovereignty of the emerging state system 
perspective. Also, the empirical observation of multitudes of independent small states 
engaging with more than one major power problematizes such notions o f inevitability. 
Thus, it can be concluded that wedging does not have to necessarily be a transient state 
but become of tool o f long-term strategy adopted by small states.
Therefore, for those with limited resources and capabilities, whether the rules of 
the game are conducive or not, matter greatly. A system that privileges and honors the 
norms of sovereignty is qualitatively different than the one that does not from the point of 
view of small states. For instance, an international system based on the state of nature 
would most certainly mean the automatic demise and dismemberment of its weaker units. 
On the other hand a system of strong rules, constraining procedures and, well-agreed 
upon laws would mean that the strong would be restrained in their wills and desires, thus 
limiting the chances for Melian tragedy. Changes in the structural features of the system
59 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins o f  Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
60 Handel, Weak States in the International System, 41.
61 Barrington Moore, Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant 
in the Making o f the Modem World (Boston: Beacon Press, 2003 (1966)), xix.
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would most definitely result in material differences in the existential conditions of small 
states. Echoing such sentiments, Erling Bjol writing in 1971, in that era o f Cold War 
competition and budding interest in the rising numbers of new small states, argued about 
the priority o f the type of state system upon the fates of small states, thus:
“The problems, possibilities and behavior of small states vary considerably 
according to the types of international systems in which they operate -  hegemon 
systems, confrontation systems, integration systems, security communities -  
according to the geographic parameters which condition their foreign-policy.. .”62
In the earlier decades of the 20th century, small states had often been viewed as 
nuisances of (Cooper and Shaw 2009)the international system, sometimes even held 
responsible, historically incorrectly, for being the causes of wars among major powers, a 
view that was especially prevalent in the aftermath of the First World War, given the 
proximate causes of that war.63 The interwar period can be seen as the birthing period of 
the recognition of the “idea” of the viability and independence of small states. President 
Woodrow Wilson’s declaration o f the rights of self-determination of all peoples and the 
establishment of the League of Nations on the basis of “one sovereign, one vote” became 
the watershed change that expanded “the possibilities” of fashioning the structure of the 
international systems in which small states could survive.64 But the small state moment 
remained premature.
Yet, the sorry fates of the small states during the great recession and especially 
during the Second World War might have put a damper on notions of their viability and 
survival in an anarchic world. Upon annexing Austria in 1938, Hitler himself put the 
structural problematic of small state existence in its most basic, starkest essence, when he 
declared, “What can words like “independence” or “sovereignty” mean for a state of only
62 Erling Bjol (1971) quoted by Lewis, "Foreword: Studying Small States over the 
Twentieth into the Twenty-First Centuries," xiii.
63 Roger MacGinty, "War Cause and Peace Aim? Small States and the First World War," 
European History Quarterly 27, no. 1 (1997).
64 Woodrow Wilson, "The Fourteen Points," in Classic Readings and Contemporary 
Debates in International Relations, ed. Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. 
Shafritz (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006 (1918)), 33-36.
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6 million people?”65 For any small state of the international state system contending with 
that basic question when demanded by a powerful adversary is existentially analogous to 
the familiar no-win dilemma that the Melians faced against the unyielding demands of 
Athenians. But Hitler’s pronouncement has to be read in the context of the nature of the 
system that obtains during a period of total war, and the fact must be considered that 
there were enough states that opposed Hitler’s view, which ended up saying that 
independence and sovereignty applied even to the smaller states.
Precisely because it takes someone like Adolf Hitler, hell-bent on his mad project, 
to espouse such denials about the viability, independence, and sovereignty of small states 
proves the unreasonableness of his argument. That a country such as Austria—or Poland, 
Burma, Ethiopia—might have a right to coexist as a state formally, jurisdictionally equal 
to major powers, even if such rights were not enshrined in the system of international 
states prevalent before the Second World War, in its aftermath, the world could not allow 
itself to deny such rights to all. The Second World War had been fought in part to uphold 
those fundamental rights against an indiscriminate aggressor.
For the small states, the post-war international system ushered into being was 
fundamentally and characteristically different than what preceded it. Formal sovereign 
equality of the small states was enshrined in the auspices of the United Nations and the 
American dominated Western state system that rose from the ashes of the World War II. 
So much so that by the late 1960s, observers contended that the international system had 
changed due to the aggregation o f actions and desires by the increasingly assertive, and 
ever numerous small states, acting in unison at the sympathetic forum of the UN and 
other international bodies.66 The Third World small states were seen to be attempting to 
fundamentally change the international regime and its post-war rules and norms by 
capturing the international rule-making structures themselves.67
65 Quoted in James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis o f  International Society, 2. from 
Stanley A. de Smith, Microstates and Micronesia (New York: New York University 
Press, 1970), 19.
66 Fox, "The Small States in the International System, 1919-1969," 756.
Stephen D. Krasner, "Transformed International Regimes: What the Third World 
Wants and Why," International Studies Quarterly 25, no. 1 (1981): 120.
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The bipolar competition of the Cold War was yet another wrinkle on that period’s 
structural system of interstate interaction, which constrained and structured the glut of 
new small states that came into being. In Alliances and Small Powers Robert Rothstein 
highlights such heterogeneous system-specific influence on small state condition and 
choices. Concerned with small state alliance decisions resulting from Cold War bipolar 
competition, Rothstein showed that different types of historical balance of power systems 
have produced markedly different impacts and choices sets on small state survival and 
security.68 As Keohane summarizes in his review of small state literature, Rothstein 
identified various balance of power arrangements during the 19th century, ranging from 
“conservative stability” to a “fluid and competitive” scramble for allies. Based on such 
schema, Rothstein theorized that small states’ interest o f survival is best protected in the 
conservative and stable balance of power system; but their autonomy and 
maneuverability are best maximized, albeit compromising on their security, in a balance 
of power system characterized by fluidity and competition and among major, hegemonic 
powers.69 The prime application of this conceptual analysis in the Cold War era thus 
concerned the “alliance decisions” of small states faced with choosing between the rival 
superpowers. Theoretically, the research questions were, what option, in the realist sense 
of either bandwagoning or balancing, and which side a small state chooses or is forced to 
choose would depend upon what state system prevails at the point of decision. During 
periods when the superpowers are scrambling for allies, such as during the Cold War, 
some small states enjoy “bargaining advantages that may accrue from offering to 
dismantle a new alliance and the political and psychological advantages of allying with 
the prestigious and powerful state.”70
Observers of small state alliance decisions cautioned that, in general, the alliance 
o f the week with a great power is a losing hand. The fates of Eastern European 
communist states ostensibly allied as equals with USSR under the Warsaw Pact, serves as 
key evidence, which Keohane memorably termed the “A1 Capone alliance,” in which a
68 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers.
69 Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas," 299-300.
70 Quoted in ibid., 301. from Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 50.
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weakling pays a powerful thug for protection against the selfsame thug.71 To escape such 
a precarious structural situation, it was concluded that the best alliance for small states, if 
one has to be made, would be “mixed, multilateral alliances,” which might be further 
logically extrapolated to mean “multilateral institutions,” if they could be made strong 
enough, as the best allies of small states. Ideally, small states would prefer a system of 
states with strong constraining multilateral institutions committed to the norms of 
collective security.
For small states a seductive alternative to Cold War alliances, against the grain of 
the structural prescriptions of bandwagoning, was non-alignment. While the superpowers 
were busy carving up the globe via alliances into two conflicting camps of ideological 
rigidity and all-out competition, some middle powers wanted no part of that and declared 
a policy of “non-alignment.” In analyzing the attraction and viability of this strategy, it 
has to be borne in mind that the leaders and powerbrokers of the non-aligned movement 
(NAM) were major secondary powers, such as India and Yugoslavia, and not small or 
patently weak states.72 In joining the movement the true small states were following and 
not leading, and instead of openly aligning with one of the great powers, they were 
hedging on the ability of middle powers to provide them with some security and 
economic aid. Ultimately the progressive strengthening of the multilateral institutions and 
the conclusion of the Cold War might have removed the need for the third way of 
nonalignment. Or for that matter the primary decision of alliance choice.
By the 1970s scholars began to anticipate that the anarchic structural constraint of 
the international system had undergone a radical transformation due to the interweaving 
“interconnectedness” and what was described as “complex interdependence,” a 
phenomenon which began to manifest in the American hegemonic Western centric states. 
In their path breaking work, Keohane and Nye famously argued that the three crucial 
characteristic of this evolving structure predicated on interdependence were the multiple 
channels of interactions between states, removal of military force as a tool of dispute
71 Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas," 302.
72 Sally Morphet, "Multilateralism and the Non-Aligned Movement: What Is the Global 
South Doing and Where Is It Going?," Global Governance 10, no. 4 (2004).
38
resolution, and the lack of hierarchy among issue areas, meaning that states that did not 
possess large capabilities in terms of security could also be major players in other realms 
and issues.73 Furthermore, in many cases states managed to compromise the impediment 
of anarchy and security dilemma to cooperate by creating “international regimes,” which 
constrained the actions of all members irrespective of their size. Soon enough the web of 
interdependence spread to the far reaches of the globe turbocharged by technological 
innovations and a novel ethos of openness, eventually embracing all states, small and 
large, in a phenomenon that has been called globalization.
In these early years of the 21st century, in the post-Cold War era of globalized 
system of states characterized by contested but well-established norms of sovereignty, 
increasing calcification and respect for international borders, an era that is characterized 
by epochal economic, political and social interdependence, small states find themselves 
in a system, which affords them unique opportunities and challenges along with formal 
security unmatched in history. However, the vulnerability inherent in the position of 
smallness and weakness in a still anarchic structural system persists. The fact remains 
true that centralized authority has not extended beyond the state’s borders, so that 
anarchy prevails in the international system as a whole. Concerning the existence of 
modem smaller, weaker states, the implication of an anarchic but rule-bound state system 
must be: why do the powerful states in the anarchical world allow the powerless small 
states to exist? Why are the small states not annexed by major neighboring powers? The 
only answer is that anarchy remains but has been tempered, at least in the overt 
expansionist sense, from the earlier, historical eras.
Societal Actors Perspective
The societal actors perspective challenges the structural view, which accords 
decisive primacy solely to the external, systemic factors in small state outcomes. Rather 
than being uniformly constrained by the structural forces, this perspective argues that 
states respond uniquely based on the distinct interplay among their internal actors, 
coalitions, institutions and processes, dependent on their level of institutional 
development and regime type. The level of analysis is at the unit level and individual
73 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 21.
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level because powerful personalities and their foreign policy apparatus are sometimes 
able to overcome the structural constraints placed upon small states.
In a volume of empirical case studies devoted to investigate the level-of- 
analysis—systemic, state or individual—which best explains small state foreign policy, 
Jeanne Hey concludes that in most circumstances the systemic factors play a major role. 
However, she argues that “although small states face a common systemic challenge, 
operating at a disadvantage to local hegemonic powers, they respond in a myriad of ways 
that reflect historical circumstance, domestic political dynamics, individual choice and of 
course, the behavior of the hegemonic powers.”74 While state-level factors are found to 
be of lesser importance than systemic ones, Hey suggests two important considerations at 
the state-level: regime type and level of development of the state.75 Whether a small state 
is an established democracy or a teetering dictatorship explains the form of international 
legitimacy that the state enjoys, hence expanding or limiting its strategic space. Level of 
economic development determines the number and kinds of international engagements 
that a small state is able to sustain. Each of these two factors would have profound impact 
on the policy choices available and behavioral outcomes of small states, even under the 
same systemic environment. The varieties of small states seen around the globe today, 
differing in their level of dependence and available choices from Singapore and Sweden 
to Bhutan and Cuba, gives empirical weight to those two state-level factors.
On the other hand, individual-level factors of leadership and personality are quite 
persuasive in explaining the levels of autonomy and independence that can be asserted by 
an otherwise systemically constrained small state. Hey argues that “the actions of often 
charismatic or authoritarian leaders (are) all the more forceful and independent.”76 In 
many small states, foreign policy is the exclusive province of an individual leader or a 
small group of elites, unencumbered by the large foreign policy apparatus found in a 
major power. Such powerful leaders might use the freedom to easily respond to 
incentives and switch sides or policy directions and preferences. Such switches and




changes o f direction might be extremely important for those small states that are also 
wedge states. Since there is little margin for error in their interstate relations, the personal 
qualities and diplomatic abilities of the small state leaders in diplomatic negotiations— 
which have been called the “right handmaiden of the weaker states”77—would be 
extremely vital.
A special illustration of the power of leadership personalities to sway the direction 
of foreign policy in a small wedge state is the phenomenon that has been termed 
“pendulum politics” in the context of South American small states lurching from the lap 
of one regional power in Argentina to another in Brazil. Frank O. Mora discusses the 
classic of example this phenomenon in Paraguay under the paternalistic leadership of 
President Alfredo Stroessner, who personally swung the pendulum from longstanding 
loyalty to Argentina, the dominant economic benefactor, towards Brazil in the 1960s.78 
Powerful unitary leaders such as Stroessner can “drag” their foreign policy in 
idiosyncratic directions in response to the systemic forces acting on their countries, which 
scholars on South America has characterized as “dragged” foreign policy.79
The external influence factor may be necessary but not sufficient to explain how 
small states can react to the structural imperative. The specific question about whether the 
direction of change comes from the structural forces to bind the choices of small states or 
if internal reactions to systemic forces have intrinsic, a priori, salience has been of 
especial concern in the post-war experience of European small states. The major problem 
faced by all Western states, including the smaller ones, was how to respond to economic 
openness and liberalization of the Western economies in the second half of the twentieth 
century. In his authoritative work on the topic, Peter Katzenstein has cogently argued that 
in the case o f the smaller European states, the domestic economic and political 
transformation proceeded from cohesive and flexible bargaining between the internal 
societal actors, who were responding to the demands of the systemic forces of open 
competition. Disputing the primarily “external influence” view of the structuralists,
77 Fox, "The Small States in the International System, 1919-1969," 754.
78 Mara, "Paraguay: From the Stronato to the Democratic Transition," 19-21.
79 Ibid., 22.
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Katzenstein argues that the external influence “acted as an opportunity as much as a 
constraint” in shaping the local societal actors to compromise in specific ways, so that in
O A
many of the smaller European states, variants of democratic corporatism emerged.
In disputing the basic argument that systemic forces solely determine the 
foreign policy choices of small states, Miriam Elman finds evidence in emerging weak 
states. Analyzing the evidence from the state formation, institutional consolidation and 
military strategies of the United States during the nineteenth century, which was 
admittedly a weak state in that time and context, Elman argues that external influence is 
sufficient explanation in phase of the development of local institutions. But once 
institutions take hold and societal actors emerge, domestic factors take precedence in 
explaining subsequent foreign policy behavior of these states based on domestic
Q |
institutional procedures, sectoral politics and distributional conflicts. Structure does not 
automatically socialize weak states, especially if process of state formation and 
consolidation have completed.
In summary, the societal actors perspective questions the unqualified explanatory 
power of structural factors in small state foreign policy behavior. Various state and 
individual level factors, such as geographic location, regime type, role of national and 
transnational non-state actors, or the personality of a powerful leader, necessarily 
complicate the pidture. This perspective argues that, especially for well-established small 
states, domestic politics seem to play equally important part in explaining behavioral and 
foreign policy outcomes.
Economic and Developmental Studies Perspective
The concern with small states or “small economies” in the field of economics and 
developmental studies began with the fundamental question of whether general economic 
theories hold equally and similarly in all types and sizes of states. Reality shows that 
there are states of different sizes and varying levels of developmental levels and
80 Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets, 181-86.
81 Miriam Fendius Elman, "The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging 
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economic complexities, which exhibit a range of economic conditions, often inconsistent 
with received wisdom in the mainstream economic literature. Are small states viable 
economically and if they are not, how do they respond? Obviously, the answer to these 
questions would also inform how small states interact economically with their wealthier, 
economically powerful, partners.
The earliest attempt to grapple with these concern was a 1957 conference 
organized by the International Economics Association with the theme of “Economic 
Consequences of the Size of Nations,” the proceedings from which was published as a 
edited volume under the same title in I960.82 The questions, assumptions and definitions 
generated by this research program dominated the discussion in this field in the 
subsequent decades. Subsequent scholars in this research program concluded that size of 
the economy does indeed matter, and small size is especially indicative of unique 
economic implications. According to the general economic consensus then, small states 
suffer from the following generalized economic problems:
1. Because of their small territorial size, most small states do not possess a large 
variety of natural resources or agricultural land. They can only produce one or a 
few primary commodities as their exports becoming “one-dimensional states,” 
because they have to rely on the exports of a single primary commodity.
2. Because of their smaller population, smaller labor force, and thus smaller 
domestic market, small states suffer from “diseconomies of scale”—the inability 
to produce high returns to scale in manufacturing and production of goods. They 
are forced to seek outside markets for their primary products and reliant on 
imports from foreign producers to fulfill domestic consumption.
3. Owing to these fundamentally inalterable conditions, small states exhibit high 
trade to GNP ratio and have no choice but to open their borders for trade. Thus,
82 E. A. G. Robinson, ed. Economic Consequences o f the Size o f Nations; Proceedings o f  
a Conference Held by the International Economics Association (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1960). More recent attempts to explain the causes and consequences o f state sizes 
are: Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore, On the Number and Size o f  Nations 
(Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995); Alesina, "The Size of 
Countries: Does It Matter?."
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they are acutely sensitive to volatility in trade patterns and dependent on other 
states for market access and trade terms.
4. Also, since their primary product exports constitute a fairly small percentage of 
the total in world markets, they are “price-takers” and doubly vulnerable to the 
swings in external demands and prices.83
As the number of small states continued to climb up and their relative size 
continued to decline, observers questioned the economic “viability” of small states based 
on concerns about the “economically determinist” view of state size. Nevertheless, many 
small European states had managed to overcome the general economic predictions of 
unalterable vulnerability and dependence. Yet, many others, mainly Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), seemed to be indeed 
mired in the exact predictions made by mainstream economic theories. Ironically for 
these smaller economies, the orthodox models of economic development and growth, 
such as the Lewis Model based on large-scale industrialization, could not be applicable 
due to their lack of a large population base and small market size.84
However, in the last couple of decades rigorous quantitative analyses have 
challenged and often modified the economic consensus on small state vulnerability, 
volatility and dependence. In 1988 Srinivasan analyzed small states defined as those with 
population less than 5 million, and he found mixed evidence on each o f the constituent 
points of small state economic consensus: the concern for economies of scale was not 
really warranted on goods for sale but proved true for infrastructure costs because of high 
cost per unit; in terms of environmental and economic vulnerabilities, many small states 
indeed faced catastrophic ruin due to the former but the latter could be managed better by 
the governments; many remote small island nations indeed faced high costs of transport 
and communication; but in regards to access to capital markets, macroeconomic policy
83 Handel, Weak States in the International System, 220-28.
84 Harvey W Armstrong and Robert Read, "The Determinants of Economic Growth in 
Small States," The Round Table 92, no. 368 (2003): 102.
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Of
independence or low income levels, he did not find conclusive evidence. In most o f the 
cases, smallness alone was not the cause of the purported economic ills. Along the same 
vein, a 2000 study conducted by Easterly and Kraay analyzed a large data-set evidence to 
ascertain if small states (population less than 1 million) were different from other states in 
terms of their income, growth and volatility outcomes. The authors found that small 
states had higher per capita GDP due to “productivity advantage,” and comparable 
growth rates to other states, while they did seem to suffer from higher volatility due to 
trade openness and terms of trade volatility, although the openness factor resulted in a 
“positive net payoff for growth.”86
Such findings and some empirical examples problematize the economic 
consensus on small states. On the one hand, many policy and advocacy organizations 
continue to argue that small states, especially those with less than 1.5 million population, 
suffer from significant barriers to economic well being. Research continues on that vein 
to enumerate the specific vulnerabilities faced by those small states while recommending 
special policy tools, including aid and tariffs protection, to help build resilience to combat 
against the vulnerabilities. The institutional leadership provided by the Commonwealth 
has supported an extensive research program for the unique concerns of small states 
facing high levels of vulnerability. The creation of the Commonwealth Vulnerability 
Index (CVI), and measures of resilience,87 continued with the publication o f a joint task 
force report by the World Bank and the Commonwealth Secretariat in 2000.88
85 T. N. Srinivasan, "The Costs and Benefits of Being a Small, Remote, Island, 
Landlocked, or Ministate Economy," The World Bank Research Observer 1, no. 2 
(1986): 211-17.
86 William Easterly and Aart Kraay, "Small States, Small Problems? Income, Growth, 
and Volatility in Small States," World Development 28, no. 11 (2000): 2014.
87 Jonathan P Atkins, Sonia Mazzi, and Christopher D Easter, "A Commonwealth 
Vulnerability Index for Developing Countries: The Position of Small States," in Small 
States in the Global Economy: Background Papers Presented to the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, World Bank Joint Task Force on Small States, ed. David Peretz, Rumman 
Faruqi, and E. J. Kisanga (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000); David Peretz, 
Rumman Faruqi, and Eliawony J. Kisanga, eds., Small States in the Global Economy, 
Background Papers Presented to the Commonwealth Secretariat, World Bank Joint Task 
Force on Small States (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001); Lino Briguglio et al.,
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On the other hand, most less developed small states have to face the phenomenon 
made popular by Briguglio’s phrase, the “Singapore Paradox,” which is a case o f a highly 
vulnerable small state able to achieve rapid economic growth and high levels of GDP per 
capita.89 While there are no ready solutions to the paradox, analysts, working in this 
intersection of small state research, economics, international political economy and 
developmental studies, have generated theoretical and empirical scholarship to explain 
the evolving nature of vulnerabilities facing small states and novel ways that they have 
resorted to overcome the said vulnerabilities and build resilience. In a penetrating study, 
Naren Prasad shows how small island states of the Caribbean have used unique economic 
and political strategies to cope with their inherent vulnerability: using sovereignty to set 
up off-shore financial centers; relying on the traditional means of tourism, aid and 
remittance; such unorthodox means as “selling sovereignty” in the form of fishing rights, 
military bases, shipping rights, allowing “flags of convenience,” selling passports, 
hosting internet gambling sites and domain names, etc.,.90 These kinds o f niche economic 
comparative advantage might only apply for the “micro” states and island nations of the 
Caribbean and the Pacific, or the entrenched ones in Europe such as Luxembourg or 
Lichtenstein.
However, for relatively larger small states relying on the global capitalism while 
adjusting to its rules is inescapable. At issue again is whether the volatility and 
vulnerability is produced exclusively by external influence or more by internal factors. 
While both types of influences may be in play, their exact interplay and relative 
importance along with societal factors has been the theoretical contribution to the
"Economic Vulnerability and Resilience: Concepts and Measurements," Oxford 
Development Studies 37, no. 3 (2009).
88 Commonwealth Secretariat and World Bank, "Small States: Meeting Challenges in the 
Global Economy; Final Report Prepared for the Joint Task Force on Small States," 
(London/Washington, DC.: Commonwealth Secretariat / World Bank, April 2000).
89 Lino Briguglio, "The Vulnerability Index and Small Island Developing States: A 
Review of Conceptual and Methodological Issues" (paper presented at the AIMS 
Regional Preparatory Meeting on the Ten Year Review of the Barbados Programme of 
Action: Praia, Cape Verde, 2003).
90 Naren Prasad, "Small but Smart: Small States in the Global System," in The 
Diplomacies o f  Small States : Between Vulnerability and Resilience, ed. Andrew Fenton 
Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 41-64.
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economic perspective by the IPE scholars. In that regard, at least in the case of small 
European states, Katzenstein maintained that they were forced to adopt a “preference for 
a reactive and flexible” economic and social policies to mitigate the external influence of 
global economy.91 Thus, the nature of internal response—reactive but flexible—has to be 
paramount in considering the economic and developmental perspective, as well as the 
other perspectives, on small states’ interaction with their larger economic partners and the 
global economy as a whole. Rather than painting with a wide brush and analyzing all 
small states using the vulnerability paradigm, disaggregating the political, social and 
economic responses of sub-groups of small states, including wedge states, would be more 
fruitful.
91 Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets, 27.
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND M ETHODOLOGY
The objective of this chapter is to design a research project that answers the 
questions of whether small wedge states can possess autonomy of strategic policy choice 
in their international relations with great powers, and what factors determine the 
likelihood of such instances of small state autonomy of strategic action. To explore these 
primary research questions, this chapter shall: a) Specify the theoretical model of “wedge 
states” and deduce crucial theoretical elements—variables and hypotheses—of the 
model; b) Drawing from the model specification, present a research design and 
methodology; c) Introduce the empirical unit of analysis of a typical wedge state of Nepal 
and its tripartite relationship—in three crucial cases of differing strength of preferences— 
with India and China. Taken in aggregate, the theory o f wedge states and the selection of 
Nepal’s tripartite relationship with India and China form the research design foundation 
for the remainder of the study.
MODEL SPECIFICATION
The proposed model of wedge states involves one small (weak) state in a tripartite 
relationship between two rival powers. In terms of material power and capabilities, both 
the rival powers enjoy an unbridgeable gap in comparison to the wedge state. These two 
powers are in a mutually competitive environment but not in a declared or undeclared 
state of war because during wars greater powers demand absolute loyalty of the small 
states. The wedge state maintains cordial relations with both the rival powers and engages 
with and negotiates with each of them on a host of wide-ranging and crosscutting 
interactions. The wedge state may theoretically try to adopt wedging strategies to derive 
maximum gains from interaction with each of the rival powers because many of these 
interactions are coordination or collective actions problems with distributive 
consequences.
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In the context o f these interactions between the wedge state and either of the rival 
powers, we can speak of and investigate the space for or the extent of the foreign policy 
autonomy and independence afforded to the wedge states. Strategic autonomy refers to 
any state’s ability to choose policy options based on prior consideration of national 
interest and distributive gains. The proposed model situates wedge states in a possible 
position of utility maximization based on the competitive rivalry between the two 
powers. Theoretically, wedge states are able to “solve” the small state problematic and 
create the necessary space for autonomic strategic policy choices, precisely due to their 
strategic position between competing rival powers in a forgiving and favorable 
international system of states and institutions.
A couple o f caveats are in order. First, when we think of the wedge state as a 
small state, we do so in a relative sense compared to the rival powers between which it is 
wedged. Simply, in absolute geographical or other material sense the wedge state may 
not look “small,” but in relation to either rival powers, it is definitely smaller and weaker. 
For example, Mongolia is not small geographically, but in relation to Russia and China, it 
can be seen as a small wedge state. Second, it is possible that there are more than two 
rival powers acting upon the wedge state at any given time. Historically, Poland or 
Belgium might be seen as wedge states between three or more superior powers. However, 
for the sake of the theoretical simplification, this research focuses on wedge states 
between two rival powers. The insights gleaned from such a heuristic model might be of 
some application to cases of more than two competing powers but extrapolating such 
implications is beyond the scope of the present research.
This model of a wedge state differs significantly from the extant theoretical view 
of a typical small state. As discussed in the literature review, extant theories, especially in 
the structural perspective, view small states through the lens of: “balancing, 
bandwagoning or buffering,” in each of which the small state’s relationship with a greater 
power is based strictly from the perspective o f the great power’s utility derived from 
using the small state. However, when there are multiple great powers in a mutually 
competitive mode, the small states might also accrue utility despite their gap in material 
power. If there were no great power competition, then there would be no existence of
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wedge states, because there would be no space available for possibly taking advantage of 
the great power rivalry. Extant perspectives on small states highlight the vulnerabilities 
and external factors that circumscribe the range of action options available for small 
states. In contrast, the notion of wedge states views them as theoretically capable of 
independent action.
Theoretical Variables
In this model, the unit of analysis is a wedge state situated between two rival 
powers, and the subject of inquiry is the patterns of interaction among the three. 
Therefore, the study variable is the strategic autonomy of the wedge state in its 
interaction with the rival powers in various cases of tripartite interests. The study variable 
could vary between high and low levels of strategic autonomy acquired by the wedge 
state in a given case or in a certain period. In order to study “strategic autonomy,” this 
abstract notion is operationalized into material and political gains or losses that the wedge 
state might enjoy or suffer in due course of bargaining or negotiation in matters of mutual 
concern from either of the rival powers.
Although the concept of strategic autonomy is used here to largely correspond 
with national strategic policies adopted by a state, the concept of material gains is, of 
course, not a unified conception of national interests. We could disaggregate material 
gains of a small state to investigate if various sectors of the society or different 
stakeholders are impacted differentially by wedging strategies. In other words, there may 
be winners and losers from what politicians and policymakers might consider “strategic 
autonomy,” thus, problematizing the dependent variable (DV). However, since this study 
is concerned with interstate interaction between a wedge states and its rival powers, we 
will refer to material gains as a aggregated average of positive outcomes from wedging 
interactions. In various cases that are studied, multiple sectoral interests are analyzed 
organically whenever they arise.
Therefore, in this research I represent strategic autonomy of wedge states by the 
as the wedge state’s “gains from interaction” or simply “gains.” Gains might be positive 
or negative (loss) corresponding to the high or low levels, respectively, of the strategic
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autonomy acquired by the wedge state in a given negotiation, under given conditions and 
in given circumstances. For example, interstate agreements in trade and foreign direct 
investment policies result in distributive economic gains, whereas cooperative 
agreements in environmental regulation might result in short term economic loss with 
unequal burden to be shared.
The literature on small states as covered in the previous chapter informs the 
generation and selection of the proposed independent variables (IVs). We begin by 
enumerating a number of factors that have been proposed in the bodies of literature to 
explain the level of gains accrued from interaction by small states with greater powers; 
then a couple of variables are chosen for this purposes of this study. The four theoretical 
perspectives discussed in the previous chapter propose the following major explanatory 
IVs to explain the level of gains and structural autonomy for small states.
The emerging system o f  states and norms perspective argues that the smaller 
members of the state system emerged and have managed to survive due to the evolution 
of a conducive state system itself as well as the expanding norms of sovereignty across 
the globe. The primary IVs identified in this perspective are: type of state system and 
extent of sovereignty norms prevalent in a certain system. The structural IR perspective 
focuses on the inherent distribution of power among the units of an anarchic state system 
as well as the institutions that have emerged to overcome the hurdle o f anarchy to forge 
cooperation and coordination in the context of globalization, and generates the following 
IVs: distribution of power, level of institutionalization and level of interdependence. The 
societal actors perspective emphasizes the important roles played by the internal factors 
including the response-making processes and actors o f the small states themselves in 
explaining the variation in behavioral outcomes so that the major IVs to explain the small 
state outcomes are: type of the domestic political system, level o f political stability, and 
the role of non-state actors. Finally, the economics and developmental studies perspective 
highlights the economic difficulty inherent with small market size and limited economic 
capabilities, generating these two IVs: level of trade dependence and level of economic 
development.
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From the extant perspectives on small states then, we have derived the following 
ten independent variables (IVs) each of which might explain the variation in the 
dependent variable (DV), the gains from interaction: type of state system; extent of 
sovereignty norms; distribution of power; level of institutionalization; level of 
interdependence; type of the domestic political system; level of political stability; role of 
non-state actors; level of trade dependence; level of economic development. From this 
potential pool of ten identified theoretical IVs, now we select three to generate test 
hypotheses for this research project.
Test Hypotheses
One limitation o f the present research project is related to Lijphart’s famous 
pronouncement on the limitations of case study and comparative method, namely that of 
“many variables, small number of cases.”1 For theory testing, Lijphart offers the now 
familiar recommendations of either increasing the number of cases or reducing the 
number of variables into a few “key” variables by combining two or more related 
variables. Using Lijphart’s criteria, from the above listed ten theoretical IVs based on 
extant literature, I select two for hypothesis generation. The criterion for selection is the 
choice of the case-study research method and the process of combining related variables.
The empirical question centers on the proposed notion of a single wedge state and 
its two neighboring rival major powers over a short period of time allows the study to 
control for larger structural IVs, namely type of the state system and extent of 
sovereignty norms, so those are not considered for study. Similarly, the distribution of 
relative power among the three states in the triad remains constant, in that the two rival 
powers remain more powerful that the small wedge state, so that variable isn’t chosen. 
Another two IVs—level of political stability and level of economic development—seem 
equally and independently interesting, yet the short-period single-unit case study may not 
capture the possible variation on these long-term trends, and are thus not considered.
1 Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," The American 
Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (1971): 685.
2 Ibid., 690.
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From the theoretical orientation of societal actor perspective, the type of domestic 
system of governance, whether it is a democratic system or an authoritarian system— 
“type of the domestic political system”—is definitely observable and it is noticeable 
when it changes. So, this IV forms our first test hypotheses.
Hypothesis HI: When considering wedge states, a democratic political system in the 
wedge state produces higher gains in its interaction with the rival powers.
As evidenced in the literature reviewed, the societal actors perspective is not clear 
about the directionality of this IV, whether a democratic system or an authoritarian 
system produces higher material gains for the wedge state. However, this study is 
agnostic about the directionality of causality in this relationship. Analyzing the effect of 
the type of political system may show higher gains for either authoritarian or democratic 
system, which would add to our inventory of our theoretical tests. As the subsequent 
discussion of case selection shows, this hypothesis takes into account the political change 
in1990, when Nepal went from a autocratic monarchical system to a democratic 
constitutional monarchy, which is to note that this IV, type of political system in the 
wedge state, varies in the unit of analysis.
Two other IVs—level of systemic institutionalization and level of 
interdependence—may be combined because both are related to impacts of political and 
economic globalization, to generate the second test IV— level of systemic globalization— 
and the operational hypothesis thereof. This combination may also capture the effect of 
another IV, the role of transnational non-state actors operating in the period of 
globalization.
Hypothesis H2: When considering wedge states, their strategic autonomy vis-a-vis rival 
powers is higher i f  there is higher level o f  general political and economic 
interdependence in the state system.
Finally, from the economic and developmental perspective the IV, level of trade 
dependence, captures a more of a dynamic of interaction of trade between the wedge state 
and the rival powers. Thus, we choose this IV to generate the third test hypothesis for this 
study:
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Hypothesis H3: When considering wedge states, the higher its level o f  trade dependence 
on either o f  the rival powers, the lower its gains from tripartite interaction.
It is necessary here to highlight the fact that both H2 and H3 are, at least partly, 
concerned with issues of economic interrelationship between states. However, each of 
them is profoundly different in the factors that it is trying to measure. The IV “level 
systemic globalization” relates to global economic and political interdependence in the 
system, and its effect on all the states involved, the wedge as well as the rival powers. But 
the third IV, “level of trade dependence” is strictly looking at the measure of the wedge 
state’s specific trade relations with either of the rival powers. So these two IVs and the 
resulting hypotheses are used to capture independent factors at different levels, systemic 
against bilateral, that might explain the outcome on the level o f material gains, which is 
theDV.
Now that we have three IVs under consideration and the corresponding test 
hypotheses, I now present the design of the research project that would allow us to test 
the most empirically salient implications of these hypotheses.
RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY
The ideal research design to investigate the behavioral outcomes for my 
theoretical notion of wedge states would be to test the hypotheses and implications on the 
empirical cases of the universe of all wedge states. That approach is not feasible here, not 
just for the usual caveats of finite time and resources, but also because the research 
problem is related to the issue of preliminary theory building on a proposed notion of 
wedge states, this project is indeed nearer to an initial plausibility probe of a nascent 
theory building rather than an exercise in testing a mature theory.
In recent decades, the disciplines of political science, international relations and 
comparative politics have been mired in methodological debates about qualitative against 
quantitative approaches to research. The leading lights of the field have concluded that, 
“the differences between the quantitative and qualitative traditions are only stylistic and
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are methodologically and substantively unimportant.”3 The important task is actually to 
define succinctly a research question and design the empirical research to answer that 
question. When the primary research goal is theory building, as it is in this research 
project, the usability of a single case study is indispensable. By holding many structural 
variables constant and by probing the plausibility of the notion of wedge states, this 
analysis of the single unit o f study contributes to our understanding of larger population 
of similar units. This approach is especially useful in generating new hypotheses based on 
novel theoretical claims, which can subsequently be tested and built upon. By employing 
the discussed research design to answer my research question, this project aims to 
contribute such new insights to the discipline.
To that end, this research design employs the approach of a qualitative analysis 
over time of three cases within a single triadic unit. One of the pioneers of comparative 
social science research, Arend Lijphart, suggests that there are essentially four scientific 
methods of empirical evidence testing: experimental, statistical, case-study and 
comparative. He viewed the case study method as a complement to the comparative 
method, arguing that inter alia, a single case study over time approach could be 
hypothesis generating, theory confirming or theory infirming.4 The choice of a single unit 
of analysis to probe the theory of wedge state behavioral outcomes is based on such 
theory building and testing aspirations.
Stephen Van Evera highlights five main purposes of case studies: “testing 
theories, creating theories, identifying antecedent conditions, testing the importance of 
these antecedent conditions, and explaining cases of intrinsic importance.”5 One of the 
ways to test theories with single-unit cases is by “process tracing” in which we observe 
within units rather than across them. David Collier defines process tracing as “the 
systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of the
3 Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry : Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 4.
4 Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," 682-92.
5 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods fo r  Students o f  Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), 55.
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research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator.”6 The evidence presented 
in this research, in the form of a detailed qualitative study tracing the historical and 
temporal processes of a wedge state interacting with two rival greater powers across three 
cases, provides an inductive method of theory building and testing as well as explaining 
necessary preconditions.
While the traditional connotation of a case study is a research design that 
“investigates a single phenomenon, instance or example” of the research topic, more 
recently John Gerring has argued for a more systematic understanding of the case study 
approach, which he defines as, “an intensive study of a single unit for the purposes of 
understanding a larger class of (similar) units.”7 Gerring’s main innovation is to situate 
the qualitative case-study approach within the framework of an increasingly quantitative 
research paradigm in social sciences, especially political science. Thus, his definition 
allows for case studies to be designed as rigorously as necessary for meeting the essential 
feature of empirical research, in which “covariation is demonstrated by a single unit,” 
from a possible population of similar units. Gerring’s observation guides my selection of 
a single unit o f research. The investigation of a prototypical wedge state would constitute 
a unit studied from the population o f such units. As such my research design constitutes, 
analyzing in detail the processes, preferences and outcomes of negotiations between a 
theorized wedge state with its two rival great power neighbors. The goal of social 
scientific research is drawing inference, which can be either descriptive or causal in 
nature. Case studies are better suited to draw descriptive inferences and “enjoy a natural
o
advantage in research of an explanatory nature.”
I maintain a temporal boundary, the over time feature, of the case analysis by 
analyzing a period marked by changing conditions and variables. To further add to the 
explanatory power o f the research design, I delve into the unit of analysis of a single 
wedge state and examine three crucial cases of interaction, each of which highlight a
6 David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," PS: Political Science & Politics 44, 
no. 04 (2011): 823.
7 John Gerring, "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?," American Political 
Science Review 98, no. 02 (2004): 342.
8 Ibid., 349.
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particular perspective in the tripartite relationship. This within-unit analysis of three 
separate cases of interaction also allows for controlling some variables in specific areas, 
and provides the opportunity for within-unit comparison of evidence that might explain 
the variation over time of the dependent variable.9
EMPIRICAL CASES & EVIDENCE
To explore the empirical manifestation of wedge states and their wedging 
strategies, and to analyze the theoretical implications of different factors determining 
wedge state behavioral outcomes, this study will present the evidence from one 
prototypical wedge state. The cases are derived from Nepal’s relations with two rival 
powers India and China in the modem period since 1947, with the study period focused 
primarily between 1980 and 2010. This historical tripartite relationship provides a natural 
unit of study over time of a wedge state that has formal, longstanding and friendly 
relations with both its rival neighbors. These three states are also a good unit to study 
because myriad issues of local, regional as well as global significance bind them. The 
examination of a sample of cases from the pool of crucial issues provides variation in 
their relationship to explore the nature and characteristics o f the Nepal’s wedge position 
and the possibility of using wedging strategies vis-a-vis India and China. This unit is an 
instance of a small wedge state, which might not fit the typical behavioral patterns of 
typical small states, but may be seen as a distinct subclass of small states. Thus, the case 
also provides the necessary material for inductive theory building on wedge states.
Furthermore, by looking at one example of a small state that is wedged between 
two historical and current powers, the research design controls for rival variables, 
primarily structural variables, especially power distribution, as well as societal factors, 
when examined in the same time period. Since their existence as modem nation-states, 
the distribution of material power between these three countries has remained the same: 
Nepal has been and is clearly a small, weak state in contrast to both India and China. 
There is no question that both India and China view each other as great powers whereas 
Nepal is a small state in their periphery.
9 James Mahoney, "Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics," Comparative 
Political Studies 40, no. 2 (2007): 131-33.
57
However, we can observe variation in the strategic choice autonomy and 
independence afforded to Nepal by the rival powers in the various issues in which they 
are entangled. Historically, security relations between China and India have been 
problematic and Nepal has served as a buffer state and geographic demarcation between 
the two powers. Both India and China have vigorously labored to enhance their influence 
within Nepal at different times. But the realms of non-security issues are equally 
compelling and offer prime evidentiary scope for research into Nepal’s successes in using 
a wedging strategy or lack thereof.
The intensity of interests shown by India and China on the three cases described 
below are strong enough historically or now to justify the selection of this unit of study. 
While each of the rival powers may have gone through a variation in the strength of their 
preferences over time, we can expect to see the impact on the material gains on the 
wedge state because of the changing preferences as well. Also, it is to be expected that 
sub-national interests in China or India might have strong economic or financial interests 
in cases where the central state may not exhibit strong enough preference. Ultimately, the 
study hopes to ascertain the strength of the preferences shown by the rival powers in the 
selected cases by conducting the analysis of their policies and actions, which will become 
visible in the course of the analysis itself.
As shall be emphasized in the following description of the three cases to be 
studied, this research relies in qualitative case-study evidence. The comparison of the 
cases introduces variation in the dependent variable, which is the strategic autonomy of 
small states. Analyzing the processes and political developments in the period from 1980 
to 1990 and from 1990 to 2000 also allows for the domestic institutional change that 
occurred in Nepal in 1990, when it went from an autocratic monarchical system to a 
constitutional monarchy with a democratic parliamentary system. Thus, analyzing the 
same core of three states controls for the structural power distribution factor which did 
not vary, as well as the internal political structure, which remained uniform in a single 
period.
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Three Cases o f  Tripartite Relationship
Within the single unit of Nepal’s wedge relations with India and China, I analyze 
evidence from three distinct cases of their interaction from the period 1980 to 2000. The 
selection of the three cases introduces variation. If the nature o f the international system 
doe not change and with that the power distribution remains uniform, the wedge state 
might be able to negotiate differently depending on different cases. Here the notion of the 
“spatio-temporal context” of a small state’s various interaction with larger powers, as 
used by Thorhallson and Wievel and discussed in the previous chapter, proves a useful 
guide to specify how small states can influence outcomes against more powerful actors 
depending certain temporal conditions and under certain circumstances.10
Each case features a particular social, economic, and environmental arena of 
interstate interaction. In each case, I shall analyze the possible existence of the wedging 
strategy that the wedge state tried to adopt and the result of such efforts in enhancing or 
reducing its strategic choice space. The presumed interests of the wedge state, the 
expected outcomes of the interaction in the particular case, and the process of outcome 
formation will generate crucial evidence to test our selected test hypotheses.
The three cases chosen for analysis are: the issue of the migration of Tibetan 
refugees into Nepal and India; Nepal’s economic policies regarding foreign direct 
investments from India and China in its hydropower projects; and prospective 
cooperation on environmental issues related to global climate change pertaining the high 
Himalayas region, which forms the boundary between the three states. Each case will 
show a differing intensity of interests of the three actors and highlight the possibility of 
the wedge state finding space for strategic choice or the powerful rivals attempting to 
curtail the wedge state’s preferred choice.
Most interestingly, these three cases represent three different kinds o f cooperation 
problems for the wedge state and rival powers, with distinct distributive consequences, 
which allows us to test and differentiate between levels of normative or material gains
10 Thorhallsson and Wivel, "Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and 
What Would We Like to Know?."
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from the interaction. The first case of Tibetan refugees is a classic zero-sum game where 
relative power should dominate. The second and third cases of hydropower investment 
and environmental cooperation are types of coordination problems with material 
distributive consequences for the three players.
Tibetan Refugees and Exiles
The historical interrelationships in South Asia have been shaped by the 
experience of Tibet and the continuing policy reactions on this sensitive issue by the two 
major stakeholders, namely the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India. In 
such a delicate balance, Nepal’s geographic, historic and cultural ties with both Tibet and 
India generate ample chance for interactions and reaction to the needs and demands of the 
rival superpowers. Although the issue of Tibetan sovereignty has been resolved de jure , 
in practice there are considerable problems outstanding. The prime concern is that since 
India offers the sanctuary to the spiritual leader Dalai Lama and a large population of 
Tibetan refugees in Dharamsala, new Tibetan refugees have to traverse Nepali territory in 
most cases to migrate to India. Also, large populations o f Tibetans make their home in 
Nepal itself and are engaged in activities of Tibetan politics, which produces demands 
from China and India upon Nepal. Such a political, social and security issue of concern 
requires Nepal to continually leverage a high degree of cooperation and interaction in 
response to conflicting demands and requirements from both China and India.
Referring to the theoretical hypotheses, this case of the status, treatment and safe 
travels for refugees is not just a national or regional concern but also one that relates to 
international regimes and institutions of human rights. Other explanatory factors of 
impact are Nepal’s changing domestic societal actors and institutions, which have 
handled the conflicting demands differently. As we shall see Nepal’s gains from this 
interaction are not strictly material but political, social and ideational, although there have 
been instances of quid pro quo relating to certain treatment of exiles living in Nepal and 
refugees passing through it. Thus, the analysis of this case teases apart how the wedge 
state operates under the demands of its rival great power neighbors as well as the appeals 
of global norms in a globalized setting.
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Competitive Hydropower Investment
At the beginning of the millennium, both the Chinese and Indian economies are 
roaring so much so that they are challenging the major Western economies. While 
numerous domestic economic problems persist in both countries, the overall economic 
health is trending up. However, their common neighbor Nepal remains mired in poverty 
and a dearth o f capital for any real investments and productivity gains. Nepal’s historical 
economic role was that of a trading post between Tibet and India. In the modem era, that 
benefit has eroded but still Nepal relies on its trade relationship with its two neighbors 
and sees them as major sources of intergovernmental aid and investments. As a 
landlocked, least developed country, Nepal is quite dependent on trade with its neighbors, 
especially India. As such, trade interactions have produced wedging situations so that 
trade negotiations with favorable terms with one neighbor have followed similar 
agreements with the other.
In terms of capital-intensive infrastructure investment, Nepal’s interest is in 
developing its large natural bounty of hydropower resources. To make that dream a 
reality, Nepal has sought the investment from both China and India. For the concern of 
this study, the pertinent question is if Nepal’s wedge position has allowed it to accrue 
economic benefits from the rival economics powers on the question of capital investment 
in hydropower sector. Do either India or China take into account Nepal’s wedge position 
in considering foreign direct investments into Nepal? Has Nepal been able to maximize 
its gains in attracting capital-intensive investments, especially in its abundant hydropower 
resources sector? Such evidence would point towards the heightened ability by Nepal to 
leverage its wedge strategy to enlarge its strategic benefit. Do Nepalese policymakers 
consciously use strategic competition between India and China to accrue economic 
benefits in the form of higher foreign direct investments in sensitive assets? Analysis of 
this case will provide insights into the factors such as Nepal’s level of trade dependence, 
which would impact its ability to negotiate with autonomy and gain from the interaction.
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Environmental Cooperation
All three countries share the geography of the Himalayan range and the 
concomitant environment challenges, especially the need to mitigate and adapt to the 
consequences of the global climate change. In the context of the growing crisis of global 
climate change, the vulnerable environments and ecosystems of the high Himalayas have 
the possibility of profound impacts on Nepal, India and China. Environmental 
degradation resulting in melting glaciers, management of water resources for 
consumption and related trans-boundary issues would be expected to force all three 
stakeholders to collaborate to stanch the damage and minimize the climatic effects.
In addition to the regional environmental concerns, all three states operate under 
various international and global agreements and regimes regarding global climate change. 
As emerging economic powers, China and India have global and regional interests that 
may not be shared by Nepal. Additionally, various non-state actors, NGOs and INGOs, 
are involved in activities related to the environmental conservation in the high 
Himalayas, which try to generate state-based policy coordination and cooperation by the 
involved states. If there is one area in which common interests of all three states align, it 
might be that of environmental preservation under the specter of global climate change. 
Although due to the recent provenance of the phenomenon of climate change policy 
debate in the region, compared to the other two cases, it is an open question whether or 
not there is enough evidence to be found in this case. Simply, the tripartite interaction in 
this case may not be mature enough to assess the existence of wedging or of beneficial 
gains. It means that this may be a tough case for this study, so that if there is evidence of 
wedging by Nepal in this case the argument in favor the theory of wedge states is so 
much stronger. Analysis of the existence or lack thereof of cooperation and coordination 
among the three states and the possible determination of the distribution of gains or costs 
from cooperation would shed light on the question of the wedge states’ strategic 
autonomy. However, it is equally possible that differing economic and social priorities 
will limit the wedge state’s space for generating cooperation and coordination between 
the two rival major powers.
62
CONCLUSION
This chapter developed three test hypotheses to test the identified independent 
variables that might explain the presence and variation of the dependent variable, which 
is the material gains accrued by the wedge state in its interaction with two rival powers. 
The dependent variable is a proxy for the ultimate question directing this study of 
whether small wedge states possess strategic autonomy in dealing with rival major 
powers.
To analyze the research question and test the hypotheses, this chapter also 
presented a research of a typical wedge state Nepal in its tripartite interaction with India 
and China. The next three chapters form the evidence base of this study, where the 
tripartite interactions between those three states are analyzed in three cases: the case of 
Tibetan refugees in Nepal, the case of competitive hydropower development in Nepal, 
and the possibility of environmental cooperation in the high Himalayas. We begin by 
analyzing the first case of Tibetans in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CASE OF TIBETAN EXILES IN NEPAL
THE OLYMPIC DIVERSION
In the six months leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the world witnessed 
unprecedented levels of anti-China protests around the globe. As the Olympic torch 
travelled the continents, in major cities from San Francisco, to London, Paris, Hong Kong 
and New Delhi, Tibetan exiles and free-Tibet demonstrators used the global media 
spotlight of the Olympics to orchestrate particularly symbolic and visible protests against 
the Chinese rule in Tibet." While the activists asserted a litany of historical and recent 
Tibetan grievances, their urgent rallying cry was centered on the recent heavy-handed 
repression of the restive population in Lhasa and other towns of Tibet by the Chinese 
security forces. In mid-March of that year Tibet had erupted in violent riots, where it was 
alleged that anti-Chinese Tibetan locals had attacked Han Chinese settlers and burned 
their businesses leading to a security backlash of total lockdown and police action amid 
conflicting reports of deaths numbering from dozens to more than a hundred.12 World 
leaders and global media reacted with predictable concern entreating restraint on both 
sides, and some even called for a boycott of the Olympics in solidarity.13 Predictably, the 
Chinese authorities lay the blame for the unrest in Tibet squarely on the “Dalai Lama 
clique” and the “secessionists” and “separatists” followers who sought to undermine the 
Olympics, and they brushed aside international media reports of repression as attempts to 
politicize a sporting event and an example of external interference in China’s internal
11 Jenny Percival and Elizabeth Stewart, "Olympic Protests Held around the World," The 
Guardian(August 8, 2008), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/08/china.tibet.
12 CBS News, "Dozens Reported Killed in Tibetan Protests," CBS /Vew^March 15,
2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/dozens-reported-killed-in-tibetan-protests/; 
Jonathan Watts, "Beijing Locks Down Lhasa as Crisis Grows," The Observer (The 
Guardian)(March 15, 2008),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/16/tibet. china#.
13 The Economist, "Tibet and the Beijing Olympics: A Sporting Chance," The 
Economist(March 27, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/10924179.
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matters.14 Amid the global showdown, the situation was especially sensitive in Nepal and 
India, where large numbers of Tibetan exiles and refugees live.
This chapter analyzes Nepal’s opportunities and successes in using wedging 
strategies in its interaction with the two major powers in the context of its evolving 
policies and treatment of Tibetan exiles and refugees. The evidentiary pattern of Nepal’s 
evolving policies on Tibetans, those that have settled in Nepal for more than five decades 
as well as the regular trickle o f new arrivals, can be tested against the hypothesized 
relationship between salient internal and external independent variables and accrual of 
material gains by wedge states in their interaction with greater rival powers, as described 
previously in the research design chapter. As the host nation of a sizeable contingent of 
Tibetan exiles, Nepal faces many competing demands and pressures regarding its policies 
on Tibetans. In the recent decades, China has strongly and consistently demanded that 
Nepal honor its commitment to one-China policy and stop any and all anti-China 
activities that may occur within Nepal’s soil, even demanding that escaped Tibetans be 
repatriated. In reaction, global leaders and media have faulted Nepalese policy and 
practice regarding the rights of Tibetan exiles by underscoring Nepal’s commitment to 
human rights and rights of refugees under international law.15 Various Western donor 
states, multilateral organizations and NGOs have been sympathetic to the cause of the 
Tibetan diaspora and consistently raise the issue of their rights to political activism and 
expression. As usual, India views any change in Nepalese internal or external policy with 
keen interest. Despite these net of constraints and pressures, the puzzling situation is that 
Nepal has achieved greater autonomy in its policy choice and opportunity for material
14 Xinhua, "Premier: Ample Facts Prove Dalai's Role in Lhasa Riot, Door of Dialogue 
Still Open," Xinhua(March 18,2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008- 
03/18/content_7813012.htm; "Lhasa Riot Aimed to Undermine Beijing Olympics: 
Veteran Tibetan Official," Xinhua(March 19,2008), 
http://news.xinhuanet.eom/english/2008-03/l 9/content_7819061 .htm.
15 Gopal Sharma, "Ex-President Carter Says China Pressuring Nepal on Tibetans," 
Reuters(April 1, 2013), http://www.reuters.eom/article/2013/04/01/us-nepal-tibet-carter- 
idUSBRE9300BJ20130401; Jon Krakauer, "Why Is Nepal Cracking Down on Tibetan 




gains in the last couple o f decades despite the pressure by and preferences of its Western 
aid donors.
The genesis, history and the current manifestation of the issue of Tibetan exiles in 
Nepal neither tie neatly to concerns o f adherence to international human rights norms nor 
to capitulation in the face of direct pressures from diplomatic channels. The study below 
interrogates the historical context of Nepal’s foreign policy with Tibet, China and India, 
and analyzes the effect that the current regional geostrategic context has on Nepal’s 
recent policies towards Tibetans within its borders. It traces the many critical junctures of 
Nepal’s internal political transformation in addition to the changing dynamics o f regional 
diplomatic and economic pressures over the past half century. The analysis highlights the 
changing dynamics of Nepal’s interaction with China and India, including the reasons 
behind the crucial fulcrum of a shift in policy in 1989 when Nepal stopped granting 
permanent settlement to newly arriving Tibetans. The evidentiary pattern that emerges, at 
least in this critical and sensitive political issue, demonstrates the limited extent of 
independence or autonomy that Nepal’s wedging opportunities accrue in its network of 
interactions with China and India plus Western governments, multilateral organizations 
and Tibetan exile community.
The evidence as presented below helps answer the two major questions raised in 
the literature review and the design of this research in the previous chapters, namely:
First, did Nepal’s internal change in its political system from autocracy to constitutional 
monarchical democracy in 1990 have any affect on Nepal’s policies regarding the 
Tibetan exiles issue? Second, does Nepal’s increasing trade dependence with China and 
India play a decisive role in the direction of its policy evolution regarding Tibetan 
refugees? The analysis produces mixed results, so a quick caveat might be offered now. 
Unlike many other tripartite issues o f economic, environmental and strategic interaction, 
India’s progressively muted interest on Tibetan cause compared with many Western 
governments’ normative and passionate support on behalf of the Tibetan cause muddles 
independent effects of the interaction between the two rival powers on Nepal’s wedging 
opportunities. Yet, the analysis leads to the conclusion that Nepal is able to reap
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maximum material, if not political, gains by the resolute application of its recent policy 
direction.
The ultimate cause of the current state o f Tibetan situation—be it in Nepal, India 
or in Tibet itself—is the presently intractable nature of the larger Tibetan questions, 
including the ultimate status o f Dalai Lama, his followers and their govemment-in-exile 
based in Dharamsala, India. China has been increasingly assertive in putting enormous 
pressure on Nepal to stem any Tibetan political activities within its borders. Suffering 
chronic instability and transition, Nepal, for its part, has been only too willing to abide 
the wishes of its major trading partner and economic patron. On the other hand, being the 
providers of sizeable foreign aid to the impoverished nation, the Western democracies 
and NGOs feel obliged to put moral, economic and political pressure to moderate Nepal’s 
policies toward the Tibetan exiles. Finally, due to their long-term settlement in the Nepali 
society as well as their historical, cultural and religious similarity to a portion of native 
population, the Tibetan community itself exerts significant empathy in the Nepalese 
society and polity. The efforts of the exile government run from India to inform, educate 
and mobilize certainly influences many activists from around the world, compels 
worldwide journalists to highlight Nepal’s behavior on the issue, and informs common 
folks to take interest and build pressure.
Such interactive dynamics animates the puzzle of Nepal’s evolving historical 
policies regarding the status and treatment of Tibetan exiles. It highlights one important 
example of Nepal’s inescapable position as a small, weak state between two burgeoning 
great powers in a globalized epoch. The tripartite interaction between Nepal, India and 
China in myriad issues in the political, social, economic and environmental dimensions 
can be understood not just by the internal processes inherent in those issues but also by 
the Nepalese strategy of trying to maintain its independence while maximizing the 
material and political gains from the competition and cross-cutting demands from its 
more powerful partners, India and China. Actually, as a sensitive geopolitical and 
strategic issue of utmost concern to China, and also part of one of the unresolved knots in 
the burgeoning China-India rivalry, the question of Tibet and the fate of Tibetan exiles
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warrant ample analytical results to understand the tripartite dynamic in its crucial 
elements. These dynamics have roots deep in history.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows order: the first section gives a brief 
overview of the historical events leading up to the origin of the Tibetan refugee issue; the 
second section identifies the interests of the actors involved, including the three states as 
well as the Tibetan diaspora community and the Western states and the multilateral 
institutions; the evolution of Nepal’s policies and practices regarding its Tibetan exile 
population is charted in the third section; based on that evidence, the fourth section 
analyzes Nepal’s wedge prospects in the regional interaction and evaluates the factors 
that determine the shift of its preferences; the final section concludes the discussion.
CONTEXT: HISTORY AND TRANSFORMATION UNTIL 1959
To understand the tripartite relationship between China, India and Nepal and their 
current impact on the Tibetan exiles, one has to first understand the historical roots that 
have intertwined these states and peoples. Modem history of the region shows that 
China’s capture of Tibet secured its strategic security interests in the vast Southern and 
Western frontier. Stunned and alarmed, India’s strategic response was to establish its 
South Asian security perimeter extending in the north all the way to the Himalayan 
boundary abutting Chinese controlled Tibet. In order to maintain that security perimeter, 
India necessarily had to interfere into the affairs o f Nepal and other mountain states. The 
ever-changing leadership in Nepal eventually reacted against the pressing Indian 
dominance by trying to play the China card as counterweight. Nevertheless, Indian 
primacy in the region has been such that Nepal has only been able to counterbalance 
using China on limited issue areas, specifically those issues, such as the policy on Tibetan 
exiles, on which Indian interests have long been waning.
Historical Pathways
The common expression of Nepal’s geo-strategic location is that of a ‘yam 
between two boulders.’ The metaphor is ascribed to King Prithivi Narayan Shah, who in 
1769 AD united the various minor kingdoms of the time to found the modem nation of 
Nepal. Indeed, with the Tibetan plateau of China looming from the North beyond the
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Himalayan range, and the landmass of India surrounding the small nation from the East, 
West and South, King Prithivi’s image of Nepal remains apt. In these early years of the 
21s* century, the sleeping giants surrounding Nepal have almost suddenly transformed. 
China, the fire-breathing dragon, is on a dizzying flight to reach the economic and 
military mountaintop of the world, apparently razing to ground the remnants of the old 
world order. And like a tiger awakened from a long slumber, India has quickly 
discovered its footing for a fast chase. On their quests to become major powers, fiercely 
competitive though not currently openly adversarial, both countries seem intent to secure 
their influence, especially in their immediate neighborhood.
The cultural, economic and military-political interaction between Nepal and Tibet 
goes back more than a thousand years. Although separated by the natural boundary of the 
Himalayas, the peoples in the immediate vicinity on both sides have always shared many 
familial, cultural and linguistic commonalities and enjoyed everyday travel, movement 
and exchanges. Buddhism, which itself had spread from the Indian Gangetic plains via 
Nepal north to Tibet, formed the basis of the religious order that ruled Tibet from 
Lhasa.16 Trade and commerce between Tibet and India flowed through Nepal via the 
ancient city centered in Kathmandu valley. Not long after its formation as the Kingdom 
of Nepal by King Prithivi Narayan Shah in 1769, the martial minded Gorkhali army set 
their sights to the north on Tibet to gain the upper hand in the lucrative trans-Himalayan 
trade relations and to acquire preferred treatment for Nepali traders. Nepal fought three 
major wars with Tibet, the first one in 1786, when the Nepalese forces were able to 
dictate the terms of Tibet’s surrender in terms of favorable trade conditions and yearly 
payments. The second Nepalese war on Tibet in 1791 produced decidedly worse outcome 
because Nepal’s attack brought China to the aid of Tibet’s defense, when Nepal for the 
first time came face to face with the major but distant power o f China. The final war 
between Nepal and Tibet in 1854 ended with the Nepal-Tibet Treaty of 1856, which 
established a century long position of privilege for Nepalese traders in Lhasa and practice 
of yearly monetary tribute. Regular trade and exchanges conducted along ancient
16 John Whelpton, A History o f Nepal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
29.
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pathways settled into a pattern of long and amicable relations with Tibet, which 
continued until the mid-twentieth century.17 And in the past five decades the same 
traditional pathways have been used by the fleeing Tibetans to cross the Himalayas into 
Nepal and beyond, in the process, entangling the modem Nepalese state in sensitive 
interaction of strategic, political and economic salience with China, India and the West.
On the Southern front, from the perspective of the British in India, Tibet formed a 
natural security buffer in addition to Nepal against China. The insight that the Himalayas 
along with the Tibetan plateau served two useful purposes, firstly, by preventing the 
encounter between two great civilizations and empires, and secondly, by allowing them 
discrete spheres of influence within their respective regions, was older than the arrival of 
the East India Company in the sub-continent and it survived their departure.18 In Tibet, 
the Lamas maintained stability and control based on their own historical ruling practices; 
whereas in Nepal, by mid-nineteenth century, the state had officially fallen prey to the 
autocratic and hereditary Rana prime ministers, who received support and protection 
from the British. The arrangement was long able to maintain the security buffer, avoid 
instability, all the while conserving traditional pattern of trade and exchange relations 
between the Tibetans and Nepalese and beyond to the British and Indians. That historical 
pattern was rapidly and irrevocably broken in the middle twentieth century by the 
independence of India and the Communist control of China.
Mid-Century Transformation
The basic status of Tibet as well as the core pattern of the Nepal’s tripartite 
relationship with India and China was set in motion during the years 1947 to 1959. 
During this juncture the entire region underwent momentous transformations in: the 
shape and size of the new states and the borders between them; the internal political 
structures of those states and the basis of interactions among them; the transformed
17 For detailed review of Nepalese history and early Nepal-Tibet relations, see Leo E 
Rose, Nepal: Strategy fo r Survival (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); S 
D. Muni, Foreign Policy o f  Nepal (Delhi: National Pub. House, 1973); Whelpton, A 
History o f Nepal.
18 J Mohan Malik, "South Asia in China's Foreign Relations," Pacifica Review: Peace, 
Security & Global Change 13, no. 1 (2001): 76-77.
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conception of their geostrategic interests and the uncertainty of ambitions between the 
newly minted leaders in positions of power in those states. It is safe to say that the 
epochal changes in that period have wrought far-reaching regional, and global, 
implications, which continue to this day. Although a narrow slice of the regional picture 
now, the issue of Tibetans in South Asia owes its endurance to that period of turmoil.
When India became independent of the British Raj in 1947, it was simultaneously 
partitioned giving birth to Pakistan and ushering into being a still-present dynamic of 
conflict, one that Beijing has found so fruitful to exploit. Leading independent India was 
the Indian National Congress (INC) party headed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, 
committed internally to their plan of making democracy work despite the vast diversity of 
India. Externally, the notion of the “magnificent frontier” of the Himalayas, in Nehru’s 
words, persisted from the Indian perspective. In China, it was the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) that came out on top to capture central control in 1949, ending a century of 
instability and decline. Beijing’s power consolidated under the forceful leadership of Mao 
Zedong. The new regimes in India and China were intensely nationalistic, proud of their 
civilization and history, and both were eager to claim their places in regional and global 
affairs.
These transformations in India and China had critical impact on both Tibet and 
Nepal. In Nepal’s case, the autocratically ruling Rana clan, which had maintained 
hereditary control of the isolationist state for more than a hundred years, lost their prime 
protectors after the British left India. Educated Nepalese elites and expatriates, who 
began agitating for political rights and democracy had hoped to find a committed 
democrat in Prime Minister Nehru. But Nehru became wedded to the strategy of a 
“middle way,” by which he hoped to allow needed political reform and some liberty 
while preserving the ancient regime in Nepal, and thus limiting the chances of major 
upheaval in what he had always considered as India’s proper and strategic northern 
frontier.19 Independent India formalized its “special relationship” with Nepal by signing 
two far-reaching treaties of “peace and friendship” and “trade and commerce,” while the
19 Rose, Strategy fo r  Survival, 182.
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Rana government still remained in power on July 31, 1950.20 However, the decisive 
action of asylum to India by the heretofore figurehead King Tribhuvan as well as 
persistent political protest and guerilla action by the out-lawed political parties of Nepal, 
forced Nehru hand. On February 7,1951, the so-called “Delhi compromise” finally 
brought about the ouster of the Ranas from absolute power in Nepal and restored the 
Shah monarchy to the throne along with the promise of political rights and democracy for 
the people.21 In addition to Nepal and India’s historical and cultural linkages, the 
aftermath of the Indian independence and its role in the Nepalese revolution fashioned 
the continued pattern o f Indian involvement in Nepal’s political and strategic 
developments. Nepalese political structure and historical direction was shaped with India 
playing the role of the advisor, mediator, guarantor and the mid-wife.
For Tibet, the transformative juncture of mid-century was all the more definitive. 
In October 1950, the communist military forces began the offensive into Tibetan 
territories, a process ultimately culminated in taking control of Lhasa. Beijing justified its 
actions as “liberation” of Tibet, over which it asserted controversial and disputed 
historical Chinese claims of suzerainty. The established autonomous rulers of Tibet under 
the leadership o f Dalai Lama appealed to India, Nepal and Western powers to protect 
them against Chinese annexation. But Prime Minister Nehru was powerless to confront 
China militarily beyond the Himalayas, and resorted to diplomatic calls for Tibetan 
autonomy, which Beijing swatted as unwarranted “foreign interference” in their internal 
matters.22
The invasion of Tibet at the hands of the Communists was outright alarming for 
India. The long-held Indian belief in the buffer role of Tibet would vanish only to be 
replaced by the military might of the PLA overlooking the South Asian sub-continent 
from the Tibetan piedmont. Having apparently lost the traditional Tibetan buffer, India 
scrambled to limit the damage. Nehru forcefully argued that the Himalayas were India's 
northern frontier and sought to forestall Beijing against further ambitions, warning, “an
20 Ibid., 185-86.
21 Muni, Foreign Policy o f  Nepal, 22-27; Rose, Strategy fo r  Survival, 187-94.
22 Strategy fo r  Survival, 187.
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attack on Nepal would be, in effect, an attack on India.” Nehru elucidated the swiftly 
changing strategic landscape in his 1950 speech to the Indian parliament:
"Our interest in the internal conditions of Nepal becomes still more acute and 
personal because of the developments across our borders, to be frank, especially 
those in China and Tibet.. . .  The Himalayas lie mostly on the northern border of 
Nepal. We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the 
principal barrier to India. Therefore, much as we appreciate the independence of 
Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be 
crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security."23
In addition to its clear strategic goal of making Nepal the new buffer against 
China, India sought to minimize the risk of political instability in Kathmandu, as Nepal’s 
older political structure began to crumble. Thus, the Indian policy of deep strategic and 
political interference into Nepal had the perfect pretext. With Indian guidance, Nepal 
maintained studied silence on the matter of Tibet. The fact of Chinese military footprints 
so close to its borders certainly unnerved the Nepalese, especially because of the 
uncertainty of the extent of Chinese territorial ambitions and potential claims; after all, in 
1939 Mao Dezong had identified Nepal as one of China’s historical “tributary states.”24 
Mired in its political transition Nepal had ample reasons to look towards India for support 
and guidance, leading to long-lasting, intense and intimate Indian involvement in the 
internal and external matters pertaining to Nepal. The short strip o f land between these 
two landmasses had become the battleground between the democratic India intent on 
security and harboring ambitions of sole influence in the sub-continent against the 
surging Communist China that would eventually test the limits of Indian power. In the 
hopes of befriending Beijing and minimizing the chance of military confrontation along 
the long, undefined and contested Sino-Indian border, Nehru recognized Chinese 
sovereignty over Tibet in 1954. Yet, a border war did break out in 1962 tumbling China- 
India relations to historic lows. It took another two decades, with leadership changes on 
both sides, for India and China to finally see eye to eye on the matter o f Tibet, exactly 
along Chinese positions.
23 Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Where India Faces China," Foreign Affairs 37, no. 4 (July 
1959): 617.
24 Muni, Foreign Policy o f Nepal, 70.
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Unable to placate the maximalist control of the new Chinese rulers in Tibet, Dalai 
Lama ultimately escaped to seek refuge in India in 1959 amid the failure of a violent 
Lhasa Uprising against the Chinese rule. This was the genesis of the question of Tibetan 
refugees, as followers and supporters of their spiritual leader similarly chose the option to 
escape into India, Nepal, Bhutan and Burma. More than a hundred and ten thousand 
Tibetans remain in India, a majority in Dharamsala and the rest scattered in a few other 
refugee settlements.25 Tibetans fleeing the border regions crossed over into Nepal and 
settled in makeshift camps in the immediate aftermath of the failed uprising; eventually, 
they were settled in more long-term settlements around the country. Over the decades, 
many more arrived in Nepal, so that by now the estimated number o f Tibetans in Nepal 
has reached more than twenty thousand.26 The population of settled resident Tibetans and 
the continued influx of new exiles seeking safe passage into India has given Nepal a very 
sensitive and crucial challenge to manage the expectation, demands and pressure from 
China, India, the Tibetan leaders and the international community. Successive Nepali 
regimes and governments have found ad hoc and strategic policies and practices to deal 
with the issue of Tibetan exiles.
The mid-century juncture of transformation leading to the period of Tibetan 
turmoil and exile is the genesis of the Tibetan issue. Exiled Tibetans have been a matter 
of concern for Nepal since then and this issue is the core problem of this present study. 
That historical juncture first set in motion their exile into Nepal and India and keeping 
them in a state of prolonged limbo, while the three states ascertained the boundaries of 
their interests and preferences. The reverberations of that critical period remains in the 
present moment of rising China and India when both seem to be united more by their 
economical interdependence and cooperative opportunities than divided on seemingly 
settled historical positions, especially regarding Tibet. The next section evaluates the 
interests and preferences of the two rival powers as well as the wedge state and the
25 United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, "World Refugee Survey 2009 - 
India," (June 17, 2009), http://www.refugees.org/resources/refugee- 
warehousing/archived-world-refugee-surveys/2009-wrs-country-updates/india.html.




international and Tibetan communities on this issue. Specification of the interests, 
preferences permit their evaluation against the evidence of the outcomes presented in the 
later section.
SPECIFICATION: TRIPARTITE INTERESTS AND PREFERENCES
The possible wedging prospects by Nepal in its tripartite relationship with China 
and India can be evaluated by systematically specifying the interests of the three states 
involved—the wedge and the two rival powers—along with that of the Tibetan diaspora 
communities and Western states and multilateral organizations. The evidence of stated 
and observed interests o f the actors will produce the specification o f their preferences, 
which can be ordered on the basis of utility maximization. In other words, we can 
describe and enumerate Nepal’s interests regarding specific policies for the Tibetan 
refugees arriving within its borders, which will inform the specification of Nepal’s 
preferred outcomes of the issue resolution as well. Nepal’s interests and preferences do 
not necessarily or always align with those of China and India regarding the very same 
issue of the policies on the Tibetans. From the interaction, we are able to identify possible 
decision and the final observed outcome gives us a sense of possible gains, if any, for the 
wedge state.
Competing Sino-Indian Interests
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) espouses the clearest and most hardened 
rhetoric of its interests and preferences regarding the issue of Tibet and Tibetan exiles. 
Stated plainly, Beijing’s four top interests and preferences are: the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) is the highest legitimate government of the land; China’s territorial 
integrity, incorporating all of Tibet, is paramount; the Chinese socialist model is the only 
one viable model of social and economic organization within all of China; to achieve its 
desired position of global power, China must prevent the rise of a competing actor in the 
region. The official white paper of Chinese State Council asserts that Tibet is and has 
always been an integral part of China, and what the Communist Party o f China (CPC) 
under Mao’s leadership did in “peacefully liberating” Tibet was fair and far-sighted, not
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only for Chinese security interests, but more so for freeing the native Tibetans from their 
“feudal serfdom” under the autocratic theocracy of the Lamas.27
Observers and critics of Chinese misrule charge with the evidence in the early 
period of the cultural revolution and later Chinese direct rule meant an attempt to stamp 
out the backward Tibetan religious hierarchy, during which numerous monasteries and 
temples were destroyed and their nuns and monks were defrocked so as to bring the Tibet 
under Maoist principles of control, while countless ordinary Tibetans were sent to labor 
camps or prison amid large-scale migration of Han Chinese into Tibetan territories.28 
However, recent Chinese Tibetan policy has also involved massive capital investment in 
infrastructure and manpower in trying to modernize the economy and society of Tibet, 
which has shown undeniable effects in the last two decades. In a 2001 speech in Lhasa to 
mark the 50th anniversary of Chinese control of Tibet, future President Hu Jintao made 
the official Chinese interests and preference on Tibet perfectly clear:
“It is only under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, only in the 
embrace of the big family o f the motherland and only by firmly taking the 
socialist road with Chinese characteristics that Tibet can enjoy today's prosperity 
and progress and an even better tomorrow. This is the most important conclusion 
that we have drawn from the 50 years of Tibet's development and also the 
fundamental principle that must be followed in building and developing Tibet in 
the days to come... Tibet is in the southwestern frontier of the motherland, with a 
vast stretch of land and a most important strategic position. The development, 
stability and security of Tibet have a direct bearing on the fundamental interests 
of people of all ethnic groups in Tibet as well as ethnic solidarity, national unity 
and state security.”29
27 The Information Office of the State Council: China's Cabinet, "Sixty Years since 
Peaceful Liberation of Tibet," (July 11,2011), http://english.gov.cn/official/20U- 
07/1 l/content_l 904075.htm.
28 Wang Ruowang, "The Status of Tibet: Recalling a Visit to Lhasa," in Tibet through 
Dissident Chinese Eyes : Essays on Self-Determination, ed. Cao Changqing and James D. 
Seymour (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 71-73; John F. Avedon, "Tibet Today: 
Current Conditions and Prospects," Himalaya, the Journal o f  the Association o f Nepal 
and Himalayan Studies 7, no. 2, Article 4 (1987): 1-2.
29 Hu Jintao, "Full Text of Speech by the Vice-President Hu Jintao at the Rally in 
Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet," Xinhua(]\i\y 
19, 2001), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/20010719/431559.htm.
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From Beijing’s perspective, Tibetan liberation and five-decade long economic 
modernization effort reflects Chinese commitment to uplifting the indigenous people of 
the Tibetan plateau but also the undeniable fact that Tibet holds the immense geostrategic 
importance. In Beijing’s view, those who misunderstand the sensitivity are deluded, that 
includes any Tibetan who is unhappy about the arrangement, who could thus be labeled a 
“secessionist” and a traitor to the Chinese nationalism. Or they are waylaid by the 
spiritual but dangerous rhetoric of the “Dalai Lama clique,” who have been used by 
foreign political forces to destabilize China. Thus, in regards to the issue of Tibetan 
refugees, the official Chinese position is that there are no Tibetan refugees; the exiles, 
including the leadership of the govemment-in-exile based in India and aided by Western 
forces, have traitorous motives.
From these stated objectives and rhetoric, we may tease out Chinese preferences 
regarding the rather narrow matter of Tibetan exiles living in Nepal. Given the reality of 
the situation, Beijing’s one non-negotiable position has been and will remain maintaining 
the ultimate authority in all Tibet related matters. Preserving that authority is the first 
interest and primary preference of Beijing, which would ideally favor that all the Tibetan 
exiles were repatriated to live in Tibet under Beijing’s current direct rule. Inasmuch as 
that primary interest collides with the aspirations of Tibetan exiles and the demands of 
the Dalai Lama’s govemment-in-exile, China would surely like to remove that thom from 
its side, albeit only in its own terms. The least favorable outcome to Beijing is the 
fulfillment of the demand of true autonomy and self-rule by the exiled leadership in 
Tibet. Yet, even the talk of Tibetan regional autonomy is only entertained in abstract 
rhetoric not as a matter of practical reality. Also, despite two decades worth of 
intermittent direct talks between Beijing and the Dalai Lama’s associates, there appears 
zero likelihood of true autonomy and self-rule in Tibet, especially not under the current 
Tibetan exile leadership.
Therefore, the status quo of more than one hundred and thirty thousand Tibetan 
exiles living in Nepal, India, and around the world, is at least more preferable outcome to 
Beijing, than giving any ground to the exile leadership in the matter o f ultimate 
autonomy. Maybe a higher preference and the modus operandi of Chinese policy in the
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last two decades has been to use all diplomatic and strategic tools to checkmate the 
activities and influence o f the Tibetan exile communities and their leadership at every 
step of the way. The goal is no less than effective de-legitimization of the Dalai Lama 
and his leadership as well as the demands o f the entire exile community. To that end, 
China has found it in its interest to apply diplomatic pressure on its neighboring states to 
recognize to the letter the spirit of “one-China” policy, demanding restriction of 
movement and political activities of the exiles in Nepal or India, using diplomatic and 
media channels to slander and delegitimize Dalai Lama personally and his followers in 
general. In pursuing these policies, China seems to have met its priorities and second-best 
policy preferences. Short of complete repatriation and removal of the Tibetan exile 
problem, Beijing accepts the state o f total challenge in all the activities and the ultimate 
defeat of the Tibetan exiles. Also, the larger geostrategic consideration that China enjoys 
in Tibet helps extend its interests into South Asia and matches nicely with Tibet’s 
continued status quo.
The regional dynamic brings us to the interests that India harbors in relation to the 
issues of Tibet and Tibetan exiles. Stated sequentially in terms of preference, India’s 
ostensible interests are fourfold: gaining high confidence in the security of its Northern 
frontier; achieving greater autonomy for Tibetans in Tibet leading to lesser role for the 
Beijing; the continuing rise o f trade and economic interaction with China coupled with 
the status quo on Tibetan issues; and India’s least preferred outcome, which is the 
redrawing of the border between China and India based on possible evidence of Tibetan 
claims after repatriation on Chinese terms.
As a rival and historic co-equal to China in the region, India’s interests on the 
Tibetan issue have certainly evolved in reaction to successive Chinese policies in the last 
six decades. But at its core, India has always seen, even before and after independence, 
the Himalayas as the ultimate barrier of its security buffer against China. Yet, due to 
historical—economic, religious, and cultural—reasons Indian interests extended to Tibet, 
which served nicely as the independent frontier for the British till the very end o f their 
Raj in India. The view that China was too powerless or distant to ever anticipate it 
overturning a millennia-long Tibetan independent stability could be counted, in hindsight,
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as sound policy for those times. Hence, right after Communist China’s sudden and 
shocking assertion of historical sovereignty over Tibet in the early 1950s, independent 
India under the leadership of its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was unable 
to mount a challenge to the Chinese military might encroaching on the Tibetan piedmont, 
resorted to a supposed realpolitik policy of common cause with the Communist China 
against the Western imperialists.30 The short-lived bonhomie came essentially at the 
expense of Tibet's independence with the mistaken expectation that mere recognition by 
India would placate Chinese threats of total control. In a fateful move, that has been 
invariably described since as “naive,” 31 Nehru recognized Chinese sovereignty over 
Tibet in 1954.
In contrast, since then India's primary interest has been to somehow hope for a 
reduction o f China’s total authority and presence over that important northern security 
frontier. Widespread public sentiment of support encouraged Nehru himself to favor such 
preference by becoming the political backer of the Dalai Lama and the autonomy of the 
ancien regime that had ruled Tibet for centuries as well as by giving shelter and 
settlement to the first wave of Tibetan exiles who followed their leader into India.32 As 
the decades of Chinese rule made their definitive and perhaps perpetual control o f Tibet a 
fa it accompli, India has been forced to periodically revise its interests and preferences on 
Tibet in order to accommodate the emergent reality. After two decades o f the Sino-Indian 
border war in 1962, India finally recognized Tibet as “an autonomous region o f China” in 
1984, while progressively lowering the decibel of its demands of Tibetan autonomy.33 In 
regards to Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees living within its borders, India has 
remained a gracious host, hoping for the ideal outcome of their eventual return to form an 
autonomous Tibetan leadership. A less ideal but all the more realistic outcome is the
30 Dawa Norbu, "Chinese Strategic Thinking on Tibet and the Himalayan Region," 
Strategic Analysis 12, no. 4 (July 1988): 372-73.
31 Parshotam Mehra, From Conflict to Conciliation: Tibetan Polity Revisited 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004), 116; Prasenjit Duara, The Global and Regional in 
China’s Nation-Formation (New York: Routledge, 2008), 192.
32 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century 
(Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 2001), 54, 57.
33 Tsering Topgyal, "Charting the Tibet Issue in the Sino-Indian Border Dispute," China 
Report 47, no. 2 (2011): 117.
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status quo. As Topgyal has cogently argued, the least preferred outcome for India is the 
repatriation of Tibetans after which, based on historical Tibetan claims, they make the 
case for disputed Indian territories on China’s behalf.34 Thus, the current Indian 
preference on this is to accommodate the Chinese until the border disputes and larger 
geostrategic concerns are resolved independently of the final settlement of the issue of 
Tibetans living within India.
The dimension of disputed borders and competing territorial claims leads us to the 
matter of utmost importance: the larger strategic picture of China-India rivalry and 
tension. Both China and India’s respective interests and preferences on the matter of 
Tibetan exiles, which is admittedly a smaller concern among many other competing 
issues, is played in the context o f their regional rivalry. J. Mohan Malik asserts that since 
both states are ancient civilizations and empires, they view their eventual roles as 
regional and global leaders. Thus, Malik succinctly argues that China’s primary interest 
centers on preventing “the rise of a peer competitor,” in Asia, which is evidenced by its 
policy of encirclement of India in the form of close relationships, based on economic aid 
and transfer of military hardware, to South Asian states, primarily Pakistan, but also at 
various degrees to Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.35 As for Tibet itself, the fact that 
China has amassed large number of PLA personnel along with modem military 
installations and infrastructure in the plateau means India certainly feels hemmed in from 
the North.
The two basic prongs of Indian objectives in South Asia have been to maintain 
geostrategic insulation in its backyards and to safeguard regional stability near its 
borders.36 Both of these objectives had to be recalibrated periodically by events beyond 
India’s borders. Starting with Chinese control of Tibet and the flight of the Dalai Lama, 
to the partition and independence of Bangladesh, to the Tamil-Sinhalese civil war in Sri 
Lanka, and Burmese military usurping power, the South Asian backyard has been 
anything but stable over the decades, allowing China perfect opportunities to extend its
34 Ibid., 127.
35 Malik, "South Asia in China's Foreign Relations," 74-75, 82.
36 Ibid., 74.
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tentacles into the Indian orbit. In the recent decades, the Chinese-Indian rivalry has 
outspread to encompass their naval ambitions for supremacy in the Indian Ocean and the 
South China Sea. Economic interests and opportunities have provided the counter to 
impel both countries to pursue engagement and cooperation in South Asia and beyond.
Divergent Interests: Nepal and Tibetan Community
Dwelling under the strategic context of these two regional powers, Nepal’s 
interests on the issue of Tibetan exiles is absolutely predicated by Indian and Chinese 
preferences. Historical ties dictated that Nepal's sense of security was temporarily rattled 
by Chinese expansionism into Tibet in the 1950s. That period also coincided with 
extensive intervention by India into Nepal's political transformation leading to the 
subsequent decade of “special relationship” between India-Nepal. However, much has 
changed since that period of internal and regional transformation. At the moment, we can 
identify four major policy objectives and interests that have guided Nepalese actions 
regarding the Tibetan exiles issue: continuing cordial relationship with New Delhi but 
preferably with less political interference internally; maintaining an across-the-spectrum 
friendly relationship with Beijing to achieve material gains from Chinese aid and 
investment; maintaining continued flow of economic aid and investment from Western 
donor nations, the multilateral institutions and non-governmental organizations; and 
finally, the least preferred option, is increasing constraints due to any external pressures, 
mainly from the Western actors, to accommodate the political and economic rights of the 
Tibetan refugees already living within Nepalese borders. The policy course that Nepal 
has adopted since 1989 on Tibetan exiles have been reasonably successful in meeting the 
objectives of the three most preferred options listed above.
Nepal's interest in allowing the first wave of Tibetan exiles to settle within its 
territory was purely practical based on humanitarian concerns and inability to stop them 
from crossing the unguarded, porous border. Beginning in the 1960s, as Nepal's internal 
political calculations as well as limitation of Chinese ambitions beyond Tibet made it 
worthwhile to pursue China as a counterbalance to Indian hegemonic influence, Nepal's 
interests and policies on the Tibetans also began to evolve. By the 1980s, China began to 
increase its diplomatic pressure on Nepal regarding Tibetans at the same time that India
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downgraded its interests on Tibetans to improve its own economic relationship with 
China. Such changing dynamic allowed Nepal starting in 1989 to follow a new policy 
direction regarding the Tibetan refugees strictly based on maintaining its friendly 
relations with China with the attendant promise of economic aid balanced against the 
diffused demands of the Western-led international community.
The current status quo set in 1989 provides higher material gains to Nepal, if it 
remains successful in balancing Chinese demands of restriction on Tibetans’ political 
activities while adhering to the Western governments’ and international organizations’ 
condition of non-expulsion and favorable treatment in exchange for continuing the vital 
source of foreign aid.37 Ideally, it might seem that Nepal would prefer the ultimate 
resolution of the status of Tibetan exiles by peaceful repatriation. But as one of the 
poorest economies in the world, Nepal is reliant on external support and aid— from 
Western donor nations and agencies as well as from Chinese and Indian bilateral 
economic aid and favorable policies—not just to finance its developmental projects but 
also actual running of government’s regular budgetary needs. Thus, managing a balance 
between these incompatible demands, Nepal in the past two decades has preferred a 
policy of suppression of political activities by Tibetans already settled in Nepal but not 
actual expulsion and allowing transit into India for newly arriving refugees.
Additionally, the Tibetans who have settled in Nepal for more than five decades 
have contributed enormously to the growth of one of the core sectors o f Nepal’s 
economy, the export-led traditional handmade carpet industry and other related 
handicrafts commerce.38 Harnessing initial financial support and technical assistance by 
the Swiss international aid organizations, Tibetans used their traditional knowledge and 
expertise to produce “Tibetan-styled or Tibetan-made” carpets in Nepal, which fetched
37 While never publicly discussed, analysts argue that the United States and the European 
Union have periodically conditioned aid with humane treatment and non-expulsion of 
Tibetans settled in Nepal. See page 29, especially footnote 22, in Tibet Justice Center, 
"Tibet's Stateless Nationals: Tibetan Refugees in Nepal," (June 2002), 
http://www.tibetjustice.org/reports/nepal.pdf. For further evidence of the role of 
international aid see Ann Frechette, Tibetans in Nepal: The Dynamics o f  International 
Assistance among a Community in Exile (Berghahn Books, 2002), 123.
38 Tibetans in Nepal, 48-51.
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high global prices and became the number one source of foreign exchange and 
employment until the late 1990s.39 Thus, concerns regarding both continuing external 
economic aid from the West and China, in addition to internal economic vitality in core 
domestic industries means that total repatriation would be a net negative, in strictly 
monetary sense, for the Nepalese state and economy.
Advocates of Tibetan rights have actively denounced Nepal's progressive 
capitulation to Chinese pressures.40 Nonetheless, Nepal's policy preference on Tibetan 
exiles has settled on this course for more than two decades since 1989, despite roiling 
internal instability in this period. The fact that neither the disinterested India nor the 
divided international community has managed to deter Nepal's behavior shows that 
Nepal’s calculation of economic and political gain from China is paramount. Successive 
leaders and governments in Kathmandu have affirmed the inviolable friendship with 
China and acknowledged one-China policy as the bedrock of Nepalese foreign relations, 
in words similar to the current Ministry o f Foreign Affairs formulation, which is 
unequivocally clear about Nepalese position: “Nepal has always been upholding 'One 
China' policy and is committed not to allow Nepalese territory to be used against our 
friendly neighbor China's core interests.”41
That leaves the interests of the final interested party, the Tibetan communities in 
exile and their leadership, in a very precarious position. Their appeal to the international 
community and Western democracies is based on the messages of the endangered cultural 
practices, environmental destruction and trampled human rights in Tibet; the historical 
fact of Tibet’s independence lost by the forced and brutal Chinese annexation; and the 
ultimate hope for autonomy and return to the cherished Shangri-la for the Tibetan 
peoples.42 To sustain worldwide attention to the Tibetan cause, the charismatic spiritual 
leadership of Dalai Lama has been channeled and shaped by an efficient, clever public
39 Whelpton, A History o f  Nepal, 148; Frechette, Tibetans in Nepal, 54.
40 See the 2002 and subsequent yearly reports by International Campaign for Tibet, 
"Dangerous Crossing: Conditions Impacting the Flight of Tibetan Refguees," (2002), 
http://www.savetibet.org/resource-center/ict-publications/publications.
41 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs - Government of Nepal, "Nepal - People's Republic of 
China, Bilateral Relations," http://www.mofa.gov.np/en/nepal-china-relations-78.html.
42 Frechette, Tibetans in Nepal, 94-99, 101-03.
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relations operation started in the 1970s by the govemment-in-exile whose efforts have 
successfully generated passionate support from many Western leaders, celebrities, single­
issue advocacy groups and common folks, forming the so-called global ‘friends of Tibet’ 
network bound together on Tibet by their liberal humanism and their concern for human 
rights, religious freedom and multiculturalism.43 Yet, all these activities have not met any 
real success in their central purpose: politically isolating China on the issue to impair its 
stranglehold over Tibet.
The exile leadership has long held on to a “five points peace plan” as the 
statement of its ultimate political preferences and has used it as the basis during its 
intermittent negotiations with Beijing. The five points peace plan was outlined by the 
Dalai Lama during the apogee of his personal worldwide popularity—he won the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1989—in a speech to the U.S. Congressional Human Right’s Caucus in
1987. The first four conditions of the plan include transforming Tibet into a zone of 
peace, abandoning Han migration into Tibet, a guarantee of basic human rights for 
Tibetans, and environmental conservation o f Tibetan lands with discontinuation of 
nuclear waste dumping there.44 The final point, later called the Strasbourg Proposal, after 
Dalai Lama’s speech elaborating his five points peace plan to the European Parliament in
1988, sought “earnest negotiations” with China with the ultimate goal being full Tibetan 
autonomy under a Government of Tibet responsible for all “non-political” internal and 
external policies, with defense and foreign policy managed by government of China 45
The five points plan is the ideal Tibetan preference, which when articulated 
succinctly means: full autonomy, just short of independence, under the exile leadership. 
Since those heady days, the developments in the last two decades have proved the
43 For a detailed analysis of the sophisticated public relations campaign behind the global 
visibility and the deeper meaning of the Tibetan cause, see Frechette’s penetrating 
chapter, “Friends of Tibet,” in ibid., 92-119.
44 Dalai Lama, "Five Point Peace Plan: Address to the U.S. Congressional Human Right's 
Caucus," (September 21, 1987), http://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/five-point- 
peace-plan.
5 "Strasbourg Proposal 1988: Address to the Members of the European Parliament, 
Strasbourg, France," (June 15, 1988),
http://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/strasbourg-proposal-1988.
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realization full Tibetan autonomy seems remote indeed. The continued economic and 
political rise of China has only made its hand stronger. Increasing economic ties and 
expanding role of China in the international system of governance means that the options 
for Dalai Lama’s hopeless followers have reduced to such symbolic acts of protests as of 
horrifying cases of self-immolations by Tibetan youths and monks.46 Further concerning 
is the fact that international pressure has progressively lost its influence on the Nepalese 
or Indian policies on Tibetan refugees. Their freedom of political activism and protest, 
maybe even their very existence, appears to be under threat of suppression by the 
Nepalese, which appears gradually more concerned with its interest of upholding the 
good graces of Beijing.
We now turn to the evidence of Nepal’s evolving policies and practices in its 
treatment o f Tibetan exiles and refugees. The narrative below explores the critical 
junctures where Nepal’s policies shifted, bowing to the demands of shifting regional 
context, overt diplomatic pressures and international demands as well as, and most 
importantly internal political changes and shifting interests. The analysis highlights 
Nepal’s periodic ability and inability to use the issue to further its material gains from its 
tripartite relationship.
EVIDENCE: NEPAL’S POLICY EVOLUTION ON TIBETAN EXILES
It has been more than five decades since the first Tibetan exiles crossed the border 
into Nepal, and their recent experiences could not be more different than in the first few 
decades. What was then welcoming and benign neglect by the Nepalese authorities has 
now become more coercive and restrictive, a just tolerant official attitude. Scrutinizing 
the evolution of Nepal’s specific policies and treatment of Tibetan exiles shows the effect 
not just of internal political changes overtime but of the unalterable external reality of 
rising Chinese pressure coupled with Indian indifference amid sympathetic Western 
concern on the matter. Still, it can be argued that Nepal’s internal political calculations of
46 News reports of self-immolations by Tibetans abound; for a cogent analysis of the 
phenomenon see Tsering Shakya, "Self-Immolation: The Changing Language of Protest 
in Tibet," Revue d'Etudes Tibetaines 25 (December 2012).
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its interests are paramount. Tracing the patterns of this shift yields analytical possibility 
of gauzing if Nepal is gaining materially or politically from its evolving polices.
Before and Since 1989
When the Dalai Lama escaped to India, many Tibetans decided to flee South as 
well. The situation in Tibet was dire once the PLA finally asserted full control in Lhasa, 
crushing violently the Tibetan Uprising of 1959. While much of the early refugees went 
to India, many Tibetans from the border areas moved into the Nepalese territory across 
the border. Those early arrivals lived in makeshift camps across the border in extreme 
circumstances without any aid or concern from the Nepalese state or much attention from 
the international aid community.
Eventually the Nepali government permitted the Red Cross to set up settlements 
for the burgeoning number of Tibetans in different parts of the country. Aid from the 
Swiss international development agencies and the UNHCR as well as the Americans 
began to settle the refugees, while the Nepalese government allowed legal asylum and 
settlement to these early refugees.47 Until 1989, Nepal allowed Tibetan refugees to settle 
in Nepal and provided them with a refugee Registration Card (RC), which permitted 
basic protection and identification. Over the decades many Tibetans were able to partner 
with native Nepalese to open businesses; they opened schools, which taught Tibetan 
languages and culture; and all participated in their religious and cultural practices, so that 
by the 1970s, many observers felt that the refugees in Nepal would preserve Tibetan 
culture while integration into Nepali society.48
However, things began changing drastically in the late 1980s. On 1989, ostensibly 
faced with the influx of larger number of refugees escaping that year’s Tibetan uprising 
and resulting Chinese crackdown, the government of Nepal scrapped the resettlement 
policy, only allowing the UNHCR to label new Tibetan arrivals as “persons of concern,”
47 Frechette, Tibetans in Nepal, 40-43; Tibet Justice Center, "Tibet's Stateless Nationals: 
Tibetan Refugees in Nepal". 33-37.
48 "Tibet's Stateless Nationals: Tibetan Refugees in Nepal". 36.
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who were only permitted to be sent on to India.49 Since, Nepal is not a party to the 
international conventions on refugees, there is no formal policy in Nepal’s laws regarding 
this shift, only a “gentlemen’s agreement” between Nepal, UNHCR and the U.S. 
Embassy, which in practice allowed Nepal to adhere to international human rights 
standards.50
Currently there are more than 20,000 refugees who live in Nepal and every year 
additional 2500 more make the arduous journey crossing from Tibet over the dangerous 
mountain passes into Nepal. The experiences of Tibetan refugees as they come in contact 
with Nepalese state authorities begin at the border and continues throughout their stay in 
Nepal. Gathering field data in 2004, Dolma et al. documented the difficulty of Tibetans’ 
journey due to the harsh terrain, lack of food, frostbite, and many such hardships due to 
the sheer length of time it takes for them to arrive at their destination, which in average 
takes more than 30 days on buses and on foot.51 Their misery worsens when they 
encounter Nepalese border guards or militia, who were reported to mete out harsh, 
inhumane and illegal harassment, including physical and sexual violence, financial 
extortion. Despite Nepal’s international obligations and responsibilities to human rights, 
there are reports of routine threats of refoulement of the refugees back into the yet more 
dangerous hands of Chinese authorities.52
While some of these reported abuses of the refugees might be chalked up to 
administrative failure or indiscipline o f individual border guard or unit, it is nonetheless 
instructive to notice a changing pattern of Nepal’s overall policy on the issue of not just 
o f newly arriving Tibetan refugees but, more importantly, the rights and freedoms of 
those that have settled in Nepal since 1959. Many observers find that Nepal’s faithfulness 
to the aforementioned “gentlemen’s agreement” of 1989 has been deteriorating and there
49 UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, "2014 UNHCR Regional Operations Profile - 
South Asia," http://www.unhcr.Org/pages/49e487856.html#NEPKA.
50 Tibet Justice Center, "Tibet's Stateless Nationals: Tibetan Refugees in Nepal". 88-113.
51 Sonam Dolma et al., "Dangerous Journey: Documenting the Experience of Tibetan 
Refugees," American Journal o f  Public Health 96, no. 11 (2006): 2062.
52 Ibid., 2062-64.
87
have been a few instances of clearly illegal refoulements as well as increasing number of 
human rights abuses of the legally settled refugees in the last two decades.53
Especially worrisome has been Nepal's suppression of and unlawful restriction of 
the rights of the Tibetans in Nepal to freedom of expression, assembly and movement. 
The scrutiny and monitoring of Tibetan’s activities has extended from the overtly 
political demonstrations to even encompass practice and participation in religious and 
cultural activities. While the government officials maintain that only anti-China activities 
are restricted, recent reports based on fieldwork and documentation in Nepal lead to the 
conclusion that the arbitrary definition of the threshold of permitted activities has led 
towards increased suppression.54
With the Nepalese state intent on suppression of their rights of expression, 
political protests by Tibetans, which are not uncommon in Nepal, have become scenes of 
state repression. Tibetan protests and political activities have occurred periodically before 
the Beijing Olympics and they have continued since. When yet again protests broke out 
against the sensitive backdrop of the Olympics, Nepal found itself needing to negotiate 
between the strident demands from its giant northern neighbor to take strict action against 
Tibetan protestors on one side, and international pressure to allow them their basic human 
rights and freedom of expression and assembly. Prominent global figures and media 
showered attention on the rights of Tibetan refugees in Nepal to freely associate and 
protest, and deplored the heavy-handed, some even claimed inhumane, treatment by the 
Nepalese state that arrested and jailed Tibetan protestors, including monks and nuns.55 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), the international NGO, published a biting report
53 Krakauer, "Why Is Nepal Cracking Down on Tibetan Refugees?".
54 Niharika Mandhana, "As China Squeezes Nepal, Tibetan Escape Route Narrows," 
Time Magazine^July 17, 2012), http://world.time.com/2012/07/17/as-china-squeezes- 
nepal-tibetan-escape-route-narrows/; Tibet Justice Center, "Tibet's Stateless Nationals: 
Tibetan Refugees in Nepal". 74.
55 Andrew Buncome, "Violence in Nepal as Tibetans Protest Olympics," The 




meticulously documenting the systemic harassment of Tibetan refugees by the Nepali 
police and judiciary, denouncing the:
“violations of human rights by the Nepali authorities, particularly the police, 
against Tibetans involved in demonstrations in Kathmandu, Nepal. These include 
unnecessary and excessive use o f force, arbitrary arrest, sexual assault of women 
during arrest, arbitrary and preventive detention, beatings in detention, unlawful 
threats to deport Tibetans to China, and unnecessary restrictions on freedom of 
movement in the Kathmandu Valley. Nepali authorities have also harassed 
Tibetan and foreign journalists and Nepali, Tibetan, and foreign human rights 
defenders.”56
Most international observers, like the HRW report, point the finger of blame 
directly to the immense Chinese political pressure on Nepal, and cite ample international 
human rights norms and conventions on refugees to pressure the Nepalese authorities to 
moderate the state behavior and allow peaceful protests by the Tibetans.57 More than five 
years after the Beijing Olympics, the global attention to the Tibetan cause has receded 
from the headlines, but the intermittent international media stories on anti-China protests 
by Tibetan exiles in Nepal and the attendant opprobrium meted to the Nepalese state 
beholden to Beijing’s diktat continues.58
Such evidence primarily begs the question regarding Nepal's international treaty 
obligations and adherence to the customary laws concerning the political rights of 
refugees, especially since Nepalese policies were deemed sufficiently democratic and 
supportive before 1989. Existing Nepalese domestic law is silent or ambiguous as it 
portends directly to the rights of refugees although the constitution guarantees basic 
rights to all “persons” not just to citizens, with certain caveats. In terms of international 
law and regimes, although Nepal has neither ratified the 1951 Convention on the Status 
of Refugees nor the related 1967 Protocol, as a member of the United Nations, Nepal 
adheres to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and it also signed the
56 Human Rights Watch, Appeasing China: Restricting the Rights o f  Tibetans in Nepal 
(New York: Human Rights Watch, July 2008), 4.
57 Ibid., 8-9.
58 Edward Wong, "China Makes Inroads in Nepal, and Stanches Tibetan Influx," The 
New York Times(April 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.eom/2013/04/14/world/asia/china- 
makes-inroads-in-nepal-stemming-tibetan-presence.html.
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International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1991. While international 
law provides for lawful restriction of the freedom of expression under certain strict 
condition, application of suitable international law that Nepal is party to leads one 
observer to conclude that the government of Nepal's restriction on Tibetan freedom of 
expression violates the customary application of "three-part test," viz. the principles of 
predictability and transparency, the principle o f legitimacy, and the principles of 
necessity and proportionality.59
Single-issue Tibetan advocacy organizations have meticulously documented the 
increasing suppression, violence, and restriction of Tibetans’ rights of expression and 
assembly, as well as cases of unambiguously illegal refoulements by the Nepalese 
authorities in the last two decades. Verification of such activities has also come from 
independent international human rights organizations and NGOs, which have periodically 
documented such human rights abuses and faulted the Nepalese state for flouting 
democratic process and the rights of Tibetans to assembly, movement and peaceful 
protests.60 The international media, the rights organizations that work on issues of human 
rights, as well as the Tibetan advocacy groups have all made their verdict clear: there is 
evidence of increase in Nepal's suppression of Tibetan activism including the unlawful 
restriction of their freedom of expression, all of which is against the letter and the spirit 
of international law and norms.
The most relevant question is why the Nepalese state in the last twenty-five years 
seen is fit to change its policies towards more suppression of the rights o f Tibetan 
refugees’ rights. Contrary to the received wisdom, Nepali leaders from across the 
political spectrum as well as the bureaucrats and policymakers in foreign affairs have 
been remarkably consistent in their reasoning, which can be summed into a neat three- 
point argument as formulated by the Nepalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: PRC is
59 Barun Ghimire, "Lawful Limitation or Northern Influence? Restricting the Freedom of 
Expression of Tibetan Refugees in Nepal" (master's thesis, University o f Tromso, 
Norway, 2013).
60 See, inter alia, Human Rights Watch, Appeasing China', International Campaign for 
Tibet, "Dangerous Crossing: Conditions Impacting the Flight of Tibetan Refguees"; Tibet 
Justice Center, "Tibet's Stateless Nationals: Tibetan Refugees in Nepal".
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Nepal’s most loyal and historical friend; Nepal assiduously supports one-China policy; 
hence, Nepal won’t allow any anti-China activities within its borders.61 As described 
above, all leaders from the volatile and unstable rotation of political parties and 
policymakers in Kathmandu have used this exact three-part rationale to explain Nepal’s 
policy on Tibetan refugees since 1989.
However, this chapter has posited that Nepalese policymakers were able to so 
clearly and comprehensively align their interests with the Chinese position because the 
third actor in the tripartite relationship, India, became effectively indifferent on this 
crucial issue. Thus, it may be instructive to review the evidence of India’s own evolving 
policies regarding the Tibetan refugees, which seems to inform quite nicely how Nepal 
has handled the issue. Based on the analysis I argue that the reason why Nepal changed 
its formal recognition of Tibetan refugees in 1989 to begin to increasingly toe the harsh 
and demanding Chinese line on the matter is the removal of Indian wedging opportunity 
on this issue. Since India itself was not going to make Tibet or the rights of Tibetans a 
major issue o f contention in the developing Sino-Indian relationship, Nepal was quite 
secure in its policy of aligning its interests to the specific policy position of the northern 
rival. Nepal’s wedge had been blunted so that it could accrue benefits by following the 
wishes o f only China due to the utter detachment o f India.
Mirroring India’s Tibetan Policy
In order to understand Indian interests on the issue of Tibet and Tibetans, it might 
be instructive to review the evidence of the status and treatment of Tibetans in India. 
When Dalai Lama escaped Tibet in 1959, he sought political protection and asylum for 
him and his followers in India. The political reception and support the early refugees 
received from India was noteworthy. Although, India hadn’t signed on to the 1951 
Convention on the Status of Refugees, that first wave of Tibetan refugees arriving in 
India were given formal asylum as well as material aid in the form of land and money. 
They were also provided with an identification document, called the Registration Card 
(RC), which allowed the refugees a host of rights and privileges facilitating education,
61 Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Government of Nepal, "Nepal - People's Republic of 
China, Bilateral Relations".
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travel and other activities. However, subsequent waves of Tibetans arriving after the 
1970s found the environment much challenging in India. In 1963, India stopped 
recognizing new arriving Tibetans as refugees and by the 1970s, they found it much 
harder to receive the identification and protection o f the Registration Card (RC) leaving 
them vulnerable to legal protections and drying up of economic and other opportunities.62
It has been argued that India’s abstention from the 1951 Convention on the Status 
of Refugees and the related 1967 Protocol on Refugees allows lack o f Indian 
accountability regarding the proper and similar treatment of continuing Tibetan refugees 
arriving in India. As such, due to the lack of any international or regional legal 
framework, Indian domestic law and its definition of foreigners are used as the legal basis 
o f new policy.
However, one might ask, why has there been such a change in India’s policy 
regarding Tibetan refugees between those arriving before 1970s with those that arrived 
since then? The answer is surely changing national interests regarding the issue of Tibet 
itself and the evolution of the India-China relationship. Domestic leadership changes 
replacing the old-guard freedom fighters to the newer generation of Indian leaders with a 
new sensibility about China’s claims on Tibet is surely part o f the answer. That amalgam 
of domestic political change and evolving interests regarding China would explain why 
India modified its explicit policy on Tibetans. Since the 1990s, Tibetan refugees in India 
have found it much harder to engage in many political activities regarding Tibet and 
China. They have been harshly barred or discouraged from their rights of assembly and 
protest on many occasions, for example, during the visit of Chinese Prime Minister Li 
Peng in 1991, in the months before the Beijing Olympics, and later during the visit of 
Wen Jiabao in 2010.63 The India state used strict police action as well as severe warnings 
against any such political activities repeatedly. It would be impossible to imagine any 
such qualms against anti-China protests during Nehru’s heyday, when Indians joined
62 Claudia Artiles, "Tibetan Refugees' Rights and Services in India," Human Rights & 
Human Welfare Working Papers(20l I),
http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/minority/Tibetan.pdf.
63 Ibid., p. 5.
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Tibetans in staging protests when Zhou En-Lai in 1956 and 1957; o f course, Nehru gave 
asylum to the Dalai Lama against the fervent wishes of the Chinese.64
This review of India’s evolving policies and interests regarding the status and 
treatment o f Tibetan refugees sheds light on similar evolution of policy and practice by 
Nepal on the same issue. Nepal also went from welcoming the Tibetans in the early years 
and allowing them legal rights and opportunities, to the current state where they are 
merely tolerated and ordered to not make any trouble in deference to sensitive political 
calculations. Yet, compared to India, as a small wedge state, Nepal’s interests and 
preferences are undoubtedly impacted by additional considerations. Chief among such 
concerns is the fact that Nepal relies much more heavily on international economic aid 
from Western governments and multilateral organizations, which are keen to see proper 
treatment of Tibetan refugees. Also, Nepal’s shared and porous border with Tibet as well 
as the historical and traditional interaction of the peoples on two sides plays into 
Nepalese policy formulation. However, the most significant concern on Nepalese policy­
making is Chinese diplomatic pressure and opportunities of gains from heeding such 
pressure, in the crucial context that India’s countervailing interests is waning on this 
particular issue.
Chinese Promises and Pressures
Most analysts and observers attribute Chinese pressures on Nepal as the most 
crucial factor determining the choice of policy on Tibetan refugees by the Nepalese state. 
This chapter has argued that, while Chinese influence is undeniable, we must also look at 
Nepal’s own interests as defined by Nepalese policymakers across the political spectrum 
to complicate the issue of first causes. The fact remains that over the last twenty-five 
years Nepal’s policy regarding the treatment of Tibetan refugees within its borders has 
changed from before. And only one of the important facets of explanation comes from 
looking at Chinese pressures and promises. This section briefly reviews the growing 
Chinese influence along with the evidentiary instances of direct Chinese pressures, and 
traces the reasoning of Beijing’s current stance.
64 Garver, Protracted Contest, 53-54.
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It is no secret why Nepal has increasingly begun to apply stiffer suppression for 
Tibetans legally settled on its soil for not just their political beliefs but even, in some 
occasions, for their religious and cultural practices. The preservation of Nepal’s friendly 
relations with China and the positive and negative costs of seeming to cause offence to 
the northern power is the overriding consideration of Nepal’s recent behavior. 
International press and media have been frequent and adamant in their finger pointing 
towards China for putting the noose on Tibetan activism by pressuring the instable and 
pliant leadership in Nepal.
China, for its part, has not been all that coy about its specific demands on the 
stamping out of the Tibetan activism in Nepal. China has repeatedly and openly called on 
Nepal to follow the 1960 Nepal-China Treaty of Friendship to the letter, so as to not 
allow any anti-China political activities in Nepali soil. Also, China routinely refers to 
Nepal’s utmost adherence of the one-China policy, which says that both Tibet and 
Taiwan are inalienable territorial parts of China. When there are any Tibetan protest 
activities in Kathmandu, swift diplomatic pressure from the Chinese embassy has been 
noted. Furthermore, it is alleged that Nepal changed its policy of granting “refugee” 
status and asylum to the Tibetans in 1989 because China impressed upon the fact that 
there were no human rights abuses in Tibet, which means the exiles cannot be deemed to 
be fleeing any sort of persecution. Thus, Nepal has since referred to newly arrived 
Tibetans as “persons of concern” and allowed UNHCR, the UN agency for refugees, 
minimal role in ensuring their safe passage onto India for long-term settlement. Due to 
such Chinese demands, Nepal has begun to subdue the more than 20,000 legally settled 
Tibetans, those who arrived before 1989 and their progeny, who had been formally given 
rights of resettlement.
The most blatant public show of Chinese diplomatic pressure on Nepalese 
authorities occurred during the period of Olympic protests, probably due to the 
heightened sensitivity regarding the historical event. The then Chinese ambassador to 
Nepal, Zhang Xiangling seemed to break diplomatic protocol when he organized a press 
conference to vehemently denounce “anti-China” activities carried on by the “anarchists” 
in Nepal, and called on the Nepalese government to use maximum force to silence them,
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including not releasing protestors who weren’t formally charged, which is contrary to the 
Nepalese law.65 Furthermore, the senior-most bureaucrat o f the Home Ministry during the 
period later admitted to a researcher that he accompanied the Chinese ambassador to the 
Everest base camp in a helicopter to sufficiently convince the ambassador of adequate 
security preparation.66 However, despite the heavy-handed perception of Ambassador 
Xiangling’s behavior, it has to be reiterated the acute instability in Nepal during that 
specific period as well as the fact that Nepalese authorities actually released most Tibetan 
protestors very quickly, which adhered to Nepalese law.
The larger Chinese position on the Tibetan exiles in Nepal has not mellowed but 
only toughened. The Nepalese policy also seems to be settling on the pattern of dictated 
by its adherence to the three-part formulation of loyal friendship with China, commitment 
to one-China policy, and no anti-China policy within Nepal. Thus, the report by Human 
Right Watch finds a remarkable consistency in Chinese concerns and Nepalese response:
“In May 2005, then Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala assured visiting Chinese 
Premier Zhu Rongji that no anti-China activities would take place in Nepal. In 
April 2002, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba stated the same. In 2005 the 
King of Nepal, who had then assumed all executive powers, said during a meeting 
with China’s Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing that he, too, would not allow anti- 
China activities in Nepal. In November 2006, Prime Minister Girija Prasad 
Koirala, representing the Seven Party Alliance, affirmed that there would be no 
anti-China activities permitted in Nepal.”67
This analysis clearly shows not only the consistency of Chinese demands but also 
the across-the-political-spectrum consistency of Nepalese response based on the three- 
part formulation deployed by the Nepalese policymakers. We now analyze the presented 
evidence to ascertain if Nepal’s prospects for wedging behavior on this issue.
65 Human Rights Watch, Appeasing China, 29-30, 53-56; Ujjwal Prajapati, "Influence of 
Foreign Policy on Nepalese Press : A Case Study on Coverage of Tibetan Protest in 
Nepal" (master's thesis, University o f Oslo, Norway, 2011), 10.
66 "Influence of Foreign Policy on Nepalese Press," 17.
67 Human Rights Watch, Appeasing China, 53, citation # 123.
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ANALYSIS: NEPAL’S WEDGE PROSPECTS?
The evidence outlined above of Nepal’s evolving policy on Tibetan exiles, within 
the historical context of its tripartite interaction with India and China, provides ample 
material for abstract analysis on the specific questions raised in the literature review 
chapter on small wedge states. What does the evidence of Nepal’s changed policies 
regarding the treatment of Tibetan refugees in the last five decades, especially since the 
late 1980s, suggest? And how do we evaluate Nepal’s position as a wedge state and the 
possibility of higher material gains based on the observed change in policies and events?
To restate, the pertinent theoretical questions inquired is the possibility that small 
weak states may enhance their gains from concurrent interactions with two rival powers; 
and, if  so, what factors would impact a wedge state’s ability to maximize the level of 
material gains (as proxy for strategic autonomy) from such policy interactions. In the 
research design chapter, it was postulated that given suitable conditions of tripartite 
interactions between the wedge state and two rival powers, many internal and external 
factors could impact the level of possible material gains for the wedge state. For the 
scope of this research, three independent variables (IVs) were identified for analysis: the 
domestic political system in the wedge state, whether it is a democracy or dictatorship; 
the level of interdependence or globalization in the system; and the level of its trade 
dependence with either of the two rival powers. The hypothesized relationship between 
these IVs and the wedge states’ level of material gains from tripartite interactions was the 
core of the evidentiary analysis in this chapter.
The first hypothesis (HI) says that democracy in the wedge state is more 
conducive than dictatorship to realize higher gains from possible wedging opportunities. 
Per the review of the evolving history of Nepalese policies and tripartite interaction 
presented above, the succinct answer is that Nepal’s major shift in its policy towards 
greater suppression of Tibetan activism began in the late 1980s and has progressed since, 
which coincides with a period of the advent of democratic system in Nepal. From 1959 to 
1990, Nepal was a single-party autocracy ruled by the supreme leadership of the 
monarch. King Mahendra, who ruled from 1955 to 1973 initiated an avowed policy of 
“playing the China-card” to demand respect and concession from India in myriad
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political and economic concerns. Yet, when it comes to Tibetan refugees, it was under 
King Mahendra’a autocratic rule that they began crossing into Nepal to eventually settle 
in various camps around the country. The then King even found it easy to provide overt 
and tacit support to the early settlement process; there is evidence of him attending public 
functions organized by the Tibetan exiled communities, such as the inauguration of the 
first Tibetan handicrafts showroom in 1961.68 It was in those early decades that the 
various international organizations—the Swiss Red Cross, UNHCR, and USAID—were 
allowed freedom to cater to the basic survival needs and long-term economic livelihood 
plans of the settled refugees.
Similar benign supportive approach continued unabated during the autocratic rule 
of King Birendra when he was enthroned in 1972. In the late 1980s, owing to a growing 
Indian impatience regarding Nepalese internal politics led to a critical diplomatic and 
trade tussle with India as recounted above. One element of friction was a newly signed 
treaty with China regarding revised Tibetan policy, which was just one of the many 
particulars of Nepalese desire to ingratiate itself more to Beijing. Thus, King Birendra 
followed his father’s example to attempt to play the China card; the difference being this 
instance produced disastrous results when in 1990 a wave of democratic protests with 
tacit support by India led to the loosening of the absolute monarchical control of the 
political system.
The adoption in 1989 of a more repressive policy towards new Tibetans arriving 
in Nepal could be seen as an autocratic monarch trying to oblige the demands of one of 
its patrons. However, the supposed democrats, representing political parties from across 
the ideological spectrum, who came into leadership positions of control beginning in 
1990, have all followed the repressive policies adopted in 1989. It is curious to note that 
of all the ostensibly democratic political parties that have rotated into central power in 
Kathmandu, none have veered even minutely from the policy of increasing suppression 
and control o f Tibetan refugees in acceding to the Chinese preferences and demands. 
Actually, the trend as reported earlier is of greater restriction and adherence to Beijing’s 
wishes in the last two decades of democratic political system in Nepal. While it is true
68 Frechette, Tibetans in Nepal, 41.
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that during this period, Nepal has been constantly gripped by extreme instability and 
volatility, the bedrock foreign policy positions o f the political parties have acknowledged 
“one-China” policy and the need to preserve the sanctity o f Nepal’s friendship with 
China. Of course, left unstated is the fact that India’s massive influence and interference 
is always a given. So clearly, democracy by itself has not produced the observed changes 
in Nepal’s policy on Tibetan refugees. In this issue of strategic significance for the 
weaker state, indeed, external pressure seems to have been more crucial.
Impact of globalization on Nepal’s wedging prospects constitutes the second 
hypothesis (H2). As the evidence suggests, various foreign governments, beside the two 
rival powers have tried to influence Nepal’s behavior on the matter of Tibetan refugees. 
At many instances, the US government and European states have conditioned 
development aid contingent on better treatment o f Tibetans and a pledge to not expel 
them. However, the globalization impact also shows the impact of growing economic and 
political interdependence between China, one of the rival powers, and the Western states, 
so that those pressures and influences on Tibetan rights and freedoms have slowly 
eroded. Thus, globalization in this aspect has strengthened Chinese position. Also, the 
activism and support o f the transnational non-state actors has helped the material and 
social well being of the Tibetan refugees living in Nepal and India. However, their 
political influence, although not completely spent, has eroded in the last few decades.
The crucial effect of globalization, as the analysis of the growing Indian 
indifference to the issue o f Tibet and Tibetans shows, may have been in changing of 
Indian strategic view regarding India-China relationship at the expense o f Tibetan 
position. As the analysis shows, as India became greatly bound with China on economic 
interdependence, the thom on the side o f Tibetans has slowly been removed. The ultimate 
factor of Indian indifference to the issue, has guided the proximate position of Nepal in 
favoring Chinese demands on the treatment of Tibetan exiles in its soil.
The third independent variable (IV) that might explain the possibility and level of 
the wedge state’s material gains is its level of trade dependence to its two rival powers. 
The hypothesis (H3) says that material gains from an issue of tripartite interaction moves 
in the same direction as the level of trade dependence. In Nepal’s case, its trade with
98
China has skyrocketed since the 1990s and especially in the second half of the 2000s.69 It 
could not be mere coincidence that Chinese demands have begun hardening during that 
period; however, the policy of on the Tibetan refugees was adopted a long time before 
Nepal became trade dependent with China. By signing the bilateral treaty with Nepal in 
August 1955, China had started providing economic aid and capital investments to Nepal 
in hopes of keeping the door ajar on future political influence and the possibility of 
puncturing the sphere of Indian dominance. But the volume o f trade in manufactured 
goods spiked significantly only by the late 1990s to coincide with China’s growing 
manufacturing prowess as well as the liberalization of economic policies in Nepal. Yet, 
Nepal is too small a market for China’s productive industries although Chinese dry goods 
flood Nepalese markets. Along with rising volume of imports, Chinese government has 
been quite willing to provide large capital grants and aid to facilitate Nepal’s 
development projects and budgetary needs becoming, in the past two decade, a major 
donor to compete with India, Japan, the Western states and various aid organizations.
The extreme caution regarding China’s sensitivities and acquiescence to Chinese 
demands by all political elites in Nepal in the last couple of decades could not simply be 
mere coincidence. So the effect of trade dependence on Nepal’s strategic autonomy, and 
hence the level of its material gains, from its wedging strategies has to be measured 
against the total trade value that Nepal gains from all external sources. In concrete 
numerical terms, the ever-rising value and proportion of Chinese aid and trade in that 
period makes any deviation from their demands demonstrably costly. Yet, Nepal’s trade 
dependence on China is not supreme, given that more than thrice the trade volume is 
exchanged between Nepal and India.70 The default mental paradigm of Nepalese 
leadership class, who place Beijing as a probable countervailing force to New Delhi’s 
overwhelming influence, must also play a part.
69 Trade and Export Promotion Center; Ministry of Commerce and Supplies; Government 
of Nepal, "Trade Statistics: Nepal's Trade with China P.R.," 
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70 "Compare Countries of Multiple Year for Export & Import,"
http://www.efourcore.com.np/tepcdatabank/compareexportimport.php?txtmode=search.
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To summarize, in the context of the historical regional entanglements, Nepal’s 
evolving pattern of policies on Tibetan refugees within its borders shows that the current 
status quo of not expelling them but restricting their rights of political activities and 
expression, especially anything that could be construed as “anti-China,” is Nepal’s best 
choice, especially in consideration of purely material, economic concerns. Frechette 
argues that upon the contending pressures from the China and various intergovernmental 
organizations about the treatment of Tibetan exiles within its soil, the Nepali state has 
routinely relied on the “weapons of the weak,” including such tactics as “administrative 
delays, false compliance, and feigned ignorance, to maintain state sovereignty in the 
context of multilateral intervention.”71 Of course, moral, humanitarian and political 
considerations do not seem to be critically operant factors guiding Nepalese decision­
making and actual practice on this issue.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has set the historical and contemporary context of the regional 
rivalry between China and India, and analyzed the policy options and preferences 
available to Nepal as it has been dealing with the long-term issue of the Tibetan exiles. 
Based on the presented evidence, I have argued that Nepal’s internal political formulation 
of its strategic interests, which involves calculation of costs and material benefits, has 
allowed it to align its policy with Chinese preferences when it comes to the activities of 
Tibetan exiles living in Nepal or passing through its territory. In this matter, Nepalese 
leadership and policymakers have to respond to the pressures from various actors 
including, India, the international community and the Tibetan exile community. 
Ultimately, I have made the argument that the recent status quo policy of increased 
suppression of Tibetan exiles has provided the most utility to Nepal in the form of 
material aid from all concerned actors, which I frame as increased “strategic autonomy” 
for Nepal in this crucial strategic issue of interaction.
There could be two reasonable criticism regarding the evidence and conclusions 
presented in this chapter. First, observers may find the mistreatment of Tibetan exiles by
71 Frechette, Tibetans in Nepal, 123.
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Nepal in the name of material gains under unjustifiable Chinese pressure morally 
objectionable, which is an ethical criticism. To that, I would have to assert that this is a 
work of dispassionate social science research not a critical analysis o f the ethical or 
normative content of Nepal’s domestic or foreign policies. If the leadership o f Nepal 
finds this course of policy as the most suitable for furthering the national interests of their 
nation, for the purposes of this research the analysis uses their baseline as valid 
expression of Nepal’s interests. Furthermore, it has to be highlighted that Nepal has not 
resorted to wholesale expulsion or imprisonment of Tibetan refugees, in contravention of 
its own domestic laws.
The second criticism could come from an empirical or conceptual perspective, 
which might sensibly question if the alignment of Nepal’s policy preference with China’s 
does not prove subservience or coercion instead of strategic autonomy. While the 
evidence shows minor instances of Chinese strident demands, even during the periods of 
extreme instability and volatility, Nepalese authorities have been able to uphold domestic 
laws and norms in regards to the treatment of Tibetan refugees. Moreover, it can be 
argued alignment of policy choices between Nepal and China may be a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition to show Chinese coercion or Nepalese subservience. If Nepal were 
following the maximalist Chinese position of total repatriation of Tibetans, or if there 
were no issues of disagreement to Chinese wishes, or if Nepal were following Chinese 
positions which were contrary to Nepal’s own interests, only such conditions would be 
sufficient to establish total coercion or subservience by Nepal. As it is, the above analysis 
shows considerable influence and interactive effects of India, and the Western states in 
addition to China, when it comes to the full picture of Nepal’s strategic policymaking.
Finally, the major implication of the argument presented in this chapter is that the 
criticism of lack of autonomy in the part of Nepal is wrong because it ascribes all agency, 
and the appropriate culpability, to China. If there are moral, ethical or legal objections to 
the Nepalese treatment of Tibetan refugees, we might not blame China. We have to point 
the finger of blame strictly at the Nepalese authorities and leadership as well as Indian 
indifference because both have chosen these policy directions based on their calculations 
of their respective national interests.
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CHAPTER V
COM PETITIVE HYDROPOW ER INVESTM ENTS IN NEPAL
THE PROMISE OF NEPAL’S WATER
In 1990, the banned political parties o f Nepal were able to end three-decades long 
monarchic autocracy to usher in constitutional monarchy. Coming to power on the heels 
of surging popular demands for democracy and economic development, the new political 
leaders promised to unleash Nepal’s vast natural potential to build the country into 
another Singapore or harkening to the similarity of its snow-capped mountainous terrain, 
the Switzerland of Asia. Their claims were indeed ambitious and reflected to a certain 
extent the zeal of the revolutionary moment and the combustible bursting forth of a 
famously poor people’s long-held desire for social and economic wellbeing. In the 
subsequent decades, those initial hyperbolic promises have either been neglected in the 
mire of transitional politics or only remembered as a cynical joke, almost a pipedream. 
Yet, the dream of developmental riches flowing from the bountiful natural resources of 
Nepal has a long provenance. It is based on the sliver of possibility that the country’s 
immense hydropower potential could indeed be harnessed for large-scale hydroelectric 
production, which if realized could add to the national coffers through domestic 
productive use as well as lucrative foreign exports.
The previous chapter analyzed the context of the Sino-Indian interaction on the 
political issue of Tibet, the fate of Tibetan refugees and the resulting effect on Nepal’s 
policy autonomy on that issue. Given the regional context of Chinese and Indian 
economic rivalry and their contesting regional interests, the possibility that their 
competitive geo-economic strategy might have the effect of benefiting Nepal’s 
hydropower quest is all the more tantalizing. In this chapter, I examine the economic 
interaction between the two regional powers and specifically question the possibility of 
economic gains for Nepal in its hydropower sector. Like in other issue-areas of tripartite 
interaction, in the economic realm Nepal’s wedge state status might allow it to benefit
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from higher gains in the form of larger capital investments particularly in foreign direct 
investments in hydropower projects with export potential. Analyzing the evolving policy 
climate in Nepal towards economic liberalization coupled with the pattern of competitive 
action-reaction chains of Chinese and Indian role in economic aid and capital investments 
highlight the extent of Nepal’s wedging aspirations.
As the subsequent analysis will show, Nepal is not bandwagoning with either 
major player, but inasmuch as Nepal suffers for underdevelopment and lack of financial 
capital, the flow of capital from both India and China in the hydropower sector of Nepal 
shows that it is accruing positive material gains. While the evidence for explicit wedging 
is presently inconclusive, the evidence presented below finds that the situation is ripe for 
Nepal to be able to leverage enhanced gains in the economic realm generally and 
specifically in the sector of hydropower development. As for the three test variables, 
domestic political system is not directly linked to wedging gains; globalization indirectly 
affects Nepalese gains through Chinese and Indian global investment strategies; and trade 
dependence is important in that China might acquiesce to higher investment levels to 
offset growing trade imbalance.
The premise of Nepal’s hydropower potential and the proper value of its vast 
water resources can easily be lost in utopian rhetoric of economic transformation, in what 
observers have called political “propaganda”1 or “myths.”2 However, the facts regarding 
the country’s hydropower production potential and the possible economic value have 
now been well established. In 1966, a Nepali researcher conducting his graduate research 
estimated that the country possessed a theoretical possibility of producing 83,000 MW of 
electricity.3 Although that mythical figure has been repeated ad infinitum, subsequent 
analysis of commercially and technically feasible projects revised the achievable capacity
1 Dipak Gyawali, Water in Nepal: An Interdisciplinary Look at Resource Uncertainties, 
Evolving Problems, and Future Prospects (Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center, 
Environment and Policy Institute, 1989), 99.
2 Prem Jung Thapa, "Water-Led Development in Nepal: Myths, Limitations and Rational 
Concerns," Water Nepal 5, no. 1 (1997).
3 Reported from the Russian text of the graduate thesis by HM Shrestha, "Cadastre of 
Potential Water Power Resources of Less Studied High Mountainous Regions, with 
Speical Reference to Nepal," Moscow Power Institute, USSR, Moscow (1966).
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to about 43,000 MW, which is the current widely accepted figure.4 To comprehend the 
immensity o f such capacity, it is instructive to know that the total installed hydroelectric 
capacity of India, which is 22 times larger geographically and about 40 times larger in 
population than Nepal, is only about 40,000MW.5 As of 2013, the actual current total 
supply o f electricity in Nepal stands at only 720 MW, of which only 607 MW is 
domestically produced hydroelectricity, against a peak demand of 1090 MW.6 In the 
pithy words of one analyst, current domestic supply of electricity is “insufficient, 
unreliable and expensive.”7 No wonder Nepali politicians and policy-makers see the 
development of large-scale hydro-eclectic projects as the magic bullet to raise Nepalese 
living standards on its path to a developed economy. In other words, what oil had done 
for some Middle-eastern economies, hydropower could do for Nepal.
The manifold excuses for the absence of such dramatic economic gains from 
hydropower include limitations of technical knowledge, political instability, uninviting 
and unpredictable regulatory environment, and political and policy malfeasance. Above 
all else, the most important reason hindering Nepal’s hydropower development is lack of 
adequate capital. Major hydropower projects require major upfront costs for construction 
of large dams; the purchase of turbines and machinery; and construction of capital- 
intensive infrastructure such as roads and tunnels. For one of the poorest economies of 
the world, the lack o f capital for investment has hindered the development of its most 
prized asset. Since domestic capital stock is sorely inadequate, in last several decades 
foreign aid agencies and donor governments have stepped in to provide much needed 
capital. Since the 1970s, international financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB)
4 Government of Nepal Water and Energy Commission Secretariat, "National Water Plan 
- Nepal," (September 2005), http://www.moen.gov.np/pdf_files/national_waterjplan.pdf.
5 1 mega watt (MW) = 1000 kilo watt (kW); Population, size and hydroelectric capacity 
data courtesy of: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "The World Factbook," (n.d.), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/guidetowfbook.html.
6 Nepal Electricity Authority, "Annual Report of Nepal Electricity Authority - Fiscal 
Year 2012/2013," (2013), http://www.nea.org.np/images/supportive_docs/A-Year-in- 
Review-FY-2012-13.pdf.




and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have been one of the primary sources of capital 
in Nepal’s embryonic hydropower field, while donor governments such as Japan, Norway 
and Germany have also provided aid to the Nepal government to develop some projects.8 
Their efforts and aid have been necessary to develop the majority of the current 
hydropower plants in operation.
India, Nepal’s near neighbor, has been by far the largest player in providing and 
offering to provide extensive capital stock to develop major hydropower projects. 
Similarly, Nepalese politicians pin their hopes on the economic might and largesse of the 
other neighbor China were they able to lure that country into becoming a major investor. 
One of the geographic determinants of Nepal’s position is the boundary shaping 
Himalayas, the source of its water resources. This geographic fact directly informs 
Nepal’s social and political discourse and practice because the national mantra has been 
the goal of turning the economic potential of Himalayan hydropower into reality. In its 
interaction with the neighbors India and China, the matter of responsibly and sustainably 
developing Nepal’s water resources are always front and center, and in the last three 
decades the main objective guiding the policy debate in this arena has been to attract 
foreign capital to develop hydropower projects. Thus, while developmental aid from 
multilateral institutions has been utilized for many existing projects, the state is 
increasingly looking to other sources of public and private capital, especially from the 
two large neighboring countries to enhance funding opportunities. As the government and 
private sector of China and India become more capital-abundant, they also look to 
projects that serve their economic interests in Nepal.
There is more than pure economic rationale for most of the larger proposed 
hydropower projects in Nepal. Political consideration of all three actors plays an equally 
important factor in determining if certain projects get funding and get to the building 
stages or completed. The problem is one of coordination in that Nepal would like the 
maximum number of projects developed, which requires varied sources o f foreign
8 Government o f Nepal Water and Energy Commission Secretariat, Energy Sector 
Synopsis Report, (Kathmandu, NepalJuly 2010), 
http://www.wecs.gov.np/pdf7snyopsis.pdf. 53.
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capital. Furthermore, the problem is also o f distributive gains in that Nepal needs to be 
able to obtain the highest negotiated rates for exports of the produced electricity from 
multiple large-scale projects. But neither India nor China (or any other foreign investor) 
can invest ad infinitum because the number of commercially and technically viable 
projects is limited so that one’s profit-motivated investment in a project necessarily 
means lesser options for another. India’s investment limits China’s choices and vice- 
versa, if  both are interested in the finite number of projects that Nepal wants to develop. 
Thus, we can analyze if Nepal has been or is able to leverage its wedge potential in 
attracting major investments and negotiating economically beneficial terms.
Furthermore, local, domestic and regional politics frequently intervene in 
economic and investment matters. When it comes to the larger issue of utilizing water 
resources various related issues are of salience: scarcity of arable land which might be 
used up in large-scale projects; the issues of flood control both in Nepal as well as the 
northern Indian plains; utilization of excess water for irrigation, especially in the dry 
seasons; concerns about sustainable development and environmental degradation; and 
quite importantly, India’s desire for energy security so it can be the major beneficiary of 
this important resource stemming directly from its sphere of influence. We can group 
these concerns into issues of geopolitics of energy security, commercial and economic 
interests, and social or ecological concerns, each of which is duly analyzed below. The 
fundamental question guiding the analysis is whether the pattern of regional economic 
and strategic competition between India and China provides Nepal with better negotiating 
position and economic gains in seeking capital investments in its hydropower sector.
The rest of this chapter will proceed as follows: the first section delineates the 
economic and political interests of the three actors, Nepal, India and China, regarding the 
issue of hydropower sector development in Nepal; the second section reviews the context 
of hydropower sector in Nepal, including the technical and economic concerns, evolution 
of the hydropower policy and regulatory framework towards liberalization, and regional 
concerns of sustainable water resources utilization; the third section analyzes the 
evidence of Indian and Chinese economic roles in Nepal, highlighting the action-reaction 
patterns in the economic aid and investments, specifically highlighting major hydropower
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projects taken up by each country; the fourth section analyzes the evidence to find 
patterns of economic competition resulting in gains for Nepal; and the fifth section gives 
concluding remarks.
SPECIFICATION OF INTERESTS
To reiterate, as used in this research wedge states are defined as those small states 
that are characterized by their equal affinity with two major competitive or rival powers. 
One implication of the wedge state model is that, under favorable conditions of peace and 
issue-sensitivity, the wedge state would be able to accrue economic and other gains due 
to the competitive desire of rival major powers for influence. When we consider the 
hydropower sector, this theoretical discussion leads us to ask a few relevant questions. In 
the case of Nepal as a wedge state between China and India, we may inquire if Nepal’s 
hydropower investments receive more benefits due to the interests of China and India to 
achieve greater influence over Nepal. In order to analyze that question, we may delineate 
the theoretical interests of each of the three states and then review the evidentiary patterns 
of the evolving interaction in the case o f hydropower investments in Nepal. I proceed by 
highlighting the interests of China, India and that of Nepal.
Chinese Interests
In the issue o f capital investments in major hydropower projects in Nepal, a few 
interests may be anticipated for the first major power China. Being a capital rich country 
with a reportedly massive stock of capital, China might be expected to look for promising 
investment projects in Nepal. Firstly, China ought to see investment in Nepal’s 
hydropower sector as a geostrategic choice. In the last six decades since establishing 
formal ties with Nepal, the Chinese Communist Party has maintained a close political and 
economic relationship with Nepal. China has showed its commitment to the friendship by 
giving aid to build various factories, roads and bridges and other infrastructure projects.
The main reason for such generous aid is to maintain friendly relations with Nepal 
but also to remain on par or higher with other donors of such aid, including the U.S.,
U.K., and international financial institutions. But principally China’s ambition surely is to 
remain close to India and thwart attempts to solidify a preeminent position in Nepal. So 
even as a matter of its competitive influence against that of India, the Chinese might want
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to invest in the projects that Nepal critically needs. Secondly, in addition to large aid 
amount, China has invested in profitable ventures in all parts of the world from Africa to 
South America, and in other countries in South Asia. Relatedly, Chinese banks and 
construction companies have the necessary expertise in constructing and financing huge 
dams and other large-scale infrastructure projects. Those firms may indeed look to 
diversify beyond their home markets into Nepal, especially if the Chinese state would 
sufficiently nudge them in that direction for geostrategic reasons.
Nonetheless, one may ask why China would find the investments in the 
hydropower projects of Nepal attractive. These projects are costlier than many other 
forms of direct aid. Crucially, China is unable to benefit directly from the subsequent 
production of electricity because of the geographical and technical challenges of 
transmission of Nepali electricity North into Tibet. China is not the market for Nepalese 
hydroelectricity that India would so naturally become. Despite this crucial limitation of 
actual inability of use, China would be theorized to have the other proximate interests of 
geopolitics and maintenance of friendly relations as reasons for investing in Nepal's 
hydropower sector.
Indian Interests
India, on the other hand, can derive actual and direct benefits from investing in 
and developing Nepal's hydropower projects. Unlike China, which may only see 
tangential geopolitical gains, India is interested in supplying electricity to its vast 
demand, while building dams in the shared rivers of Nepal could directly benefit India as 
a means of controlling regular floods in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh states o f North India. 
Additionally, as the lower riparian the utilization of water resources development projects 
provides India with a source of irrigation during the dry seasons. Therefore, Indian 
interests are primarily based on direct quantifiable gains.
However, geo-strategic concerns are not far behind. India has always been 
hesitant to allow other foreign investments in Nepalese infrastructure, especially Chinese 
investments in what it considers sensitive infrastructure developments such as roads or 
bridges. As the only market for excess Nepalese electricity, India must surely be
108
interested in developing the hydroelectric projects rather than allowing Chinese or other 
third national investments on such critical projects. Thus, as its proximate sphere of 
influence, Indian interests should be in partnering with Nepal to invest and develop 
mutually beneficial hydropower projects.
Apart from the Indian central government, regional state governments as well as 
business lobbies should be expected to have high interest in developing Nepalese 
hydropower projects and also being concerned about how or who are allowed to invest in 
that sector. As the primary market for the exported electricity, Indian interests genuinely 
encompass the core issues of costs and pricing of produced electricity, which should 
further motivate India to be willing to partner with Nepal in investing in the projects from 
the start. As for the business interests, the Nepalese electrical and construction markets 
should prove attractive to Indian banking, construction and power companies, be they 
private or governmental.
Nepalese Interests
As a capital scarce small state, Nepal's interest in attracting foreign capital to 
develop its natural water resources is straightforward. The proximate motivation is of 
course fulfilling skyrocketing domestic demand of electricity for consumption and 
productivity. Nepalese policymakers and politicians are well aware of the people's 
demand for greater supply of electricity to fulfill the need for household use. More 
broadly, massive investment in hydro-projects is seen as a way to raise the living 
standards of the Nepalese people if it were able to export excess electricity. The ultimate 
interest, to reiterate, is to leverage hydro-fueled economic development.
Yet, within the Nepali state and society there are myriad interest groups that have 
their own motivations and preferences in seeing the kind and type of foreign investment 
in the Nepali hydro sector. Theoretically, we can identify the following state and societal 
level interests, which in amalgam work together or at cross purposes to hinder a simple 
synthesis of the Nepalese interests in the issue of hydropower investment by foreign 
governments or private companies.
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At the state level, Nepal in recent decades has been characterized foremost by 
instability resulting in almost incoherent formulation of its national interests. Numerous 
governments have been installed and removed on top of radical changes on the very 
nature of the state from one-party monarchy to multiparty constitutional monarchy on the 
road via a civil war to a Republic. Yet, the Nepali state’s unwavering interest in 
developing Nepal's water resources using foreign capital investments has remained intact. 
Policies have changed from full nationalization to allowing private investments and 
creating a business-friendly climate of investment from before and private sector or in 
public-private partnership models. It is the role of the state to seek and administer foreign 
aid and to formulate investment related policies and the negotiations thereof. In that 
context, Nepal has to look to both India and China in addition to the various donor 
governments and agencies for capital and technical transfers. The exact formula for how 
to succeed in such plans has been the exercise of countless reiterative policy debates and 
formulations. As part of the state, the hydropower bureaucracy oversees the construction 
of projects and infrastructure, the generation and transmission of electricity and its 
subsequent distribution and possibility for export. The interests and roles off the 
government bureaucracy is to continue being the controller of bespoke capital projects 
and to maintain their central position in the hydropower related societal stakeholders.
At the societal level, we can observe the role of the political parties; civil society 
groups including academics, technical experts, and activists; water and environment 
related NGOs; the business and corporate groups engaged in the hydro sector; and lastly 
the general population. For the political parties the question of the fruitful utilization of 
Nepal's water resources is not merely confined to the policy and technical details, but is 
also about the highly contentious issues o f nationalism, ideology, financial and political 
power regulation, and often serve as tools of garnering general political support and 
political capital. Each major and minor political party has an ideological stance on how or 
if to attract foreign capital for hydro projects, from which sources, and at what cost to 
nationalist sentiments. Ever since Nepal began welcoming foreign capital to develop its 
water resources, there have been examples of democratic governments falling due mainly 
or in part to the political opposition wielding such slogans as "selling Nepal's rivers" or
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not doing enough to get the best investment deals on major past projects. Civil society 
interest groups include academics and technical experts as well as activists and related 
NGOs advocating local rights or environmental sustainability. These groups and 
individuals spouse a wide range of interests and preferences regarding the hydro sector 
development and investments in Nepal. For example, technical experts disagree among 
themselves and cautioned against large dams in favor of small, economically feasible 
projects with the domestic capital for local electricity consumption. Academics and 
activists highlight the needs of the local population as well as preserving national 
interests above the profit motives of foreign investors. Many water related NGOs and 
activists campaign in support of the local population who may have to bear the costs of 
large-scale infrastructure projects as well as the environmental impact o f such 
construction in the fragile Himalayan ecosystem. The interests of Nepali business houses, 
construction companies and financial institutions center around the question of granting 
of licenses for individual projects, the regulations limiting or granting co-ventures, and 
the requirement o f local partners for joint ventures.
When it comes to major infrastructure projects, the concerns and voices of the 
general population at large and the local concerned population might also be paramount. 
Projects large and small have to address the demands and well-being of the local 
population that may be displaced due to dam construction or whose livelihoods, land and 
the local flora and fauna may also be affected. The local population has also demanded an 
equity share in the future companies that are built in their lands. Or they have demanded 
work during the construction of the projects in their region. All these groups press the 
interests and cases to the political parties, the state and its bureaucracy to recognize their 
concerns and to address them when formulating the policies that are the synthetic product 
of the national interest of Nepal. The state has to be responsive to these local, parochial 
and specific concerns while balancing the national need for more electricity supply to 
people like under the yoke of daily blackouts of up to sixteen hours. The aspiration of 
economic development is also a nationwide dream widely shared by the public.
Two examples may serve to highlight the contending interests as discussed above 
and their impact in the hydropower sector in Nepal. Indian involvement in the Mahakali
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river project in the early 1990s resulted in major political upheaval in Kathmandu, 
causing subsequent government to fall due in part to the political protests generated by 
nascent water resources development deals.9 Also, social and community mobilization 
reflecting the influence of civil-society interests groups caused many proposed 
hydropower projects to be shelved, abandoned or delayed due to political and social 
opposition creating a climate not favorable to development. The prime example of such a 
case is that of the large-scale Arun III project during the mid-1990s, in which the World 
Bank was forced to abandon the plan because of widespread community activism, both 
national and transnational, resulting in major political opposition.10
Channeling of Nepal's national interest when it comes to attracting foreign, 
specially Indian and Chinese, capital investments is a delicate balance of contending 
interests from all sections o f state and society. However, the proposition of Nepal as a 
wedge state between competing rivals should suggest that it would try to gain maximum 
benefits in this case of hydropower development. In this context, one expects that Nepal 
would try to negotiate the best possible hydropower deals to placate the various internal 
interest groups but also to get the best possible package from India due to China's interest 
and from China due to India's. To further analyze such interactive dynamics, I begin by 
reviewing the larger context of the hydropower sector in Nepal, highlighting the actual 
potential as well as limitations—technical, economic, environmental and political 
concerns—that directly inform the negotiation process of hydropower development.
HYDROPOWER IN CONTEXT: POTENTIAL AND LIMITATIONS
As a landmass sitting on the lap of the Himalayas, water is Nepal’s largest natural 
resource. More than 6000 rivers, small and large, flow from the some of the tallest peaks 
of the world through narrow gorges with enough force to be economically feasible to 
build hydroelectric plants. There are four main river basins: Kamali, Mahakali, Gandaki, 
and Koshi, all of which flow through Nepal to feed into the Ganges in northern India.
9 Dipak Gyawali and Ajaya Dixit, "Mahakali Impasse and Indo-Nepal Water Conflict," 
Economic and Political Weekly (1999).
10 Alfred Escher, "World Bank Withdraws from Arun III Project at Inspection Panel's 
Recommendation," Human Rights Brief 3 (l)(¥all 1995), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v3i l/wldbnk31 .htm.
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While the economic impact of a sufficiently developed hydropower sector could 
hardly be overstated, the context of Nepal’s hydropower sector suffers significant 
technical, economic, social and political limitations domestically. In a regional frame, the 
complex nature of the water resources flowing through Nepal into India further 
complicates matters geopolitically. We begin here to contextualize such domestic 
complexities o f the sector as the first step before analyzing Nepal’s interaction with India 
and China regarding hydropower investments in the subsequent section.
Hydropower Potential and Present Reality
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Figure 5.1: Major Hydropower projects of Nepal (Courtesy Nepal Electricity Authority)
113
Of the technically feasible capacity of 43,000 MW of hydro-electricity, Nepal has 
a current installed production of about 750 MW, or about less 1.75% of capacity." The 
figure above represents the current and proposed major hydropower projects in Nepal. 
The consequence of such miniscule utilization of water resource is felt both in the loss of 
economic productivity and social well being, much less the absence o f revenue from 
large-scale exports. Most visibly, average Nepali consumers on a daily basis feel lack of 
adequate electricity supply. Only about 50% of the population has actual access to 
electric supply in their homes.12 Even those that do have access do not have reliable or 
adequate supply to meet their daily demands. For the last two decades, people have 
endured daily “load-shedding” or blackouts due to the inability of the Nepal Electrical 
Authority (NEA) to supply adequate electricity. During the dry seasons when the 
production dwindles, people in Kathmandu, the capital city face up to 16 hours of 
blackouts daily.13 So there is tremendous unmet demand for electricity for household 
consumption on top of spotty coverage that leaves more than half of the population out of 
reach of national electric grids.
Lack of adequate supply also causes industrial loss of productivity because 
factories have to stop production or rely on expensive alternative sources of energy, 
which adds to their bottom line. Actually, this loss of productivity is spread across all the 
sectors of society and economy. Companies and educational institutions cannot rely on 
uninterrupted supply of basic electricity in the information age. In such a scenario, 
foreign investment into Nepal is cautious at best or turned away. Another consequence of 
inadequate utilization of the hydropower potential is the cost of electricity that the 
consumers must bear. Rising population and rapid urbanization has spiked demand of 
electricity, projected to increase at the rate of at least 7.5% yearly until 2028 AD from the
" Nepal Electricity Authority, "Annual Report of Nepal Electricity Authority - Fiscal 
Y ear2012/2013". 111.
12 Bergner, "Developing Nepal’s Hydroelectric Resources: Policy Alternatives". 7.
13 Deepak Adhikari, "Power to the People? Nepal's Hydropower Debate," China 
Dialogue(Jan\xary 24, 2011), https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/4070-power-to-the- 
people-.
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current demand base of about 1094 MW.14 Yet, Nepali consumers already pay the highest 
tariff for electricity in South Asia region.15 Thus, because of the lack of adequate and 
economical supply of electricity, more than 85% of Nepal’s energy usage comes from 
wood burning or agricultural waste, which harms the environment while petroleum 
imports, which constitutes about 7% of energy usage, drains the economy of valuable 
foreign currency.16 Yet, the dire consequences of lack of supply are exacerbated, 
hindering increase in production, because of a host of regulatory and policy issues; 
technical, economic and environmental limitations; and regional concerns.
Institutional and Policy Evolution
The first hydroelectric project built in Nepal was the Pharping power plant near 
Kathmandu. Constructed in 1911 for the private consumption of the ruling elites,
Pharping produced 500 KW of electricity, which was transmitted to their residences in 
Kathmandu by 6 miles of transmission lines.17 For a half-century since that pioneer 
project, development of hydropower projects remained largely dormant. It was only in 
the second half of the twentieth century that the government began to pursue the 
hydropower dream by creating various institutional mechanisms and agencies.
Beginning in the 1950s, the policy and regulatory framework in the realm of 
hydropower reflected the then Panchayat government’s larger economic policies based on 
autarky and state-led development. The First Five-year Plan adopted in 1956 began the 
practice of including large and largely unmet hydropower production targets. A few small 
to mid-sized hydropower projects began to be built by the efforts of the Electricity 
Department under the then His Majesty’s Government (HMG), and the establishment of 
the Nepal Electricity Corporation (NEC) in 1962 regulated the process of transmission 
and distribution of electricity.
14 Nepal Electricity Authority, "Annual Report of Nepal Electricity Authority - Fiscal 
Year 2012/2013". 8, 109.
15 Bergner, "Developing Nepal’s Hydroelectric Resources: Policy Alternatives". 9.
16 Ibid., 9-10.
17 Deepak Adhikari, "Hydropower Development in Nepal," NRB Economic Review 
18(2006): 72-73.
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In 1985, the hydropower and electricity regulatory authority was centrally 
consolidated by the aegis Ministry of Water Resources under the newly created NEA, 
which assumed sole responsibility for the generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity for the entire nation.18 The institutional set-up included the research and study 
functions carried out by the Water and Energy Commission Secretariat (WECS) as well 
as the Department of Electricity Development, both under the Ministry o f Water 
Resources established in 1976 and 1981 respectively.19 During the absolute hereditary 
Rana rule and the monarchic Panchayat system of government until the People’s 
Movement of 1990, the hydropower sector was entirely state-based and the productive 
capacity was merely increased from 500KW in 1911 to about 235 MW during that period 
of eighty years.20
Since the restoration of constitutional democracy in 1990, successive 
governments have produced major policies and regulations to govern the commercial and 
social utilization of water resources, advancing particular incentives to create a favorable 
climate for hydropower development. The main policy innovation, maybe reflecting the 
larger economic policy trends, is the objective of attractive domestic and foreign capital 
in the hydropower sector and to create an investor-friendly climate. The Electricity Act o f  
1992 and the Electricity Regulation o f1993 first set up the regime of licensing for survey, 
generation, transmission and distribution of electricity for mid-size or higher
71hydroelectric projects. The avowed aim of these evolving regulations were to invite 
domestic and foreign private capital for hydropower investment projects with such 
incentives as income tax and custom tariffs exemptions for technical inputs, five-year 
tax-holiday as well as mechanism for repatriation of invested capital in foreign 
currency.22 However, the overarching frame of this, and subsequent water resources and 




21 WaterAid Nepal, Water Laws in Nepal: Laws Relating to Drinking Water, Sanitation, 




trustee o f all natural resources on behalf of the Nepali people. As such the state is 
empowered to develop and manage natural resources, including hydropower to serve the 
public interest.”23 Thus, for any foreign or domestic private investments in the water 
resources or hydropower projects, the role of the state was and remains central. The state 
grants licenses for feasible projects with the prospect of collecting royalties. Also, the 
produced electricity, especially for mid-sized to larger projects, is to be fed to the national 
grid managed by the only government entity entrusted by such function, the NEA.
A major formulation of the official policies specifically regarding hydropower 
sector came in the form of The Hydropower Development Policy o f2001. This policy 
responded to the growing need of an “open and liberal” hydropower development policy, 
which was “investment friendly, clear, simple and transparent” and again adhering to the 
age-old objective to “develop hydropower as an exportable commodity,” in addition to 
realizing Nepal’s potential for low-cost electricity for domestic consumption, rural 
electrification and economic development.”24As it relates to the large-scale projects to 
produce high quantities of electricity for consumption and export, the major plank of the 
hydropower development policy of 2001 is based on creating a favorable climate for 
attracting foreign and domestic private capital in conjunction with a strategy of seeking 
“bilateral or regional cooperation in the hydropower development sector taking into 
consideration the feasibility of hydropower in Nepal and the demands of electric energy 
in neighboring countries in view of the fact that development of hydropower in Nepal 
supports not only the domestic but also the regional economy.”25 The policy envisages 
foreign investors using joint venture companies with Nepalese investors as well as 
public-private partnership ventures for the generation, transmission and distribution 
including export of electricity. In order to facilitate such joint ventures, the government 
pushed forwards quite liberal regulatory, taxation and industrial policies governing 
hydropower projects, such as: the guarantee that projects and plants would not be
23 Ibid., 58.
24 His Majesty's Government o f Nepal Ministry of Water Resources, The Hydropower 





nationalized during the license period; exchange facility for foreign investors to repatriate 
capital and profits at market rates in the form of foreign currencies; ease of worker visa 
for the employees of foreign firms to work in Nepal during the period of construction and 
operation of the plants; value added tax (VAT) holiday for machineries, equipment and 
spare parts for the plants; only one-percent customs duty on technical imports related to 
the hydro project construction, etc.26
The envisaged outcome of such economic inducements to foreign investors are 
the following: major hydropower projects are constructed under the concept of “Build, 
Operate, Own and Transfer,” in which foreign investors would seek a license to build and 
operate major hydropower projects, the produced electricity would be sold to the national 
grid or exported under a strict “power purchase agreement” signed a priori with the 
governmental agencies, the government received royalty sums for the use of water 
resources which is certain percent of the produced value of electrical energy; and finally 
once the license period ends, which can range from thirty to thirty-five years, the 
operating plants would be transferred to the ownership of the Government of Nepal.27
Along with the particular policies and regulations, the hydropower policy also 
mandated a thorough institutional rearrangement so as to respond efficiently to the tasks 
of managing the licensing processes, attract major investments as well as operate the 
national grid among other functions. Central to the government bodies remains NEA, 
which operates the hydropower plants, conducts electricity transmission through the 
national grid as well as distribution within the country. The hydropower policy called for 
the existing Department o f Electricity Development, under the latterly renamed Ministry 
of Energy (MOEN), as the promotional body to provide a “one-window policy” to 
facilitate private domestic and foreign investors in the hydropower sector.28
The other major policy documents guiding the hydropower sector are the Water 
Resources Strategy adopted in 2002 and the subsequent National Water Plan of 2005, 
both of which were produced with extensive consultations with myriad domestic
26 Ibid., 13-14, 27.
27 Ibid., 10, 12-13, 19, 23-26.
28 Ibid., 30.
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stakeholders and experts. Reflecting the vociferous domestic interests of local 
populations, experts and activists, these major policies address overarching national 
water-related concerns of fair use, equity, local-level benefits, rural electrification, 
pollution and sustainable development.29 In the particular realm of hydropower, the 
policy direction of attracting private investment and large-scale development is continued 
with the major objective being, “cost-effective hydropower developed in a sustainable 
manner.”30 These policy statements again contained some ambitious production targets; 
just one example, reaching total capacity of 2230 MW by 2017, which now is surely 
unattainable.
Despite the central level water resources and hydropower bodies producing plenty 
o f policies and strategies regarding the path to develop major hydropower projects, the 
fact that higher level political turmoil and instability with reshuffling cabinets, changing 
policy directions and lack of follow-through on stated policy aims have produced less 
progress in the level of investments than envisioned. Such climate of political and policy 
instability has caused the government to consistently miss its hydropower production 
targets amid projects construction overruns and many more that do not move beyond the 
surveying state. Relatedly, another constant criticism of the governmental bureaucracy is 
the lack of a true “one-window” agency empowered to handle the requests and concerns 
of potential and current hydropower investors.31
Technical, Economic and Environmental Concerns
Conventional wisdom suggests that Nepal being a poor country, lack of capital is 
the most important cause hindering the proper growth its existent hydropower potential. 
While that may well be the case, in his pioneering work on Nepal’s water resources, 
Dipak Gyawali problematizes such simplistic views and seeks an interdisciplinary 
understanding of the complex system of decisions affecting proper human use of water
29 Government of Nepal Water and Energy Commission Secretariat, "Executive 
Summary: Water Resources Strategy," (January 2002),
http://www.moen.gov.np/pdf_files/water_resources_strategy.pdf; "National Water Plan - 
Nepal".
30 "Executive Summary: Water Resources Strategy", xv.
31 Bergner, "Developing Nepal’s Hydroelectric Resources: Policy Alternatives". 15.
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and the resulting policies thereof. He highlights how the historical local usage of water by 
farmers and villagers often comes in conflict with the grand designs o f state-builders.32 
Furthermore, when enumerating technical issues with easy development of hydropower 
projects, the lack of most and accuracy of the rest of basic scientific knowledge is of 
great concern. For example, geological data of all the water sources; meteorological data 
related to the variations in waterfall in different seasons; economic data about the effects 
of dam construction on downstream farmers and their livelihoods; as well as 
environmental and ecological impact of such construction on fragile and mountainous 
locations are sorely lacking to the satisfaction of proper project planning as well as 
averting major catastrophes.33 Writing in the late 1980s, Gyawali bemoaned what he 
called “donor derived data,” arguing that the project donors necessarily had a bias in 
measurement of basic scientific data about the proposed projects so that various foreign 
aid schemes came to differing conclusions about similar or same projects.34
Almost twenty years later, the official policy documents governing the water 
resources sector also highlighted the lack of good scientific data and knowledge on 
various issues areas, especially the need for data on flood forecasting, hydrogeology, and 
geo-seismology.35 The solution is not to blame the donor agencies but to empower the 
national and local state and non-state impartial agencies to collect vital relevant data not 
only specific projects but also build the vital stock of domestic scientific base, which can 
be better utilized in formulating and implementing projects as well as negotiating the 
investments in those projects by foreign investors.
The technical concerns and issues regarding Nepal’s geology and topography 
reflect directly on the debate regarding the path of hydropower development that would 
be suitable for Nepal to follow. Technologically there are two major types of hydropower 
projects: the first type is called run-of-river (ROR) and diverts the flow of the river to a 
turbine to generate electricity; the second type called large-storage projects, requires
32 Gyawali, Water in Nepal, 6-7.
33 Ibid., 13-14.
34 Ibid.
35 Water and Energy Commission Secretariat, "Executive Summary: Water Resources 
Strategy", v.
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construction of large dams in a reservoir submerging large areas of land from which 
water flows into turbines.36 It is established that ROR projects are less detrimental to the 
natural trajectory of the river and also less damaging to the landscape and topography, 
but the major benefit and attraction of the reservoir type dammed-construction projects is 
that they can boast much much higher capacity to produce electricity. There are only two 
currently operational reservoir-type projects in Nepal. Most of the planned projects 
prioritized by the official bureaucracy and all recent governments, which also the ones 
requiring large foreign capital inputs, are these larger, more controversial and higher 
capacity reservoir-type dammed plants.
These large-scale dammed or reservoir projects have been criticized by wide 
swathes of activists and groups. Based on Nepal’s geological qualities, topographical 
features and seismic fault lines as well as dramatic ecological and climactic variations, 
Gyawali argues that construction of large dams is quite unreasonable.37 Also, for the vast 
majority o f the rural population who reside in areas far away from the national 
transmission grip, small or micro-scale hydropower projects built for local electricity 
needs are argued to be more beneficial.38 Using economic analysis of the cost ratio of 
production of unit of electricity in a small-scale ROR project versus a large reservoir-type 
project leads Bergner to conclude that the ROR projects would best serve Nepal’s short to 
medium term goal of reducing shortage of electricity leading to the crippling black-
TOouts. Another critique from economic perspective of the conventional policy regarding 
the desire and huge investments in the major hydropower projects is the question of 
opportunity costs: by heightening preference for capital-intensive projects built on aid or 
loans, what other important and necessary avenues of social development does the 
Nepalese state disregard?40
36 Adhikari, "Hydropower Development in Nepal," 73-74.
37 Gyawali, Water in Nepal, 21.
38 Adhikari, "Power to the People? Nepal's Hydropower Debate".
39 Bergner, "Developing Nepal’s Hydroelectric Resources: Policy Alternatives". 45-46.
40 Thapa, "Water-Led Development in Nepal: Myths, Limitations and Rational 
Concerns," 34-35.
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A national debate about such questions of technical, environmental and economic 
cost-benefit analysis has not given sufficiently definitive answer to inevitably privilege 
large-scale hydropower development relying on foreign capital transfusion. Thus, the 
national and domestic interests from all sectors of society find ample support in opposing 
many such projects unless the government and bureaucracy are able to sufficiently 
placate them. Such political and social opposition also sway the patterns of interaction 
seen between Nepal and its potential investment partners China and India. Those patterns 
of interaction over time and on two specific representative projects are analyzed in the 
next section.
EVIDENCE: ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND INVESTMENTS
Observers o f the budding global game of China-India rivalry find in their 
competitive economic statecraft echoes of the Cold War competition between USA and 
USSR in their interaction vis-a-vis the Third World countries. Economic diplomacy is 
seen as a prime tool, and far reaches of the globe such as Africa, South America as well 
as Central and South Asia seem like the theater of the competitive drama. In such a 
scenario, in the last few years major global media have fervently analyzed the prospect of 
Nepal as a state ripe for swelling Chinese economic and cultural entanglements 
signifying increased political influence at the expense of the historically favorable 
position enjoyed by India.41 And from the view o f Indian observers, the recent trend of 
ever enlarging Nepal-China bilateral trade relations, record economic aid and investment 
in sensitive infrastructure projects from China, along with increased number o f Chinese 
tourists and mushrooming Mandarin language schools in Kathmandu, all add to imply a 
certain nervousness and caution as well as a call for the New Delhi establishment to not 
lose the initiative.42 Some recent Indian reports are downright alarmist, painting a gloomy
41 John Daly, "India and China Vie for Influence in Nepal," Oilprice.co/w(March 13,
2012), http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Asia/India-and-China-Vie-for-Influence-in- 
Nepal.html; Rajesh Joshi, "Why China's Influence on Nepal Worries India," 
BBC.comQAay 8, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22365488; Wong, "China 
Makes Inroads in Nepal, and Stanches Tibetan Influx".
42 Aditya Kaul, "Delhi Loses Initiative as Nepal Seals Power Deal with Beijing," Daily 
News andAnalysis{ September 19,2012), http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-delhi- 
loses-initiative-as-nepal-seals-power-deal-with-beijing-1742574.
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zero-sum picture, one in which China is bent on fomenting “anti-India” propaganda in 
Nepal based on the platform of Maoist ideology and carried out on the backs of the many 
China study centers in Nepal as well as by the monetary support for some community 
radio stations in the borders town across India that are supposedly used for such 
propaganda and training.43 Most of these reports cite the evidence of the strengthening 
Chinese position in the matter of Tibet and Tibetan refugees in Nepal as the result of 
increasing Chinese economic role paying political dividends, as was analyzed in detail in 
the previous chapter.
Before the liberalization of the Nepalese economy in the early 1990s, culminating 
with the Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act o f 1992,44 foreign investments 
were mainly limited to bilateral or multilateral aid. In the private sector, the FDI trend 
during the years 1988 to 2001 showed a clear bias towards Indian investment against that 
of the Chinese. Most foreign firms found it best to partner with Nepalese firms to 
establish joint ownership. There were 249 approved investment projects with Indian 
corporate partners totaling $419.7 million of which 25.9% equity was held by the foreign 
equity partners. For the Chinese firms (including those from Hong Kong), there were 69 
approved projects with the total investment amount of $131.8 million of which 
approximately 32% equity was held by the foreign partners. However, the vast majority 
of these foreign investments approved projects never got off the ground and were made in 
the local service or manufacturing sectors with the intent of local consumption. Barely 
two hydropower projects received FDI.45 The period from late 1990s to mid-2000s saw 
significant decline of FDI inflows in Nepal due to the civil war and the deteriorating 
security situation. Despite improving conditions since 2008, Nepal only received about
43 Abhishek Bhalla, "Chinese Movement in Nepal Raises Concerns for India's Security 
Establishment," India 7Wqy(November 27, 2012),
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/chinese-movement-nepal-cause-of-worry-india-india- 
today/1/234876.html.
44 There was a previous act promulgated in 1982 with the same name but that didn’t lead 
to any meaningful FDI inflows, see, G.M. Jha et al., "Determinants of FDI in South 
Asia," International Research Journal o f  Social Sciences 2, no. 1 (January 2013): 4.
45 Prema-chandra Athukorala and Kishor Sharma, "Foreign Investment in a Least 
Developed Country: The Nepalese Experience," Transnational Corporations 15, no. 2 
(2006): 137-38.
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0.8 percent of total FDI inflow into South Asia and was second to last in comparison to 
its South Asian neighbors in attracting FDI.46 Given such low level of success in 
attracting private FDI, Nepal has continued rely on bilateral aid and multilateral grants 
for major infrastructure projects. Thus, the most visible and noteworthy evidence of 
growing Chinese and Indian competition over influence in Nepal is found in the strictly 
economic realm of bilateral aid and investments.
Nepal’s quest to realize its hydropower promise by leveraging foreign capital 
makes it an interstate geopolitical problem of interest to both India and China. The need 
for foreign capital has been highlighted earlier. However, another facet of the problem is 
finding export markets. Due to geographical problem of long-distance transmission as 
well as the question of commercial feasibility, India is the only viable market for 
hydroelectricity exports. The vast population centers of northern India are in dire need of 
excess energy sources, particularly electric energy. However, the only prospect of Nepali 
electricity export is possible only to India means that Nepal is necessary a “captive 
market” and the bilateral relationship in this sphere is thus a monopsony 47 The limitation 
of such a condition is that when we speak of a tripartite interaction between Nepal, India 
and China in the development of hydropower sector in Nepal, we have to question if 
China even holds any advantage vis-a-vis India. Yet, if we were to look from the 
perspective o f the Nepali state and policymakers, the wish is to engage Chinese interests 
in the capital transfusion, construction of major projects and technical transfers.
Analyzing specifically the bilateral aid and technical transfer in the hydropower 
investment sector also points to possible wedging benefits being enjoyed by Nepal. To 
that end, the prior section reviewed the evolution of the policies formulated by Nepal to 
create a climate attractive for private and foreign capital in water resources and 
hydropower development. Here I present an overview of the Nepalese economic 
interaction with China and India respectively in the realm of the hydropower sector in 
particular. Then I analyze a representative investment project, the West Seti Hydropower 
Project, to review the pattern of Nepal’s wedging interaction with the two rival powers.
46 Jha et al., "Determinants of FDI in South Asia," 4.
47 Gyawali, Water in Nepal, 80.
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Expanding Chinese Economic Influence
Nepalese leaders and policymakers have always counted on China to play the 
counterweight to the pervasive Indian economic impact. However, in the early decades in 
the modem era, in the years since the early 1950s, the young People’s Republic seemed 
reluctant to directly challenge the Indian hegemonic role. While China provided not 
insignificant aid, ranging from cash and goods, and in helping build various factories in 
industries as diverse as shoes, paper products, and sugar in the 1960s. Capital grants for 
infrastructure projects included the highly sensitive highway linking Kathmandu to 
Kodari, in Tibet, as well as the ring road and a trolley bus line in Kathmandu. However, 
Indian unease with a big Chinese footprint was highlighted when Chinese offer to build 
part of a major national highway nearby Indian border had to be turned down. All in all, 
as John Whelpton has argued, early Chinese forays into Nepal remained rooted on the 
pragmatic notion of not “unduly provoking India,” a reasoning that was given by the then 
Chinese Premiere Zhou Enlai to his Nepali counterpart B. P. Koirala in 1960 to explain 
why Chinese aid would be necessarily lesser than that from India.48 Another important 
reason, of course, was the heavy presence of the American strategic and aid commitments 
in Nepal, which tapered off after the Sino-US rapprochement in the 1970s.
Beginning in the 1990s and particularly in the last decade, a few factors led to a 
growth in the Chinese private and state investments in Nepal. First of all, the Chinese 
liberalization policies created significant number of semi-state and private firms willing 
to venture abroad to find new markets, and engage in trade and investment opportunities. 
As Chinese firms began to take global economic proportions, some found economic 
reasons to venture into beyond its boundaries, including in Nepal. Thus, globalization of 
Chinese capital and firms played a role in expanding Chinese role in trade and economic 
relations with Nepal.
Trade between China and Nepal primarily occurs through Tibet and Hong Kong, 
and in the past decade the trade imbalance has shown worrying trends. According to the 
data from Trade and Export Promotion Center of the Government of Nepal, Chinese 
imports grew five-fold between fiscal year 2001/2002 to fiscal year 2010/2011 from
48 Whelpton, A History o f Nepal, 133.
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about Nepalese Rupees (NRs.) 8.75 billion to NRs. 45.64 billion, while the trade deficit 
rose from NRs. 7.7 billion to NRs. 44.89 billion. Nepalese exports during the same period 
hardly rose above an average of NRs. 1 billion.49 This rate of burgeoning trade imbalance 
has rightly drawn the concern of policymakers but also suggests the level of growth in 
trade relations.
Secondly, as described in the previous section, Nepal’s economic liberalization 
and the shift to market-friendly regime including in the hydropower sector made it 
attractive for Chinese firms in the construction and hydropower business. Tthe desire and 
commitment shown by the Nepalese leaders to posit Chinese aid and investments as a 
“win-win” for both parties and as a symbol of Sino-Nepalese friendship has only more 
germane. Major Chinese construction companies and hydropower developers, such as 
Sinohydro, HydroChina Corporation and others have bid for survey licenses and 
construction contracts backed by official Chinese government loans or in joint ventures 
with Nepalese private companies in the Nepalese hydropower sector. Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs reports that as of 2012, China is the topmost investor in Nepal, with total 
committed investment of NRs. 7,860 million in 428 projects, which created 26,651 
jobs.50 Although, there were various Chinese funded hydropower and other projects, the 
fact was that reaching the top perch in investment in Nepal was majorly based on one 
gigantic project commitment in the West Seti hydropower project, which is discussed in 
detail as the representative case in the following section. Before that, I review the 
enduring and crucial role India plays in the larger Nepalese economy as well as in the aid 
and investments in infrastructure projects including in the hydropower sector.
Enduring Indian Economic Interests
As the traditional social, cultural and economic partner India was an early source 
of major aid for Nepal’s infrastructure projects, including in the water resources 
development sector. Dating to the 1950s, independent India had its own national interest 
front and center in developing water-related projects in Nepal. The first couple such
49 Trade and Export Promotion Center; Ministry of Commerce and Supplies; Government 
of Nepal, "Trade Statistics: Nepal's Trade with China P.R.".
50 Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Government of Nepal, "Nepal - People's Republic of 
China Relations," (2012), http://www.mofa.gov.np/en/nepal-china-relations-78.html.
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projects involved the two major river systems in Nepal, the Sapta Koshi barrage project 
in 1954 and the Sapta Gandaki project in 1959, which were designed almost exclusively 
to provide irrigation for the northern Indian plains and to better manage the yearly floods 
suffered in those regions.51 Because the direct benefits to Nepal from those early major 
projects were miniscule in terms of the amount of hydroelectricity or water for irrigation, 
nationalist sentiments in the country began to ally firmly against Indian “big-brotherly” 
method of utilizing Nepalese water resources.52 In the subsequent decades, a segment of 
the society and political parties continued to view with suspicion any major deals agreed 
with India, resulting in many recent proposed water resources projects drawing political 
opposition and delay. However, being situated completely in the major power projection 
zone of India, Nepalese policymakers and leaders of every stripe are cognizant that Nepal 
remains the mercy of patently self-interested economic largesse of India in terms of aid, 
investments and trade relations. Analysts describe land-locked Nepal more properly as 
“India-locked,” so that despite some misgivings Indian economic role in Nepal has 
always remained paramount.
The early Indian economic role in Nepal in the infrastructure sector included the 
construction of the airport in Kathmandu and the Tribhuwan Highway linking 
Kathmandu to Birganj, a Nepalese border town with India, both of which were taken up 
in the mid 1950s. Over the decades, other Indian economic aid included infrastructure 
projects such as the East-West national highway, aid to establish educational institutions 
and provide scholarship opportunities for Nepalese students, hospitals, aid in the 
agricultural and irrigation projects, as well as building factories in various industries. 
However, the larger economic relationship also suffered from the fact that Nepal relied 
heavily on imports from India without the corresponding matching volume in exports 
there. Overwhelming trade dependence, exacerbated due to its land-locked geography 
requiring the use Indian ports and overland routes, warranted that Nepal has not been able 
to sufficiently diversify its trade relations beyond India to other third countries. In the last
51 Santa Bahadur Pun, "Hydropower Development in Nepal: Lessons from Past Models," 
Hydro Nepal: Journal o f  Water, Energy and Environment 2(2008), 
http://www.nepjol.info/index.php/HN/issue/view791 /showToc.
52 Whelpton, A History o f  Nepal, 132.
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two decades, the increasing trade deficit amid ballooning trade figures reflect the 
dependent nature of such prolonged economic interaction.
In the arena of hydropower investments, India has long been the potential source 
of major aid and capital. The first hydroelectric project built with Indian aid was the 14 
MW capacity facility built at the Trishuli River, which was completed in 1971. While 
India also showed interest in developing other potential major and mega-projects over the 
decades since, including the Kamali and Mahakali rivers, internal political and policy 
uncertainty as well as recurrent opposition to Indian-led proposals stalled those efforts 
periodically, well into the 1990s.53 Beginning with the liberalization of the hydropower 
sector in the 1990s, many large-scale hydropower project licenses have been won by 
private and semi-private Indian companies. Many of these proposed Indian-built projects 
are export-oriented that are conceived to sell generated power to Indian grid, which 
include: the 900 MW Upper Kamali project to be by Indian company GMR; the 900 MW 
Arun 3 (which was previously shelved by the World Bank) to be built by quasi-private 
Indian firm Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd.; and the 303 MW Namian, which is to be built 
by another private Indian firm LANCO Infratech Ltd.54 Although none of these projects 
have begun construction yet, it is interesting to note that survey licenses for a majority of 
major hydropower projects have been bid for and won by Indian construction majors with 
the express intent of exporting to the Indian market.
When it comes to the Indian government’s direct role via investments and aid in 
Nepal’s hydropower sector, there are a few utilitarian motives and interests, and to realize 
them we find projects being mooted in a grander scale yet. In the last decade, the northern 
Indian plains of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh suffered many devastating flood seasons. 
Another important consideration is the growing demand of electricity in the bordering 
regions and the national grid itself. So one o f the major planks of Indian water resources 
strategy is to build mega-structures at the source of the flood-prone river systems in 
Nepal, such as at the Sapta Koshi River and at the Mahakali (called the Sarda river in
53 Ibid., 132, 39.
54 Government of Nepal Department of Electricity Development, "List o f Issued Survey 
Licenses (above 100 MW)," (September 2014),
http://www.doed.gov.np/survey_license_for_generation_above-100mw.php.
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India) river. It was precisely in the former river systems that India helped build earlier 
dams in the 1950s; however now their utility and efficiency has eroded and they have 
become outmoded. Thus, Indian government has proposed to replace those older 
structures with new mega structures such as the 3000 MW Sapta Koshi High Dam 
Multipurpose Project55 and the approximately 6500 MW Pancheswar High Dam Project 
at the Mahakali river.56 The express interest encompasses high level o f electricity for 
consumption, flood control in the plains and water diverted for irrigating the land even 
during the dry seasons.
It has to be noted that the neither of these mega-projects have yet reached final 
agreement phases and the political and policy process has been stuck in the initial survey 
and technical study phase, while public and political opposition to the perceived “selling 
of rivers” to India remains a distinct reality. It bears further noting in this context that the 
Mahakali-Pancheswar project was the source of deep-seated political upheaval in 
Kathmandu in the early 1990s, when the then government entered an agreement 
regarding the construction of the Tanakpur dam on the Nepalese side of the trans­
boundary river, as a part of that larger project. However, due in part to the widespread 
opposition to that “unequal” agreement, the first democratically elected majority 
government of Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala fell in July 1994.57 Subsequent 
political instabilities and repeatedly falling governments were also blamed partially on 
opposition to water and rivers-related nationalism. Such political rhetoric rests on the 
very real upstream costs of dam construction and mega-projects, namely, the 
submergence of valuable land and the disputes related to just compensation to the 
affected locals.
However, Indian interests in developing major structures on the primary water 
resources of Nepal are not limited to the utilitarian needs of electricity, irrigation and
55 Deepak Gajurel, "High Dam Planned for Nepal's Sapta Koshi River," Environment 
News Serv/ce(September 20,2004), http://ens-newswire.eom/ens/sep2004/2004-09-20- 
04.asp.
56 Government o f Nepal Department of Electricity Development, "About Project: 
Pancheswar Multipurpose Project," http://www.pmp.gov.np/about-project.php.
57 Gyawali and Dixit, "Mahakali Impasse and Indo-Nepal Water Conflict," 8-10.
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flood control. It may be surmised that as an aspiring regional power, India would rather 
not allow a third country, namely China, to control the valuable water resource that had a 
direct bearing on its wellbeing and energy security. Thus, if China’s forays into the 
hydropower sector in Nepal lead to corresponding Indian assertiveness and attention in 
delivering the capital and the wherewithal to actually construct and develop the mega­
structures as well as strictly export-oriented major projects in Nepal, we may deduce that 
Nepal’s wedge status has produced the desired fruits of higher material benefits from the 
competition of the two rivals. It is yet to be seen if and how faithfully the emerging 
reality matches the trending pattern of action-reaction between the two powers in Nepal’s 
hydropower sector. The representative case of the West Seti Hydropower Project 
discussed below encompasses both Indian and Chinese interests in the various phases of 
its long-running story and useful to understand as an instance of growing Indian unease 
predicting reactive measures against large-scale Chinese investment commitments in 
Nepal.
West Seti Hydropower Project
When it was first conceived, the West Seti hydropower project seemed a perfect 
example of realizing Nepal’s water promise: a mega-project built for lucrative exports. 
The genesis of West Seti goes back to the mid-1990s, when the government had adopted 
the policy of allowing and attracting private capital for development of hydropower 
projects. In 1994, the multi-national Australian construction company Snowy Mountain 
Engineering Corporation (SMEC) received the survey license to develop the West Seti 
project in the Far Western Development region. The final agreement was signed between 
the government of Nepal and SMEC in 2002 with the planed project construction to 
begin in 2004 and power generation to commence in 2008.58 The West Seti hydropower 
plant was supposed to be the largest in Nepal’s history with installed capacity of 750 
MW, at a time when the country’s cumulative production was less than half that. Up to 
90% of the produced electricity was to be sold to India via an agreement with the Power 
Trading Corporation of India, Ltd. (PTC), which is the Indian government-owned public
58 "Nepal Signs West Seti Deal with SMEC," International Water Power & Dam 
Construction Magazine(November 4, 2002),
http://www.waterpowermagazine.com/news/newsnepal-signs-west-seti-deal-with-smec.
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transmission and distribution company. As royalty, Nepal would receive 10% of 
produced electricity free, but subsequent agreements controversially changed that 
provision to Nepal receiving the equivalent monetary compensation.59 SMEC through its 
wholly owned local subsidiary called the West Seti Hydroelectric Corporation Limited 
(WSHL) had completed the feasibility studies and environmental impact assessments. 
With the help of Nepalese government, WSHL began to cobble together a consortium of 
financial sponsors for the project. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) joined as 
technical sponsor early on and agreed to provide a loan to the Nepal government towards 
limited part of the financing, while the China National Machinery Import and Export 
Corporation (CMC) was to be the main financiers for the major portion of the proposed 
cost of US$ 1.2 billion.60 According to a Chinese official at its embassy in Kathmandu, 
the ownership stake of the built plant would be held by CMC at 70% and the remaining 
30% by SMEC.61 As per the government’s build-own-operate-transfer policy, after 
license period of 30 years the full ownership o f the plant would revert to the government 
of Nepal.
That SMEC backed West Seti project never got off the ground. During the early 
years, a major problem was the timing; by the time the project agreement was signed in 
2002, Nepal was in the deep throes of the Maoists-led civil war, while the royal massacre 
the year before had begun the prolonged instability in Kathmandu. The rebel Maoists 
party was against the project, complicating the viability of the location of which was in 
the remote mountainous region in the least developed part of the country.62 Furthermore, 
local opposition towards the proposed project caused insurmountable delays. The project 
called for 1530 households and up to 18,000 individuals to be relocated in order to
59 Thira L Bhusal, "Lawmakers Demand Renegotiation on West Seti Hydro Project," 
Republica September 4,2009.




62 Dewan Rai, "About Time: Stalled for 15 Years by Maoist Opposition, West Seti Will 
Now Be Built under a Maoist Government by Chinese Investors," Nepali Times March 9, 
2012 .
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submerge the area to build the large-storage reservoir.63 While there were provisions for 
compensation to the local impacted population, lack of proper communication as well as 
uncertainty about the impact and effects of the humongous project meant that the local 
residents never warmed up to the idea and periodically threatened to shut down the 
plans.64 Their objections were amplified by national environmental and policy 
organizations. By the mid-2000s prominent voices in national media as well as the new 
legislature called for renegotiation of the contract finding the arrangement of selling all 
the produced electricity to India problematic and questioning the wisdom and likelihood 
of receiving royalties when much of the country was suffering through crippling power 
shortages.65 A group of affected locals and water rights organizations filed a writ petition 
in the Supreme Court alleging that the project was “illegal” and against the “national 
interests” of Nepal creating further controversy and public unease, although the Court in 
September 2008 decided for the legality of the project and allowed the government and 
SMEC to proceed.66 Meanwhile, ADB had quietly dropped their financial and technical 
backing for the project citing public opposition and lack of good governance, while CMC 
also seemed to have lost interest along the way. Finally, in July 2011 after a decade and a 
half the government revoked the construction license from SMEC, ostensibly for failing 
to initiate the construction of the West Seti hydropower project.67
To the surprise of observers, the West Seti project rose from the dead the very 
next year. On February 29 2012, the government of Nepal signed an agreement with 
China Three Gorges Corporation (CTGC), the state-owned builder of the well-known 
Three Gorges Dam, to construct the now estimated US$ 1.6 billion West Seti
63 "Nepal Signs West Seti Deal with SMEC".
64 "Doti Locals Threaten to Shut Down West Seti," The Rising Nepal(January 10, 2009), 
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Hydropower project.68 While many details of the project remained unchanged, the major 
differences were that the CTGC would own 75% of the constructed plant while the 
Nepalese state-owned electricity monopoly, Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) would 
own the remaining 25%, and also, more importantly, that the produced electricity was 
avowedly to be used primarily to meet the skyrocketing domestic demand rather than to 
export to India as was the case with earlier plan.69
What had changed? The erstwhile rebels of the Communist Party o f Nepal- 
Maoists (CPN-M) had ended their decade-long civil war, returned to mainstream politics, 
successfully led the efforts to end monarchy and declare Nepal a republic in 2008, won 
the first election to the new constitution drafting assembly, and formed the ruling 
government with promises of good governance and swift policies of rapid development. 
The major economic plank of the first CPN-Maoist led government in 2008 was the 
pledge in their first budget proposal to build a minimum of 10,000 MW over the next ten 
years, with the West Seti project a prominent contributor to the total.70 It could be mere 
coincidence that a Chinese government owned company offered to finance the largest 
hydropower development project in Nepal, which was also the largest ever-single foreign 
direct investment vehicle to Nepal, when the Maoists were in power.
However, there were various indications that the timing was right from the 
perspective of both sides, which shows the interaction gaining from the wedge status of 
Nepal. The CPN-Maoist government that came into power in 2008 brought with it an 
almost revolutionary zeal to remake the Nepalese economic climate with special 
emphasis on aggressively seeking foreign direct investments on infrastructure and 
hydropower projects to meet its 10,000 MW in ten years pledge. The party’s goals
68 Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Office o f the Embassy of the People's 
Republic of China in Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, "China Three Gorges 
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coalesced around Chinese largesse, among other traditional sources o f capital, including 
that from India. Breaking traditional protocol, the Maoist Prime Minister, Pushpa Kamal 
Dahal went on his first official foreign visit to Beijing and not New Delhi, causing a mild 
concern in India.71 Beginning with the first one, Dahal’s foreign visits, including 
subsequently to New Delhi, were explicitly tied to requesting massive capital aid for the 
development o f a “New Nepal.” It can be surmised that the People’s Republic would be 
highly sympathetic to such a gesture of equality vis-a-vis Indian position in Nepal and 
possibly eager to reciprocate. On the other hand, from the Indian perspective the unease 
at these unanticipated developments might also have sent it seeking ways to influence the 
trajectory of Nepalese political developments during such a fluid period. Besides many 
domestic reasons for the fall of that first Maoist government in May 2009, explicit lack o f 
trust shown by New Delhi should not be discounted.
By the time of the West Seti agreement with CTGC in 2012, another CPN-Maoist 
government had been in place for more than six months. The Prime Minister Baburam 
Bhattarai was the architect of the earlier budget proposal that relied on maximizing 
private and foreign hydroelectric investments by cutting the red tape and delays that had 
been the endemic feature of such project proposals. Thus, the memorandum of 
understanding for West Seti was signed with the Chinese counterparts without a proper 
global tender and bidding process. The rushed handing over of the long-percolating 
project of massive proportions to the Chinese state-owned enterprise raised considerable 
questions, leading to an enquiry by the parliamentary panel on Natural Resources and 
Means Committee regarding the legality of the agreement, including many of the finer 
details.72 Sufficient political and diplomatic pressure made sure that the committee 
reached to a rarely seen swift decision, in only three weeks, to allow the agreement to 
stand with some modifications.73 Similar parliamentary enquiries and public protests had 
derailed a number o f prior hydropower projects but the fact that CTGC and the Chinese
71 Seema Sirohi, "The Dulcet Damru," Outlook lndia(September 29,2008), 
http://www.outlookindia.com/article/The-Dulcet-Damru/238535.
72 Dewan Rai, "The Politics of Power," The Nepali 7jwes(March 27,2012), 
http://www.nepalitimes.com/blogs/thebrief/2012/03/27/the-politics-of-power/.
73 Gopal Sharma, "Nepal Clears China Plan for $1.6 Bln Hydroelectric Dam," Reuters 
April 2, 2012.
134
government made the deal for West Seti too sweet to derail by any segment of the 
political usually rambunctious opposition is significant.74
Equally instructive is the tone of the official and media coverage of the West Seti 
agreement with CTGC in all three countries. The Chinese ambassador to Nepal Mr. Wu 
Chuntai described West Seti as a “new landmark of Chinese-Nepalese friendship,” while 
the Chinese official and media reports proudly highlighted the fact that China-financed 
West Seti was the largest foreign direct investment project in Nepal while viewing the 
project as a sign of the growing Chinese economic influence in the rapidly changing 
Himalayan neighbor.75 On the other hand, Indian observers found the facts of the Chinese 
financing of the project of such massive proportions in Nepal portentous and viewed 
nervously as a sign of New Delhi losing initiative in similar projects plans. The official 
intelligence unit of the Indian government Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) sent a 
report to the Prime Minister’s Office detailing the particulars of the project, while the 
media showed appropriate alarm in the growing “coziness” between China and Nepal at 
the expense of India.76 For their part most of the Nepalese mainstream media projected a 
positive attitude towards the project, highlighting the fact that the Chinese had decided to 
invest in a very large project and that the produced electricity would be used for domestic 
consumption to alleviate the seriously unmet demand.77 The usually vociferous 
opposition did not seem to appear uniformly, although there were plenty of technical, 
procedural and legal concerns regarding the actual contract minutiae, including 
significant details of the power purchase agreement (PPA).
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The story of the Chinese financed West Seti is not over; the actual construction 
has yet to begin. Nepal’s political instability means that the CPN-Maoist government that 
signed the agreement is no longer in power giving way to a bureaucratic government led 
by the Supreme Court Chief Justice in March 2013, which conducted another constituent 
assembly elections. The newly elected government is mandated with governing while the 
constitution is finally drafted. The high level political turmoil has meant that the 
preliminary project steps are still ongoing.
The trend of the West Seti project proceeds from one that was predicated entirely 
on export of generated electricity to India and also being financed partially by Indian 
commercial interests to an entirely new arrangement purposively to be funded by Chinese 
state-related firms to produce power for domestic consumption in Nepal is interesting. 
Also, in the process the project has become a symbol of growing Chinese economic 
influence in Nepal as the largest single FDI project to be carried out in Nepal. To such 
developments, a certain unease and desire for larger symbolic reaction can be found in 
the Indian media and policy circles. It is partly in such a context that a recent and urgent 
Indian commitment to develop the long-stalled mega-project Pancheswar High Dam 
Project (which would cost many times over the cost of the West Seti project) spearheaded 
by the new Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his official visit to Nepal in August 
2014, although the long-term outcomes of these recent fluid developments have to be 
seen in their own time.78 The next section analyses the central hypothesis regarding small 
wedge states using wedging strategies to accrue higher material benefit by Nepal.
ANALYSIS: SITUATIONAL WEDGING?
The historical pattern of Nepal’s interaction with the two rival powers India and 
China in investments in the hydropower sector lends to abstract analysis of the “small 
state problematic” identified earlier in the literature review. Although strictly concerned 
with the economic question of whether Nepal’s wedge position allows it to accrue
78 Shishir Prashant, "Modi's Nepal Visit Sparks Hopes; Work on Pancheswar Dam to 




material gains due to the competitive relationship between the two rival powers, this case 
also touches upon the structural constraints o f the regional geopolitics as well as the 
internal dynamics of the wedge state itself. In the structural sense, Nepal was not 
bandwagoning with either of the larger powers but trying to engage and seek investments 
from both sources. While the Indian interests of energy security and material benefits in 
the form of electricity, flood control and irrigation is paramount, Chinese self-interest in 
profit-making opportunities and strategic considerations ensure that both o f the rival 
powers show interest in investing in Nepal’s hydropower sector as evidenced by the 
numerous infrastructure development projects highlighted above. Evolving international 
norms and structures of foreign development aid and foreign direct investments also 
ensure that Nepal is able to extract precious capital from Chinese and Indian firms as well 
as their state bodies as well.
In the question of whether Nepal was able to engage in wedging behavior the 
evidence present in the analysis above were necessary for the wedging behavior but 
weren’t sufficient to conclusively demonstrate it. No direct evidence emerged of Nepal 
engaging any form of “competitive bidding.” Yet, in specific projects, Nepal was able to 
extract maximum benefits from the competition between India and China, as we can see 
that even the modest change in one’s rival power’s action may produce a reactive 
counteraction in the form of other influential aid and investment packages from the other.
The fact that Chinese large-scale investment on the West Seti project was 
finalized during the period of Maoist government shows that the domestic political 
calculus mattered. Also, in subsequent Indian unease, provides further evidentiary pattern 
of competitive behavior, which produces beneficial wedging outcomes. As described 
above the evidence from the hydropower investment sector of Nepal shows, the 
confluence of the issue of interaction matching with the interests o f the rival powers’ 
desire for influence produces the wedging outcomes o f beneficial distributive gains for 
the wedge state of Nepal. Thus, Nepal’s beneficial outcome can be based on the evidence 
of competitive behavior of the rival powers.
As for the specific test variables and hypotheses generated in the research design 
of this project, in this case of hydropower investments, the aim is to explain the variation
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in the DV, “the level of gains from the interaction.” The first hypothesis (HI) considered 
the effect of the form of government in producing higher gains. The analysis does not 
directly compare the autocratic system against democratic system, however, it does point 
to the importance of various domestic policy actors to realize beneficial wedging gains in 
the hydropower issue. The ideological orientation of the party in power is conducive to 
generating higher gains as is the clarity and evolution of national policy in foreign direct 
investments, which is ultimately based on the prerogative of certain political orientation.
The second hypothesis (H2) said that the net impact of globalization (in its 
institutional, interdependent and transnational guises) would be to raise the gains for the 
wedge state. In this case, of hydropower investments, the evidence shows that the global 
rise of India and China and their various state-backed agencies contribute to rising 
hydropower investments in Nepal. Those globalized firms require profitable ventures 
beyond their borders and may find the neighboring Nepal as attractive. Also, the 
proximate effect of the competition between India and China in Nepalese hydropower 
sector is played under the global context of resource security and investment 
opportunities.
The third hypothesis (H3) stated that highly dependent trade relation with either 
rival power would reduce the efficacy of wedging strategies and lower material gains 
from interaction. In the context of the Chinese and Indian investments in Nepalese 
hydropower sector, that hypothesis was refuted because despite Nepal’s is high trade 
dependence with both rival powers, it is generating beneficial gains in this sector. That 
supposed anomaly might be explained by either the fact that trade dependence is not 
decisive or that other factors are sufficient to explain the wedging behavior. Another 
reason may hint to Chinese interests lies in placating the Nepalese leaders and politicians 
concerned about the trade imbalance by promising investments and aid.
Furthermore, although these variables were not explicitly highlighted, the chapter 
finds that the following two factors were important. First, the evolution of Nepal’s 
internal policy climate to create a market more attractive to foreign private and state 
capital, with the attendant efforts by various governments over the years to court Chinese 
and Indian aid and investment commitments. Secondly, the structural factor of the
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competing interests of the two rivals themselves as evidenced in their action-reaction 
pattern seemed to be quite important as well. Both of these evidentiary factors relate to 
the pool of independent variables (IVs) identified in the research design.
CONCLUSION
This chapter traced the evolution of Nepalese economic policy towards 
liberalization and the investment climate away from the strictly statist model based 
entirely on multilateral aid-dependence to a emerging free-market built on attracting 
private capital, foreign and domestic, especially in arena of hydropower development, 
which has long been the source of popular Nepali dream of economic transformation. The 
review of the history of Nepalese hydropower dream highlighted the importance of this 
particular issue but also highlighted the unique geographical, technical, political and 
economic limitations hindering the desired development and growth of Nepal’s immense 
hydroelectric potential. The current reality of Nepal’s lack of adequate electricity for 
daily consumption as well as industrial productivity juxtaposes uneasily with the dream 
and promise of the riches that could flow from a well-developed hydropower sector, a 
fact which underscored the need for vast capital infusion in the form of foreign direct 
investments and economic aid, especially from India and China.
Given such internal context, the aim of the chapter was to situate Nepalese 
economic and investment interaction with its competing rival neighbors India and China 
to inquire if such competition allowed the wedge state Nepal to accrue higher material 
benefits in the form o f higher investment in the national priority hydropower sector. 
Enumerating the material and strategic interests of China and India revealed that although 
Indian material utility and strategic sense of security from developing Nepalese water 
resources is paramount, China might also see enough strategic benefit and opportunity for 
its increasingly global firms to venture into Nepal. Thus, Nepal may be able gain from 
the action-reaction investment decisions from China and India. The long-running saga of 
the West Seti hydropower project, which went from being a project aimed for exporting 
power to India to a completely domestic utility to be funded by solely by the Chinese as 
the largest single FDI project in Nepal’s history, and the subsequent public and policy
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concerns in New Delhi provided some support to the claim regarding higher material 
benefits for Nepal.
The history of economic interaction between China and India with Nepal suggests 
that if Nepal is able to create a climate of attractiveness and a policy coherence for 
investments and efficient aid, the appealing business climate itself might lead to wedging 
outcomes due to the competitive action of the two rival powers vying for influence and 
greater strategic foothold. Such situational wedging might have more room to strengthen 
Nepal’s negotiating position and attractiveness, if the current political instability were to 




CLIM ATE COOPERATION IN THE HIGH HIM ALAYAS
A CLIMATE OF VULNERABILITY
In December 2009 Nepal’s ministerial cabinet held a symbolic meeting at 
Kalapatthar, located near the Mount Everest Base Camp in the Himalayas. It was a costly 
operation involving dozens o f helicopters to ferry the 21 ministers along with the prime 
minister and up to a 100 journalists and civil servants in addition to oxygen tanks and 
masks to cope with high altitude. Perhaps inspired by a similar meeting a couple of 
months before held entirely underwater by the cabinet in Maldives decked in scuba gear 
and suits to raise awareness of rising sea levels, the ostensible goal of such a theatrical 
stunt was to send a message regarding the degrading effects of global climate change on 
the fragile natural systems of glaciers and ecology in the high Himalayas. The Nepalese 
cabinet adopted the ten-point “Everest Declaration 2009” calling on the international 
community to do more to combat climate change and help Nepal deal with its long-term 
environmental, social and economic effects, with a view to take Nepal’s appeal to an 
worldwide audience during the Copenhagen Climate Summit which was held the week 
after.1
The meeting was another reminder of the phenomenon of global climate change 
resulting in rising temperatures that may be causing an alarming rate of melting of the 
Himalayan glaciers, which in turn has long-term adverse effects on the flow of the rivers 
that originate from there. Unlike the prior two issues analyzed in this study—that o f the 
policies on Tibetan exiles and of attracting foreign aid and investments in Nepal’s 
hydropower sector—the predicament o f climate change is such that a small state alone is
1 Joanna Jolly, "Nepal Cabinet Holds Meeting on Mount Everest," BBC News 
(December 4, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/8394452.stm; Gopal Sharma, 




unable to change its global course. Even if Nepal could design perfect policies in tandem 
with perfectly cooperative India and China, little could be achieved to halt the tide of the 
global process of rising temperatures. Yet, there can be resources and policies in place to 
build resilience and adaptive measures in one of the most vulnerable areas in earth for 
climate impacts. Furthermore, unlike the previous two cases that have been unfolding for 
many decades, this phenomenon of climate change, and especially the policy engagement 
with it are more recent and thus we only have about a decade’s worth of evidence in 
domestic policy formulation and less than that of regional policy interaction to speculate 
how the future trend of such negotiations might unfold. As such, the limitation of 
examining this recent and unfolding case, that is a tough case as underscored in research 
design before, is that the expectation of this analysis in testing the hypothesized wedging 
behavior is more modest. This issue may also prove to be the difficult case in analyzing 
the possibility of such wedging strategies across issue areas.
While the policy engagement is relatively recent, because of scary prognosis of 
the impact of climate change, each of these states might be expected to take steps toward 
adaptation to the shared effects o f climate change and work to achieve cooperation in the 
realm of environmental issues o f conservation; reducing the runaway use of fossil fuels; 
and designing adaptive institutions and processes. But such an outcome is not a given 
because there will be economic and social costs to be borne, must likely, unequally by 
each of the states in trying to address processes of mitigation as well as adaptation to the 
effects of climate change, each of which refer to the long-term processes defined and 
discussed in detail below. Analyzing the arena of nascent policy evolution between the 
wedge state and the rival states in climate-related and environmental issues, I expect that 
due to wedging strategies the wedge state might benefit in the form of higher gains or 
lower costs of mitigation or adaptation. However, the paucity o f sufficient policy 
advancement among the three states might mean relying on current state of quite limited 
interaction to speculate on future possibilities of wedging benefits or lack thereof.
This chapter analyses the case o f interstate environmental cooperation in the 
context of global climate change to explore the small wedge state interaction with rival 
powers. The issue of environment cooperation is a coordination problem, such that
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interaction in the response to the climate change presents a different kind of collective 
action problem unlike the two previous cases. In this case, the costs o f melting glaciers or 
scarcity of water resources will have to be borne by all the states in the long-term but the 
relative costs might be unequally distributed. Thus, with the prospect of irreversible 
global climate change in the long-term, the environmental issue becomes a question 
regarding the “dilemma of losses,” where each of the state involved wants to incur the 
least amount of costs possible on their populations and economy by negotiating the best 
bargains in the distribution o f the ever-scarcer resources such as supply of fresh water. In 
this case, the basic structure of the three-actor collective action problem is based on three 
major facts: 1) no single party can solve the problem on its own, which means 
cooperation is necessary, 2) none of the actors can opt out o f the larger cooperative 
problem, and 3) the costs are not uniform such that some actors pay a higher price. The 
implications of such a structure of interaction means that the relative cost of agreement 
may be lowest for the weakest actor. As an upper-riparian state Nepal may paradoxically 
enjoy significant bargaining power regarding the usage of freshwater and rivers, as is 
analyzed in the following sections. Informed by this dynamic of the tripartite collective 
action problem on the environmental and climactic concerns, this chapter analyzes the 
emerging national and regional policies that have been initiated and avenues of bilateral 
cooperation.
To operationalize the tripartite interaction between Nepal, India and China in this 
complex realm of environmental cooperation, this chapter focuses on the particular 
transboundary issue of melting glaciers in the shared Himalayan region and the resulting 
long-term prospect of scarcity of freshwater resources on which each of the countries 
relies. The major theoretical concern of this study focuses on the avenues level of 
material gains that small wedge states might enjoy from negotiation with the rival major 
powers. To reiterate, a significant limitation of the current state of affairs in this 
interactive policy arena is that the issue of climate change is a recent historical 
phenomenon lacking a long period of engagement and a mature body of policies 
formulated or implemented in cooperative regional or bilateral mechanisms. Also, the 
global focus on climate change agreements and policy is centered on the discussion and
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lack of agreement between the industrialized North and the developing South on steps to 
mitigate climate change. There is a dearth of analysis and discussion of the South-South 
negotiation and bargaining to generate cooperative policies addressing the impacts of 
climate change, which is a significant limitation of the current discourse. The dynamics 
of South-South cooperation are important because of the high number of developing 
states in the global South, the increasing contribution of greenhouse emissions by those 
states, their large population, and the relative lack of capacity of those states to adapt 
their populations to the impending changes in the environment. This research aims to fill 
that relative gap.
Despite the absence o f long-term policy engagement, the subsequent analysis 
finds that there are already significant actors in both the state and non-state sector, 
including multitudes of national and international non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), which are engaged in scientific research, policy formulation and community 
awareness regarding climate change in the region. Therefore, because of the necessarily 
in-progress nature of interstate negotiations as well as nascent domestic policy 
framework along with state-society activities, the following analysis expands the analysis 
to include the activities of non-state sector, specifically those of a regional non­
governmental institution that has been able to lead the states structures into cooperative 
interaction on transboundary cooperation. Thus the contours of the emerging tripartite 
interaction over the distribution of costs or lost opportunities due to melting glaciers and 
other shared effects of climate change would inform the possibility or lack of wedge state 
policy autonomy and wedging strategies that might be generated over time.
The analysis presented below find that none of the three states have sufficiently 
advanced their domestic policies regarding climate change adaptation, while the 
mitigation efforts are bogged down in global and regional forums. As such, the analysis 
of evolution of the national policies and the events in the past two decades finds no 
evidence of Nepal engaging in explicit wedging behavior in this case. However, as 
evidenced by a unique case of budding tripartite cooperation in the area o f transboundary 
conservation, it is concluded that all three states, including Nepal, benefit from 
significant technical, research and capacity building resources. The gains from this
144
budding cooperative interaction may be higher for Nepal because of its geographically 
determined wedge status. But it has to be admitted that these levels of current gains does 
not yet show the expansion of Nepal’s strategic autonomy in the use of scarce and shared 
resources for now or in the future. So the answer to the central research question on the 
possibility of Nepal’s wedging behavior to accumulate material gains is a cautious no.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: the first section places the issue 
of global climate change in context of the shared Himalayan region, summarizing the 
observed trends and possible adverse impacts to the three states in consideration; the 
second section outlines the emerging global and regional policy framework to address 
climate change and the role of the three states in that dialogue; the third section analyses 
the domestic policies on climate change and environment in each of the three states; the 
fourth section offers a case study of interstate environmental cooperation initiated by a 
regional non-state actor that offers a possible model of future cooperation; and finally the 
last section summarizes the conclusion of this case analysis.
CONTEXT: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOUTH ASIA
The phenomenon of climate change resulting from the rise in average global 
temperatures has global proportions, causes and manifold consequences. Yet, those 
global climatic consequences and their implications for human beings may be varied in 
the different regions of the world depending on each region’s unique “geography, 
population density and state capacity,” in addition to the current or prior baseline level of 
environmental deterioration.2 Based on such factors and the potential for large-scale 
devastating impacts, the South Asian region, home to one-fifth of the global population 
living in high density, is quite vulnerable. As such South Asia has already begun to see or 
is expected to face adverse effects in various areas, including “biodiversity, agriculture, 
water resources, rainfall patterns, seasons, coastal inhabitations, and high altitude
2 Brahma Chellaney, "Climate Change and Security in Southern Asia," The RUS1 Journal 
152, no. 2 (April 2007).
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communities.”3 The compounded outcomes due to these vulnerabilities may be acute in 
the coming decades.
To begin to understand the challenges to cooperation in this realm, we have to 
understand the regional ecosystem. The Himalayan mountain range extends from 
Pakistan in the West through India, Nepal, China and Bhutan in the East. Along with the 
abutting Karakorum and Hindu-Kush mountain ranges in its northwest and the Tibetan 
plateau in the North, the Himalayas form a unique geographical and environmental 
feature of the region. The Himalayas are responsible for weather events such as the 
monsoon as well as being the source of snow-fed and glacial major rivers in the entire 
region. Thus, the range of environmental, geographical and social impact o f the mighty 
Himalayas, called the “water towers of Asia,” can hardly be overstated. The impact of 
global climate change on the delicate geography of the Himalayan would likely result in 
unexpected and unpredictable consequences. For the states that share the geography and 
the ecosystem of the Himalayas, Nepal, India and China, due to their unique geography, 
physical location and low level of state capacity, the range of potential impacts of climate 
change is likely be severe. A salient feature o f global climate change is that it a varied 
and multidimensional phenomenon. Although there is budding global scientific 
consensus on the range of possible outcomes and effects of rising temperatures in the 
various regions and unique ecosystems of the earth, there are significant gaps and 
variability among regions.
Recent global reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
highlights the extent of observed climate variability and the range of effects that South 
Asia and the adjacent Tibetan plateau of China could face. Observed historical data 
suggests that the surface to air temperatures in the entire region are rising, with India 
seeing a 0.68 degree Celsius rise in the past century, Nepal seeing 0.09° C rise in the 
Himalayas and 0.04° C in the Terai plains, while in Tibetan plateau the rise was 0.16° C 
annually and 0.32° C during the winter per decade. In all three regions as well as in
3 Alok Bansal and Sreeradha Datta, "The Impact of Climate Change in South Asia," in 
South Asian Security: 21st Century Discourse, ed. Sagarika Dutt and Alok Bansal (New 
York: Routledge, 2011), 231.
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China, the rate of rise in temperature was higher during the winter seasons.4 Another 
climatic variable with observed historical variance is that of precipitation levels, with 
increases in extreme rainfall recorded in the northwest of India and in the northeast 
region of Tibet as well as increasing rain in Western China.5 Considering the regional 
picture, the South Asian coastal states including Maldives, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as 
well as the coastal regions o f India and Pakistan face the dire prospects of sea-level rise, 
extreme seasonal storms and inundation with the costly effects of economic and 
demographic degradation. Similar and related effects of cycles of massive floods and 
droughts; loss of freshwater sources leading to severe shortages for use or cultivation; 
lost economic opportunities from inoperative hydroelectricity production; adverse 
demographic impact faces India, Pakistan, Bhutan and Nepal. Scientific models seem to 
predict these climatic changes will increase during the course of the 21st century and the 
impact across Asia as well as in the South Asian region to continue ominously.
Such historical rises in temperature and changing patterns in precipitation across 
the region has led a host of experts to ascribe a multitude of adverse climate-related 
impacts from global climate change. In the recent decades the rise in extreme weather 
events such as recurring massive floods due to melting glaciers, rising sea levels and 
extreme storms, and cycles o f heat waves and droughts have been noted; furthermore, the 
rise in intensity and frequency of these extreme trends point to acute human impacts 
caused by lowered agricultural capacity and food productivity, scarcity of freshwater, 
inundation in the coastal areas and adverse effects on biodiversity, all compounding to 
create large-scale demographic consequences on health, livelihoods and migration 
patterns.6 Some o f the projected demographic consequences include: inability to cope 
with the basic necessities and public health effects of recurring natural disasters causing 
large-scale population displacement; resource scarcity leading to increase in localized and
4 R.V. Cruz et al., "Climate Change: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability - Asia," ed. 
M.L. Parry, et al., Contribution o f  Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report o f  
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University 





interstate violence and conflict; intrastate and interstate mass migration from the 
impacted areas, such as from the coastal regions to the hinterlands causing added 
demographic pressures in scarce resources.7 Various experts and analysts believe that due 
to the above-mentioned perfect combination of adverse factors, South Asia might be 
especially vulnerable so that it may experience the worst impacts of climate change.8
From a regional perspective, then, for South Asia the impact of global climate 
change might be debilitating when considered in conjunction with its high level of 
population density, low level of baseline economic development, and relatively lower 
level o f state capacity and resources to attend to various mitigation and adaptation 
strategies.9 As defined by climate change experts, mitigation refers to technological and 
policy instruments used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions so as to decelerate the rate of 
climate change, whereas adaptation means those processes and activities employed by 
individuals and societies to adjust behavior in response to changes in the environment 
due to climate change.10 Both mitigation and adaptation are economically costly 
processes with long time horizons requiring major transformations in human activities at 
a societal, regional and even global level. While all the states of South Asia may face 
some of these dire impacts and need to contribute to mitigation and adaptive measures, 
each one has to be prepared for specific and unique manifestations of the effects of
7 Arpita Bhattacharyya and Michael Werz, Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict in 
South Asia: Rising Tensions and Policy Options across the Subcontinent, (Center for 
American Progress & Heinrich Coll Stiftung, December 2012), 
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11 /ClimateMigrationSubContinentReportsmall.pdf.
8 World Bank, "Climate Change: Why Is South Asia Vulnerable?," (2013), 
http://go.worldbank.org/CVAV2OB8N0; Mannava V.K. Sivakumar and Rober Stefanski, 
"Climate Change in South Asia," in Climate Change and Food Security in South Asia, ed. 
R Lai, et al. (Springer, 2011).
9 For an argument that social capital is the defining variable in how societies manage 
natural disasters and sustain resilience, see, Daniel P. Aldrich, Building Resilience: Social 
Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery (University of Chicago Press, 2012).
10 United States Environmental Protection Agency, "Glossary of Climate Change Terms," 
(September 9,2013), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/glossary.html; Intergovermental 




climate change, and each state needs to prepare unique efforts of mitigation and 
adaptation at great cost. But the policy creativity and political ability to generate needed 
changes seem beyond the purview of a single state and regional cooperation in finding 
solutions and distribution of costs are needed. This makes bargaining among states an 
opportunity to shift costs onto others.
Impacts on Glaciers and Water Resources in the Himalayan Region
The risk to the Himalayan glaciers and long-term effect on water resources are the 
two main and proximate consequences of climate change that directly impact Nepal,
India and China. The shared geography of the Himalayan region means that both these 
manifestations of climate change will necessarily have transboundaiy impacts, which 
would mean that we can expect to see tripartite interaction to engage on this arena and 
maybe detect avenues of Nepal’s wedging behavior. Before analyzing the interstate and 
national policy interaction, here I present the current extent of knowledge and possible 
concerns from these two climate impacts in the region.
The Himalayan region contains the world’s highest concentration of glaciers 
outside of the two Polar Regions in the globe. Scientists have documented that rising 
temperature has caused accelerated melting or retreating of glaciers in the high 
Himalayas over the past half century, with the current rate of glacier melt being about 10 
to 60 meters per year.11 The primary observed consequence of melting glaciers is that 
they create large pools of accumulated water with the attendant risk o f glacial lake 
outburst floods (GLOFs). Extensive scientific research in Himalayan region using site 
visits, GPS and satellite images and historical corroboration have documented the rising 
number o f such lakes and noted that the lakes are indeed increasing in size, thereby 
raising the probability of catastrophic GLOFs in the coming years.12 A long term study
11 Samjwal Rama Bajracharya, Pradeep Kumar Mool, and Basanta Raj Shrestha, "Global 
Climate Change and Melting o f Himalayan Glaciers," in Melting Glaciers and Rising Sea 
Levels: Impacts and Implications, ed. Prabha Shastri Ranade (India: The ICFAI 
University Press, 2008), 28.
12 Sandeep Chamling Rai, ed. An Overview o f  Glaciers, Glacier Retreat, and Its 
Subsequent Impacts in Nepal, India and China (World Wildlife Fund Nepal Program, 
2006); Arun B Shrestha and Raju Aryal, "Climate Change in Nepal and Its Impact on 
Himalayan Glaciers," Regional Environmental Change 11, no. 1 (2011); Samjwal Ratna
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begun in the 1990s by the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development 
(ICIMOD), a policy and advocacy research institute working in the states from 
Afghanistan to Bhutan in the Hindu-Kush Himalayas, documented the baseline data 
which showed there were “ 15,000 glaciers, 9,000 lakes and 200 potentially dangerous 
glacial lakes including 21 GLOF events.”13 Given such a geographical reality, major and 
recurring flooding could be a regular part of the future o f Nepal, northern India and in the 
Tibetan plateau, causing massive infrastructure damage, siltation of farmlands, and 
inundation of downstream settlements. Critical infrastructures such as bridges, tunnels 
and hydropower plants might be washed over during such flooding, causing long-term 
economic and social impacts.
These varied effects of melting glaciers and glacial floods can only be addressed 
by increased regional cooperation coupled with national commitment to significant 
mitigation and adaptation efforts. Such efforts to manage the glaciers in the high 
Himalayan region need to include their scientific monitoring, installation of early 
warning systems to warn of GLOFs, construction of infrastructures and development 
projects in the region with GLOFs in mind, and to prepare downstream population 
centers with adaptive measures. The current research focuses on the scientific basis o f the 
problem of melting glaciers but in the years ahead the economic and interstate 
dimensions of this climactic change will need to be researched and addressed.
The second major consequence o f the global climate change on the Himalayan 
region is in the projected long-term insecurity of the water resources. As has been 
mentioned, the greater Tibetan plateau and the Himalayas are known as the “water towers 
of Asia” because they form the originating source of the major river systems including 
their tributaries in the region: the Yellow and Yangtze rivers flow into China; the 
Mekong, Salween, and Irrawaddy rivers flow into Southeast Asia; and the Ganges,
Bajracharya, Pradeep Kumar Mool, and Basanta Raj Shrestha, Impact of Climate Change 
on Himalayan Glaciers and Glacial Lakes: Case Studies on GLOF and Associated 
Hazards in Nepal and Bhutan, (Kathmandu, Nepal: International Centre for Integrated 
Mountain Development (ICIMOD), June 2007), http://lib.icimod.org/record/22442.
13 "Global Climate Change and Melting of Himalayan Glaciers," 34.
150
Brahmaputra, and Indus rivers that flow into South Asia.14 Of these rivers, the waters 
from the Ganges and its tributaries—Kamali, Gandaki and Sapta Koshi—traverse from 
the Himalayas through Nepal into India to drain into the Bay of Bengal, whereas the 
Brahmaputra river travels East from Tibet via India into Bangladesh and to the Bay.
These international rivers and the economic utility of their freshwaters necessarily are in 
the domain of interstate negotiations and as the effects of global warming put pressure on 
vital water resources, they likely will be the cause of increasing bargaining and possibly 
conflict.
In terms of long-term freshwater resources, the states in the South Asian region 
already deal with a myriad of issues. River water pollution is a major concern leading to 
public health scares; haphazard development of local infrastructure including major and 
minor hydropower projects takes an environmental toll on the ecosystem; recurring 
floods in the transboundary rivers between Nepal and India as well as between India and 
Bangladesh produce intense displacement and distress; and fair and proper distribution of 
water for irrigation and use during the dry season between the riparian states are issues of 
regular concern and negotiations between the states.15
Another aspect of water resources impacts, from the interstate perspective, is the 
possible construction of major infrastructures projects to divert waters from 
transboundary rivers, which could exacerbate or strain relations between Nepal, India and 
China. Major dams and hydropower projects in Nepal, which were analyzed in the 
previous chapter, cause variation of water flow and produce differing costs and benefits 
to downstream areas o f India. Similarly, India’s grand plan o f linking the waters of its 
major rivers via canals and reservoirs to supply water to its population centers, the so- 
called National River Linking Project (NRLP), could produce various unintended 
consequences in the water relations between that country and its neighbors Nepal and 
Bangladesh. Finally, China’s possible utilization of the Yarlung Tsangpo river (which is
14 Jayanta Bandyopadhyay, "Securing the Himalayas as the Water Tower of Asia: An 
Environmental Perspective," Asia Policy 16, no. 1 (2013).
15 For an on-the-ground reportage of the myriad water crises facing the Ganges river 
basin, see Cheryl Colopy, Dirty, Sacred Rivers: Confronting South Asia's Water Crisis 
(Oxford University Press, USA, 2012).
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called the Brahmaputra in the Indian territory) from Tibet to divert water north into its the 
population and agricultural centers would create possible conflict with India. These 
possible hotspots sometimes become fodder for alarmism or downright paranoia about 
impending “water wars,” yet in the context of long-term climate change and shortage and 
variability of freshwater, the eventual negotiations about the proper utilization of 
transboundary river systems are bound to create avenues for cooperation or conflict.16
Thus, the regional manifestation of the global warming in the form of melting 
glaciers and possible freshwater scarcity could become the major arena of interstate 
negotiation and bargaining, even conflict, in the coming decades. For the small and least 
powerful among the actors, the wedge state o f Nepal, the solution to the situation 
necessarily need to be found in negotiation under bilateral, regional and global regimes 
and not conflict. Yet, in the issue of threatened glaciers, the three states have yet to show 
concrete interest except for many formal announcements and increased bilateral scientific 
research to ascertain the extent o f the problem. On the issue of the shared water, so far 
the attention and bulk of negotiation has been focused on the economic utility related to 
hydropower, dam building, flood control and irrigation and not on the possibility of 
drastic future shortages.
As discussed earlier, the lack of deep strategic policy engagement in this arena is 
a crucial limitation in this case because the issue is a recent, ongoing phenomenon. 
Therefore, the long-term consequences o f global warming and the resulting evidentiary 
patterns o f the tripartite and bilateral interaction between Nepal, India and China might 
be understood for now in the context of global and regional policy frameworks. Another 
avenue to analyze the future contours of the tripartite interaction is by examining the 
patterns of existing cooperation in transboundary conservation efforts, pollution reduction 
measures and sustainable development partnerships. The following section reviews the 
global and regional policy framework and the participation of the three states in them; the
16 For an argument on the possibility o f regional "water wars," see Brahma Chellaney, 
Water: Asia's New Battleground (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
2011); For a cogent caution against the "hyperbole" of "water wars," see David Katz, 
"Hydro-Political Hyperbole: Examining Incentives for Overemphasizing the Risks of 
Water Wars," Global Environmental Politics 11, no. 1 (2011).
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subsequent sections analyze evolving national and bilateral policies regarding climate 
change, and the current state of the tripartite interaction.
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORKS
The global climate change debate and the emerging policy framework of 
responses addressing the mitigation and adaptation efforts has been riven by an acute 
chasm between the interests of industrialized states of the West and the developing states 
of the global South. In 1992, the United Nations (UN) and its member states began the 
global climate change framework in the form of the treaty at the Earth Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
which seeks international action on climate change, has been ratified by all UN members 
although binding agreements on climate actions has now ground to a halt because of the 
so-called “cleavage” between the West and the newly industrializing states and the 
underdeveloped states. When it came to the negotiations regarding the bearing of costs to 
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the matter of equitable compensation for 
economic, demographic and social burdens, the deep divisions between the two sides 
began with the Earth Summit and through the design and participation in the Kyoto 
Protocol framework in 1997 but the chasm has widened in the subsequent rounds of 
climate negotiations until present.17
Critics of the current global policy trajectory blame the wealthy Western nations 
of seeking to hinder the economic development path of the developing countries by using 
climate-related obligations, despite the fact of lower lever of historically aggregate and 
current per-capita GHC emissions accrued by the emerging economic regions. Observers 
even posit that as the historical source of great amounts of GHG emissions, the developed 
Western states are doing gross injustice on the rest of the states in seeking comparable 
GHG reductions in the future.18 Current estimates o f GHG emissions show a sharp rise in 
cumulative emissions in the developing world, especially in South Asia, which has seen
17 Bansal and Datta, "The Impact of Climate Change in South Asia," 218.
18 A detailed and cogent quantitatively based analysis of this idea is presented in J.T. 
Roberts and B.C. Parks, A Climate o f  Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South Politics, 
and Climate Policy (MIT Press, 2007).
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3.3 percent rise in emissions per year since 1990; however, the historical GHG footprint 
of the emerging economic regions was low and because of high population and low 
energy consumption in per capita terms, South Asians still only contribute less than one- 
fifth carbon emissions compared to the developed nations.19 The global framework under 
the UNFCC does maintain the principle of “common but differentiated” responsibilities 
between the wealthy countries and the developing or less developed countries. However, 
disagreements among the major global powers and emerging economies, including the 
refusal by the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent global standards, 
has meant that a durable global framework to address climate change has failed to 
materialize.
As far as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), such as Nepal, and their 
adaptation to climate change is concerned, the articles of UNFCCC pledged support for 
economic and technical assistance, a process which in the last decade has begun to be set 
in motion. The main vehicle of the assistance process is the drafting of National 
Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) by most of the LDCs, which outlines the current 
state o f climate research and findings, reviews the crucial long-term vulnerabilities, and 
lists immediate and urgent climate-related vulnerabilities and possible adaptive measures 
in projects that could be funded. Projects that are approved are then funded through the 
mechanism of LDC Fund under assistance from the wealthier countries of North America 
and Europe, grouped under the UNFCCC Annex-I. Other goals of drafting NAPAs and 
LDC funding include research and administrative capacity building; creating national 
nodal bodies to deal with climate change issues; providing technical training as well as 
negotiation and languages training to better equip LDC representatives to state their 
unique concerns and positions to influence the global climate process.20
19 World Bank, "South Asia - Shared Views on Development and Climate Change," 
(2009), http://documents.worldbank.Org/curated/en/2009/01/l 1472620/south-asia-shared- 
views-development-climate-change.
20 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, "Chronological Evolution 
of the LDC Work Programme and Introduction to the Concept of NAPA," 
http://unfccc.int/adaptation/knowledge_resources/ldc_portal/items/4722.php.
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On the other hand, two of the largest newly developing economies and carbon 
emitters, India and China, view the UNFCCC process and the goal of binding 
international conventions and caps on carbon emissions as a unfair hindrance to their 
right to economic growth. In the last decade, due to pressure from the established 
Western economies, global leaders and domestic scientific communities, China and India 
have acknowledged the need for action against climate change by embarking in a policy 
of adopting domestic, bilateral and regional discussions and exchanges on climate 
change, while still refusing to abide by any global emissions standards. Both countries 
have produced extensive national action plans and policies—called the National Action 
Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC)—to deal holistically with the issue, which is 
discussed in detail in the next section. In the bilateral realm, in October 2009 India hosted 
an India-China joint workshop to discuss their respective national action plans for climate 
change. The conclave produced a five-year accord between the two states, signed by 
Indian environmental minister Jairam Ramesh and Chinese vice minister of National 
Development and Reform Commission Xie Zhenhua, outlining plans to share technical, 
scientific and policy experiences on climate change adaptation measures.21 However, the 
true purpose of the meeting was to present a united negotiating front in the upcoming 
Copenhagen Summit, where the two nations again called on rich Western nations to curb 
their emissions and increase funding and technology transfer to less developed nations, 
while also reiterating their commitment to economic development and finding local 
solutions to climate change risks. This negotiating strategy, inter alia, scuttled any 
mandatory global agreements in the Copenhagen climate summit, while on the sidelines 
China and India joined Brazil and South Africa to negotiate a much-limited and voluntary 
agreement with the United States.22
21 Sunil Raghu, "India, China Sign 5-Year Pact on Climate Change," The Wall Street 
Journal (October 21 2009), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB125610390297898449; 
Gaurav Singh and John Duce, "China, India Sign Climate Change Cooperation Accord," 
Bloomberg News (October 21 2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=:aFyFHkF6C3Fs.
22 BBC News, "Q&A: The Copenhagen Climate Summit," BBC News (December 21 
2009), http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/8278973.stm.
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The prime focus of the global climate framework under UNFCCC is based on 
seeking agreements on the mitigation side of climate change efforts, by setting up the 
highly contentious binding limits on GHG emissions. Thus, in the absence of a globally 
binding emissions treaty, the complementary task of local and limited adaptation 
measures has fallen to the individual nation-states that are the most vulnerable or to 
regional efforts with economic support from the wealthy nations or international financial 
institutions. Regional fora in Asia, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have 
become venues to engage in environmental discussions and adopt common positions of 
the member states for global negotiations. As the pace of economic development as well 
as the rate of climate change accelerates, the states in the global South must certainly be 
obliged to begin cooperative and interactive negotiations among themselves. Such a 
possibility of South-South negotiations, between the emerging economies such as China, 
India, Brazil and others cannot be discounted as the effects of global climate change 
begin to impact their economies and societies.
In the South Asian region, the members of the SAARC regional body— 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka, with Afghanistan 
joining the group later—commenced in the late 1980s a regional process of consultation 
and cooperation on environmental issues. During the early phase of the budding regional 
framework, the rhetoric of “climate change” was not prominent in the regional discourse 
because the SAARC member states were mainly focused on the localized environmental 
concerns such as degradation of the regional ecosystems, pollution, transboundary 
conservation and dealing with natural disasters that were transboundary in nature.23 The 
regional policy process until recently has been focused mainly on commissioning 
research on regional environmental issues, setting up a technical committee with the task 
of gathering and sharing scientific data on regional environmental issues, and conducting 
periodic meetings of the environment ministers to produce repeated proclamations on the
23 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Secretariat, "Area of 
Cooperation: Environment," (n.d.), http://www.saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/cat- 
detail.php?catid=54.
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need for environmental cooperation rather than adopting and implementing concrete 
action plans.
By the mid-2000s, due to intensified global climate discourse as well as the 
impetus due to major regional natural disasters like the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the 
SAARC member states began to address the regional impacts of and adaptive measures 
to global climate change directly. In 2008 a ministerial level meeting specifically on 
climate change was held in Dhaka, which produced the “Dhaka Declaration,” and the 
“SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change.”24 The Action Plan formed the basis of 
creating a common position of the SAARC members in global climate negotiations, 
specifically calling on the rich, western states to provide financial and technological 
commitments per the UNFCCC principles of “responsibility based on capabilities” to 
address the mitigation and adaptation measures against climate change while preserving 
the “right to development” of the developing states. Additionally, the member states were 
given the responsibility to implement the adaptation and mitigation measures including 
cooperation on technology transfer, sharing of best practices and information in 
conservation and disaster preparation, and mass-awareness and media-engagement 
campaigns.25 Subsequently, in 2010 the Sixteenth SAARC Summit held in Thimpu, 
Bhutan, produced the “Thimpu Statement on Climate Change.” Like the prior 
declaration, this statement further served the purpose of cementing common positions of 
the SAARC member states on global climate negotiations based on the principles of 
equity and justice, while deepening the thematic cooperation of further research and
Of*policy coordination. In addition, there have been investments in scientific exchange, 
coordination in nascent regional monitoring efforts, policy exchange via periodic 
conferences of the respective agencies dealing with environmental issues, and efforts to 
raise awareness on climate change and its impacts. These local efforts are reinforced by
24 Ibid.
25 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), "Dhaka Declaration on 
Climate Change," (July 2008), available at: http://saarc- 
sdmc.nic.in/pdf7publications/climate/chapter-1 .pdf.
26 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Secretariat, "Thimpu 
Statement on Climate Change," (April 2010), http://www.saarc- 
sec.org/userfiles/ThimphuStatementonClimateChange-29April2010.pdf.
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the activities o f the major international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, 
calling for capacity building to choose a path away from the current dependence on fossil 
fuels to a “low-carbon growth” strategy of regional economic development.27
However, some significant limitations of the emerging regional policy framework 
on environmental cooperation and climate change have been the lack of binding 
commitments and leaving the responsibility of implementation entirely on the individual 
member states. Each new round of summits and meetings produce boilerplate calls for 
more research, mass-awareness and sharing of best practices to enhance cooperation. In 
other words, the regional framework suffers the same condition as the global framework, 
which is lack of concrete action. The main reasons for lack of effective cooperation, 
argues one researcher, are “lack of mutual trust, the preference of India... for excluding 
bilateral environmental issues from regional discussions, and a dependence on external 
donors for funding in support o f existing regional institutions.”28 Therefore, to locate the 
actual policy interaction and development on environmental cooperation in the era of 
climate change along with implementation efforts, we have to look within the national 
sphere and analyze domestic and bilateral policies. To understand Nepal’s national and 
bilateral policy evolution on environmental cooperation with India and China, the next 
section analyzes the evidence of such policies.
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL & BILATERAL POLICIES
The three states, Nepal, India and China, began crafting strategic policies 
specifically regarding the impacts and consequences of climate change in the first decade 
of 2000s. In all three states, the bulk of the emerging policies and their implementation 
have been focused primarily on domestic and local levels, dealing particularly with air 
and water pollution, efficiency o f resource management, increased scientific funding and 
conducting environmental reviews for development projects. The prime consideration is 
economic development in the age of climate risks and to pursue national development
27 World Bank, "South Asia - Shared Views on Development and Climate Change".
28 Ashok Swain, "South Asia, Its Environment and Regional Institutions," in 
Comparative Environmental Regionalism, ed. Lorraine Elliott and Shaun Breslin (New 
York: Taylor & Francis, 2011).
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projects adaptive and resilience to current and fixture consequences of climate change. 
Whatever tripartite or regional interactions have been initiated has come mostly in the 
realm of scientific data gathering and knowledge sharing and transboundary conservation 
efforts, much o f which has been led by the efforts of international non-governmental 
sector. The review of the individual state’s national strategic policies on climate change 
presented below highlights the current insularity o f adopted measures but also presents 
avenues for fixture cooperation and interactive negotiations. Emerging national policies of 
Nepal, India and China respectively are analyzed below.
Although the ideas of sustainable development, pollution reduction and 
environmental degradation had entered the Nepali policy consciousness beginning in the 
1980s, the specific use of the language of global climate change and policy response to its 
impacts were not adopted until the mid-2000s. This was despite the fact that Nepal had 
been a signatory of the Rio Earth Summit and ratified the UNFCC and related 
conventions. The official Nepalese development planning policy documents paid scant 
notice to climate related risks in its development activities. A thorough review published 
in an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report of the 
national planning policy documents until the Tenth Plan adopted by the National 
Planning Commission (NPC) in 2002 foixnd that until that year climate change risk 
management was not an explicit national policy priority.29 This lack of explicit focus on 
climate change impacts suggested lack of awareness but also the fact that many of the 
possible areas of development policy, such as in water resources management and 
monsoon related agricultural adaptation among others, were previously targeted under the 
rubric of “sustainable development.” The same OECD report also commented that more 
than fifty percent of donor-led development projects, especially in water resources and 
hydropower sectors, might be vulnerable to climate related risks.30 Because Nepal relies 
on foreign aid for more than 70% of its development budget, the increasing awareness 
and concern about climate related risks on donor approved and financed projects would
29 Shardul Agrawala et al., "Development and Climate Change in Nepal: Focus on Water 




mean more policy engagement regarding the various inputs of climate change in the latter 
half of the decade.
In the arena of hydropower development, until the mid-1990s, new projects were 
not legally required to conduct an environmental impact study and there was no formal 
governmental mechanism governing environmental concerns. Large donor-funded 
projects did voluntarily conduct preliminary environmental assessments and the 
government provided basic guidelines on environmental issues to consider without legal 
backing.31 The passage of the Environmental Protection Act (EPA) and the 
Environmental Protection Regulation in 1997 finally provided firm legal requirement for 
the need to conduct Initial Environmental Examination as well as a detailed 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) before being granted permission to develop 
infrastructure projects, including those related to water resources and hydropower.32 
Although the EPA does not mention “climate change,” the law reflects the guiding 
principles of environmental protection of the time by broadly defining “environment” as 
the “interaction and inter-relationship among the components of natural, cultural and 
social systems, economic and human activities and their components,” and “pollution” as 
the “activities that significantly degrade, damage the environment or harm on the 
beneficial or useful purpose of the environment, by changing the environment, directly or 
indirectly.”33 Obviously, these definitions incorporate the latterly significant concerns of 
climate change and its impacts. Therefore, appropriate laws on environmental protection 
governing the hydropower and water resources development sector in Nepal, although, 
since the long-term climatic impacts of hydro-projects are not immediately discernible, it




32 Ramesh Prasad Bhatt and Sanjay Nath Khanal, "Environmental Impact Assessment 
System in Nepal: Overview of Policy, Legal Instruments and Process," Kathmandu 
University Journal o f  Science, Engineering and Technology 5, no. 2 (September 2009): 
162-63.
33 Government of Nepal, "Environment Protection Act, 1997," (Kathmandu, Nepal 1997), 
2-3.
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is questionable if the EIA process can be instrumental in climate change mitigation and 
adaptation.
The first national policy that addressed climate change explicitly came in 2004, 
when the then Ministry of Population and Environment of Government of Nepal, 
produced an initial report on national climate change policies as part o f the reporting 
requirements of the conference of the parties of UNFCCC.34 That document was not 
meant to usher in major policy changes or initiatives but to establish baseline state-of- 
knowledge of climate change science including the possible impacts on water resources 
and livelihoods as well as a catalogue of the existing environmental policies in the 
country. Pertinently, the report highlighted the need for “comprehensive” bilateral 
cooperation with both India and China, above and beyond the existent sharing of 
information, on the hydrological impact of climate change for the rivers that flow across 
all three countries.35
In September 2010, Nepal’s Ministry of Environment completed the 
aforementioned National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) and submitted it to the 
UNFCCC. Prepared by a large group of experts after sixteen month-long multi-sector 
stakeholder consultative processes, the document presents nine integrated projects for 
funding request selected based on “urgent and immediate national adaptation priority.”36 
The identified priority projects of immediate vulnerability include such concerns as: 
adaptive measures related to: agricultural, water resources and biodiversity management; 
community-based disaster management; GLOF monitoring, early warning and risk 
reduction; forestry and ecosystem support; climate induced public health adaptation; and 
related issues of climate impacts.37 The combined cost of the nine projects for which
34 Government of Nepal Ministry of Population and Environment, Initial National 
Communication to the Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, (July 2004), 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/nepnc 1 .pdf.
35 Ibid., 103-04.
36 Government of Nepal Ministry of Environment, National Adaptation Programme of 




funding is sought is listed as US $350 million, of which about $21 million had been 
disbursed by 2013 into various projects through the LDC funding mechanism.38 
However, maybe owing to the fact that the NAPA was drafted for UNFCCC LDC Fund 
and focused on “urgent and immediate adaptive measures” there was scant mention of 
possible bilateral cooperation with either India or China on matters of water resources or 
Himalayan glaciers. Various other donor-funded projects and policies are in place 
building on these baseline ideas of climate adaptation and resilience.39 Subsequently, 
building on the guiding principles of NAPA, Local Adaptation Plans o f Action (LAP As) 
and a new Climate Change Policy were adopted in 2011.40
Yet, there are major weaknesses in the focus and direction of Nepal’s climate 
change institutional and policy practices. As noted in the analysis above, most climate 
change policy advancements are based on the global framework and domestic adaptation 
and localized developmental needs. Bilateral and regional policies have not been pursued 
as a complement to all the policy advancement in the domestic and local level; there is a 
pronounced, artificial and disappointing separation between the two levels of 
policymaking. Other weakness stem from instable institutional structure guiding climate 
change policy; for example, the ministry responsible as the nodal agency for international 
interaction on climate change, Ministry of Environment, has been reorganized and 
restructured a few times in the past decade. Added to institutional instability is the regular 
chum of personnel and lack of coordination among the many bodies, agencies and levels 
of administrative units, from the center to the local governments.41 In such an 
environment of instability and lack of coordination, lots of waste, duplicated efforts and 
blind spots are to be expected.
38 UNFCCC, "Status of NAPA Implementation under the LDCF," (n.d.), 
http://unfccc. int/adaptation/knowledge_resources/ldc_portal/ items/5632.php.
39 Some of the current projects and policies at the national level include: National Climate 
Change Support Program (NCCSP); Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR); 
Second National Communication Project (SNC).
40 Government of Nepal Ministry of Environment, "Climate Change Policy," (2011), 
http://www.climatenepal.org.np/main/?p=research&sp=onlinelibrary&opt=detail&id=419
41 Ryan Bartlett et al., Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation in Nepal (Colombo, Sri 
Lnaka: International Water Management Institute, 2010), 19-20.
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In the case of India, in June 2008, the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
adopted that country’s first National Action Plan for Climate Change (NAPCC), which 
set out the need for sustainable development amid the growing impact o f climate change 
in India. In a larger picture, on principle, Indian view of global climate change hinges on 
the idea that the developed Western economies must share most of the responsibility for 
the current situation; however, Indian policy reflects the necessity of beginning to address 
climate mitigation and adaption to achieve sustainable economic development.42 The 
NAPCC document called for the relevant government departments to draft long-term 
policy goals and implementation plans of mitigation and adaptation policies related to 
eight core national mission areas: solar energy, energy efficiency, sustainable habitat, 
expanding forests, sustainable agriculture, study of climate science as well as water 
resources and sustaining Himalayan ecosystem.43
The last two missions, on water resources and Himalayan ecosystem, which 
includes glacial retreat, ultimately require regional and tripartite interaction with Nepal 
and China. However, the NAPCC doesn’t mention those countries by name; the major 
points of water mission focus primarily on the needs of greater domestic efficiency of 
water management but the Himalayan ecosystem mission acknowledges the need to share 
scientific data and expertise in studying the extent of glacial retreat among the states of 
South Asia which share the Himalayan ecosystem and to create a credible monitoring 
network of the Himalaya environment in “cooperation with neighboring countries.”44 In 
his 2009 remarks on the national mission on the Himalayan ecosystem, PM Singh 
reiterated the very high importance o f the Himalayas for the livelihoods o f millions of 
people, commented on the continued degradation of the fragile ecosystem of the region 
and called for coordinated and comprehensive climate action plan for the entire 
Himalayan region to be developed in cooperation with the other Himalayan states, Nepal,
42 Government of India Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change, "National Action 





Bhutan, China and Pakistan.45 To that end, in subsequent SAARC summits, India 
reiterated the need for regional cooperation on climate related impacts, as described in the 
previous section, and India also hosted a SAARC Ministers Conference in 2009 to help 
prepared a joint action on climate change; yet specific agreements on the Himalayan 
issue haven’t materialized 46 On the other hand, India’s bilateral engagement with China 
on climate change was initiated with the 2009 conference held in New Delhi. As 
discussed above, the five-year accord signed then proposed increasing knowledge sharing 
and interaction on climate related activities. Another, and most important, reason for the 
Sino-Indian accord was to present unified bargaining position with the Western nations in 
global climate negotiations. So far, the latter mission has held largely intact.
A recent independent review of the India’s NAPCC produced in consultation with 
numerous experts in the field has found myriad technical and policy limitations inherent 
in the formulation of such a holistic and wide-ranging plan, which requires coordination 
from more than five ministries and multitudes o f agencies and departments of the 
government to progress.47 One of the strategic concerns voiced by the reviewers was the 
competition from Chinese firms in the solar energy sector to under Indian manufacturers, 
thus hindering the goal of sustainable economic development.48 When it comes to the 
mission of sustainable Himalayan ecosystem, the Indian national policy is thin in details 
on generating coherent policies coordination with the other states that share the 
ecosystem.49 Similarly, on the mission of efficient water utilization, the weakness of the 
current iteration of the national policy is a lack of any engagement with the possible 
impacts of climate change on water resources, while focusing solely on domestic
45 Prime Minister's Office - Government of India, "Introductory Remarks by Prime 
Minister at the Meeting of Pm's Council on Climate Change on the National Mission on 
Sustaining the Himalayan Eco-System," (October 26, 2009), 
http://www.moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/PM_speech.pdf.
46 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Secretariat, "Area of 
Cooperation: Environment".
47 Sujatha and Rajan Byravan, Sudhir Chella,, "An Evaluation of India's National Action 





concerns of efficiency and coordination.50 These concerns highlight the paucity of a 
mature Indian policy on regional solutions and interactions in addressing climate change. 
Such state of affairs provides little confidence that climate concerns would be prioritized 
in Indian strategic and economic negotiations with its neighbors, especially Nepal and 
China at the present time. However, it must be highlighted that this is a new domain for 
all states concerned to establish the expertise and best practices, and in due time cogent 
policies as well as strategic interests o f all parties would be revealed.
When it comes to China’s climate change mitigation and adaptation policies, the 
country has sought to remain unencumbered of global mandatory limits to continue 
unabated on its path of economic growth and infrastructure development. But as the 
world’s largest emitter of GHG emissions, Chinese policymakers and leaders have for the 
last two decades been cognizant o f the increasingly dire environmental problems 
produced by its breakneck pace of development and economic growth at the domestic 
level. In the late 1990s, Chinese official policy moved environmental degradation and 
climate change from a merely scientific issue to one o f sustainable developmental priority 
establishing the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC), while 
the 10th Five Year Plan of 2001 to 2005 included a thorough research agenda to ascertain 
the vulnerabilities and adaptation needs o f climate and environmental impacts.51
In the years leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, major stories of large-scale 
river water pollution, smog clouds in the cities, and desertification in the Northwest 
began to dominate the Western and national news reports, spurring the leaders to take 
significant measures to address the climate vulnerability. A year before the Olympics in 
June 2007, the powerful central body National Development and Reform Commission 
unveiled China’s National Climate Change Program (CNCCP), which accepts the reality 
of climate change’s impact on China, outlines the official policies regarding mitigation 
and adaptation to climate change while maintaining the pace of sustainable economic
50 Ibid., 13.
51 Rebecca Nadin, China: National Adaptation Programs and Strategies, (Presented at 




development.52 As a signatory to the UNFCCC and a developing economy, CNCCP 
called on the developed economies to bear their historical burden by funding and 
transferring technology to the developing nations, and by accepting binding emissions 
themselves while allowing the developing economies to their right of social development 
and poverty eradication. Thus, the plan did not include any quantifiable targets or limits 
on emissions.53 In the years since issuing CNCCP, China has adopted widely discussed 
domestic regulatory, technological and economic policies to enhance environmental 
protection, increase the use of renewable sources such as solar and hydropower to shift its 
energy profile from coal dominance, with the long-term salutary effects of such efforts 
still being debated.54 China has also stepped up engagement in regional and bilateral 
climate related exchange and cooperation agreements. One example of such bilateral 
cooperation was China’s five-year climate change cooperation accord with India signed 
in 2009, which as discussed above was based primarily on scientific collaboration and 
exchange of knowledge.
China-Nepal bilateral relation on climate change has so far been limited to the 
scientific study of the Tibetan plateau and the entire Hindu-Kush-Himalayan region. The 
Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) launched the Third Pole Environment (TPE) 
program in 2009 to scientifically study the climate change’s impact on the Tibetan 
plateau’s long-term future. In 2014, CAS signed several memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) with various educational and research institutes in Nepal to enhance scientific 
exchanges and cooperation on the issue of Himalayan ecosystem and glaciers.55 Similar 
scientific exchanges, conferences and workshops have been held regularly between China 
and its Third Pole neighbors, including Nepal. Other bilateral interaction between Nepal
52 Xinhua, "China Issues National Plan to Address Climate Change," (June 4, 2007), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-06/04/content_6196302.htm.
53 "Press Conference on National Climate Change Program," (June 4, 2007), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-06/04/content_6197309.htm.
54 Joanna Lewis, "Energy and Climate Goals of China's 12th Five-Year Plan," Center for  
Climate and Energy Solutions (March 2011), http://www.c2es.org/intemational/key- 
country-policies/china/energy-climate-goals-twelfth-five-year-plan.
55 Xinhua, "Nepal, China Join Hands in Tackling Climate Change," Global Times (April 
8,2014), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/853123.shtml.
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and China on hydropower investment and economic aid also ties in tangentially to 
concerns of environment and climate changes related to specific project impacts.
The foregoing analysis of the national and emerging bilateral policies of Nepal 
and its rival neighbors, India and China, shows that each of the states are pursuing 
primarily domestic-based policies responding to global framework related to climate 
change and environment. The trend is noticeable even in the issues of bilateral and 
trilateral concerns, such as the Himalayan glacier retreat and long-term water resources. 
While there have been policy innovation in the regional forum such as SAARC, there is 
distinct lack o f the expected tripartite interaction. Thus, the current state of policy does 
not directly allow us to test the theory of wedging and provide evidence or lack thereof in 
Nepal’s wedging behavior. As has been stated, this maybe simply due to the fact that the 
issue of climate change is so recent that the structure of competition and bargaining has 
not been reflected in the tripartite negotiations. While we may not make bold claims on 
the central question of wedging, it is still possible to see signs of possible future material 
benefits that Nepal might enjoy from its geographical condition of being a wedge. Below 
I analyze one such instance of tripartite collaboration on environmental issue; however, 
the instigating agent of that budding interaction is none of the three states but an 
international non-governmental organization, a non-state actor.
A CASE OF TRANSBOUNDARY CONSERVATION
In the fragile and shared ecosystems of the Himalayas, various forms of 
governance and cooperative partnerships among different sets of actors operate. The 
adjoining state-level should be expected to be the primary and leading actors of 
transboundary cooperation in the interstate regions of the mountain ranges. And indeed 
many national conservation reserves and protected areas are situated in the bordering 
areas with the adjoining transboundary region also being conserved. In eastern 
Himalayas, the Kanchenjunga Landscape includes various conservation areas in Nepal, 
India, and Bhutan and in the central Himalayas, including the Everest region, several 
conservation areas cross borders between Nepal and Tibet. Yet, the state-level 
transboundary conservation agreements between Nepal and its Himalayan neighbors have 
been insufficient and insubstantial.
167
However, for the last several decades numerous international non-state actors 
engaged in local and regional, transboundary conservation efforts have occupied the 
policy space vacated by the states. Some of those actors include the World Wildlife Fund, 
World Resources Institute, International Rivers, and International Union for Conservation 
of Nature, among many other local NGOs as well as the interstate body United Nations 
Environmental Program. In the context of this study, the net accrued gains of these non­
state activities has been on the whole beneficial to a developing Nepal—especially, in the 
form of accumulated scientific knowledge, development in technical and human 
resources, and financial grants and projects of various types—although they do not 
accrue from state-level wedging strategies but are simply the product of Nepal being the 
geographic wedge in the Himalayan region.
That forms of non-state governance structures have matured in one case to attract 
state-level support and coordination of the neighboring states. The case of International 
Center for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) and its Kailash Sacred 
Landscape (KSL) project is just such an example and is reviewed below.
ICIMOD and Mt. Kailash Transboundary Conservation
ICIMOD was founded in 1984 as an international center based in Kathmandu for 
research, scholarship and partnership for the wellbeing of the hill farming community in 
the Hindu-Kush Himalayan region. ICIMOD members include eight states, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, India, China, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar, each represented by an official in its 
governing board, as well as other experts and outside representatives. Initially, the 
financing was donated funds by a few European donor governments but now member 
states provide funding as do other international funding agencies. In those early years of 
its existence, the mere fact that a single regional organization would be able to bring 
together these states despite their simmering conflicts and border disputes for the sake of 
the livelihoods of the Himalayan peoples seemed a tall task.56 In the last three decades 
ICIMOD has met that challenge to become a well-established and respected policy and 
partnership organization in the arena of mountain ecosystem and livelihood conservation, 
and it has also been able to engage the governments of each of its member states,
56 Kanak Mani Dixit, "ICIMOD Searches for Its Soul," HIMAL Southasian May 1987.
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including the initially reluctant Myanmar and China, in various conservation initiatives, 
conducting collaborative research projects and policy exchanges.57
In the Southwestern part of Tibet, adjoining Nepal and India, there is a mountain 
that has remained sacred to the Hindus, Buddhists and other regional religious traditions 
for centuries, called Mount Kailash. Every year thousands of pilgrims and tourists from 
South Asia and beyond make the arduous journey to this remote area to see the mountain 
and to visit the nearby holy lake called Mansarovar. The religious, cultural and ecological 
importance of the sacred landscape surrounding Mt. Kailash has made it been the site of 
large-scale conservation effort in the last half-decade. The unique fact about this 
conservation effort is that the Greater Kailash region conservation area spans an area of 
over 31 thousand square kilometers and includes territories of the three states, China, 
India and Nepal.58 The region is a transboundary conservation area (TCA), which is 
defined as “an area that straddles international boundaries and is managed cooperatively 
for conservation purposes and may include adjacent national parks and other protected 
areas,” and have been in existence for a long time to meet the needs of conservation and 
traditional biodiversity and habitat preservation across bordering regions all over the 
world.59
Called the Kailash Sacred Landscape Conservation and Development Initiative 
(KSL), the project was spearheaded by the efforts o f ICIMOD with initial funding from 
the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the German government foreign 
development assistance. With the stated mission of promoting a “regional collaborative
Saleem H. Ali, Ecological Cooperation in South Asia: The Way Forward (Washington 
DC: New America Foundation, January 2013),
http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/flles/policydocs/Ali_EcologicalCooper 
ation_NAF_0.pdf. 7.
58 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), "South-South Cooperation Case 
Study: Transboundary Biodiversity Initiative between China, India and Nepal for the 
Conservation of the Mount Kailash Sacred Himalayan Landscape," (n.d.), 
http://www.unep.org/SOUTH-SOUTH-COOPERATION/case/casefiles.aspx?csno=49; 
Press Trust of India, "India, China, Nepal Agree on Kailash Issue," (December 19, 2010), 
http://ibnlive.in.com/news/india-china-nepal-agree-on-kailash-issue/137938-2.html.
59 Conservation.org, "Transboundary Conservation,"
http://www.conservation.org/publications/Pages/transboundary_conservation.aspx.
169
program to promote transboundary cooperation for biodiversity conservation and 
sustainable development,” KS1 led by ICIMOD’s leadership has been able to obtain the 
buy-in from the three states involved. ICIMOD also serves as the coordinating body of 
KSL-related activities as they are conducted by the governmental institutes and 
ministries.60 The various participating governmental and educational agencies in the three 
member states include: GB Pant Institute of Himalayan Environment and Development 
(GBPIHED) under the Indian Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change; the 
Institute of Geography Sciences and Natural Resources Research (IGSNRR), under the 
state body Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS); and the Department of Forests under the 
Nepalese Ministry o f Soil Conservation and Forests as well as the Central Department of 
Botany, at Nepal’s national university, Tribhuvan University.61 These institutions and the 
national governments have begun to engage in collaborative research and policy 
exchanges.
The KSL conservation initiative is a long-term project, which only completed its 
first phase in January 2011. That phase produced a Regional Cooperation Framework 
with the agreement with the three member states. That phase also produced a Regional 
Conservation Strategy to promote the goals o f biodiversity and sustainable development; 
and the Comprehensive Environmental Monitoring Strategic Plan, which is the long-term 
capacity building and research plan to study the impacts of climate change in the Kailash 
Landscape region.62 Currently, the KSL initiative is in its second five-year phase of 
implementing the consolidated plans 63 ICIMOD and KSL’s achievement in bringing the 
three states together in an enduring cooperative project plan of conservation of the shared 
environmental region is unique.
60 Ali, Ecological Cooperation in South Asia: The Way Forward
61 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), "South-South Cooperation Case 
Study: Transboundary Biodiversity Initiative between China, India and Nepal for the 
Conservation of the Mount Kailash Sacred Himalayan Landscape".
62 Ibid., 5.




The case of environmental cooperation in the face of climate change has proven 
to be a tough case to demonstrate evidence of Nepal’s wedging behavior. The reason for 
this is the fact of this phenomenon’s recent emergence compared to other cases and the 
fact that the intractable global and regional frameworks constitute the bulk of the 
emerging policy framework. The foregoing analysis is unable to decisively answer the 
existence of Nepal’s wedge state benefit, and the existing state of data is found to be 
insufficient to confirm or deny the validity of the two of the three test hypotheses and is 
refuted in the third hypothesis. Regarding the independent effects of the domestic system 
of government (HI) on the climate change negotiations or regional cooperation, the 
analysis does not find conclusive evidence either way. The third hypothesis (H3), on the 
negative effect of trade dependence on wedge state gains, can be refuted because the 
growing trade dependence has had no effect on the outcomes of the nascent policies on 
environmental cooperation.
We can still observe some pertinent findings for the second hypothesis (H2) 
regarding the positive effect o f institutional, interdependent and transnational forms of 
globalization in the matter of interstate environmental cooperation producing wedging 
behavior. Based on the impact of internationally funded, transnational research 
organization, ICIMOD and the KSL project, a narrow argument can be made regarding 
the positive impact of globalization on the possibility of interstate environmental 
cooperation. Still, even that case doesn’t provide us much evidence of wedging or 
material gains for the wedge state, other than Nepal’s minimal gain in capacity building 
and research exchange, which might have been possible regardless o f the wedge state 
status. The global climate framework, UNFCCC, and its LDC Fund, which has begun to 
fund a number of climate adaptation projects in Nepal, can also been seen as evidence of 
the effects of globalization leading to direct material benefits of Nepal. But that instance 
does not obtain from the tripartite interaction or the status of Nepal’s wedge status, which 
are the core concerns of this research.
The possible contours of the regional and bilateral policies in environmental 
cooperation and adaptive measures to climate change effects in the Himalayan region is
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yet to be seen. As this chapter has analyzed, the region and the three states are faced with 
long-term challenges in the form of retreating Himalayan glaciers and availability of 
freshwater resources, among many shared climate vulnerabilities and impacts. The 
negotiations in the global framework might eventually bear positive fruit. Yet, the current 
stance of both China and India for their right to economic and social development seems 
likely to preclude a grand bargain in the short to medium term. The policy negotiation in 
the regional forum is inherently limited by the lack of resources of the member nations 
and the lack of leadership by India. Finally, although the national policies are slowly 
beginning to take shape, they may either be too insular or are to be implemented too far 
in the future to provide concrete avenues of cooperation in the short-term.
The review of the official national and regional policies reflects the absence of 
tripartite interaction in environmental cooperation and climate change. The evidence 
suggests that we cannot speak of Nepal’s gaining material benefits from wedging as 
hypothesized. However, the negotiations and bargaining in water resources might occur 
in an ad hoc bilateral basis when the issue of hydropower projects, dam building, 
irrigation and flooding arise. In future research, those negotiations could be analyzed to 
test if  Nepal’s share of benefits is higher than would be expected or its share of costs are 
lower having been borne by one of its richer rival power neighbors.
Finally, the case of the ongoing transboundary conservation in the KSL can be 
seen as an instance of a newer form of tripartite cooperation in promoting the ideas of 
“international environmental regimes” which may benefit all the member states. The 
mode of governance in these regimes might not follow the tradition state-to-state 
negotiations based on strategic benefits-costs analysis. These newer forms of cooperative 
regimes may feature non-state actors as leaders and shapers of cooperation. This 
development relates to the influence of societal actors and the effects of globalization in 
the interaction between small wedge states and rival major powers. All we can say is that 
if such novel forms of policy advancement continue, the metric of strategic autonomy and 




At this early period o f the 21st century, the global system of states is characterized 
by the fact that, in sheer numerical terms, small states far outnumber larger states. The 
number of smaller states began swelling in the post-war years with the break-up of 
empires and the process o f decolonization.1 Despite the increase in their number, small 
states have not received adequate, systematic and careful scholarship in the field of 
international studies.2 There are many reasons for the dearth o f extant scholarship of 
small states. Foremost is the fact that most studies on small states suffer from their focus 
on matters of definitions and categorical comparison at the expense of analyzing their 
roles and functions in today’s globalized world. If they are considered by the major 
theoretical schools of international relations at all, small states are consigned to a 
prescribed theoretical function of “balancing, bandwagoning or buffering” to explain 
away their independent existence. Additionally, most studies of major power-small state 
dynamics proceed from the perspective o f the major power, categorically denying 
decisive authority to small states in interstate interactions, reminiscent of the ancient 
wisdom that “the strong do what they will, while the weak suffer what they must.” This 
study shows that despite the ambiguities of definition or the dismissive inclinations of 
mainstream theory, small states can be fruitfully studied and analyzed to help us better 
understand their roles and behaviors in the interstate system, which is an important 
dynamic of global politics.
The primary goal of this study is to fill the analytical blind spot on small states by 
extending the small states scholarship from mere debates of definition and categorization 
to their unique and evolving roles in the distinctive system of states that is emerging 
today. To that end, the major contribution of this study is to theorize the existence,
1 Lake and O'Mahony, "The Incredible Shrinking State: Explaining Change in the 
Territorial Size of Countries."
2 Ingebritsen et al., Small States in International Relations.
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distinguishing characteristics and the range o f interstate behavior o f a subclass of small 
states, that I call wedge states. The study contributes to the process o f theory building and 
preliminary analysis of this category o f small states by systematically using theoretically 
derived hypotheses to conduct empirical analysis of a single unit o f analysis of a wedge 
state in its distinctive tripartite interaction with two rival major powers. Furthermore, the 
design of the study and the selection of the wedge state case of Nepal in its interaction 
with India and China allows methodical analysis of the wedge state interaction in three 
distinctive cases of trilateral, as well as regional and global, salience. This concluding 
chapter shall briefly: review the theoretical context of the wedge states in global politics 
and the expectations thereof; present a synthesis of findings from the case studies; 
analyze the implications and rival explanations as well as limitations of the findings on 
the theory of wedge states; and identify avenues for future research on small and wedge 
states scholarship.
THEORY OF WEDGE STATES AND EXPECTATIONS
Contrary to much of extant scholarship in IR, the current study proceeds from the 
puzzle of the smaller and weaker members of the present interstate system. The point of 
departure is the claim that small states must possess some strategic autonomy in their 
interstate interactions with greater powers given the empirical reality of many smaller 
states that are thriving economically and politically rather than being acutely vulnerable. 
In this age characterized by globalization, the small states in Northern Europe are the 
striking example of such anomaly, but so are many other small states as diverse as Chile, 
Uruguay, Qatar and Singapore, which have been able to overcome their prescribed 
vulnerability. What explains the seeming anomaly?
Because there are regional, historical and individual circumstances inherent in the 
explanations of each of these cases, I argue that not all small states can be lumped into 
one “residual category”3 as has been done in most traditional theories. That tendency has 
produced the theoretical muddle so that there are as many definitions of small states as 
there are observers. Therefore, some small states may be more systematically
3 Ibid., 4.
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characterized as small wedge states, based on their geography and simultaneous 
interaction with two major powers that are competitive or engaged in regional or global 
rivalry. The proposed theory of wedge states states defines them as those small states 
situated in an interactive and simultaneous relation with two rival powers such that the 
wedge states are expected to be able to engage in “wedging strategies” with those rival 
powers to expand their space for strategic autonomy. Wedging strategies denote any 
negotiations, bargaining and statecraft vis-a-vis the two rival powers that allow a wedge 
state to expand its payoffs. The expected outcome of expanded strategic autonomy may 
be observed in the higher level of material and political gains the wedge states receive 
from the interaction with the rival powers.
As a subclass of small states, we may analyze wedge states by deducing what the 
extant IR theories imply for small states. There are two primary goals o f this direction of 
inquiry in this study. First, we want to explain the mere existence of wedge states. Do the 
states situated in a wedge position between two rival, greater powers even engage in 
strategies to maximize their gains? Second, we want to analyze the factors that might 
explain the level of gains accrued by the wedge state from its tripartite interaction with 
the rival powers. The extant theoretical perspectives inform our analysis o f wedge states, 
making us aware of the types o f factors and conditions necessary for wedge state 
behavior.
Four major theoretical perspectives are used to analyze the small, or wedge, states 
puzzle, all of which classify the wide-ranging concerns of their existence and functions 
for systematic analysis. The first theoretical tradition, the structural perspective, holds a 
deterministic view of small states and posits that the relative power differential between 
major powers and small (read, weak) states means that the latter have no strategic 
autonomy in the state system. In contrast, the evolving system of states perspective views 
the historical development of the current state system as imbuing the global arena with 
the laws, practices and norms of sovereignty, respect for international boundaries and 
institutional mechanisms of redress. All of these allow the small states to feel much more 
secure about their borders and to engage with major powers in interstate interactions on 
practically equal footing. The third perspective, the societal actors perspective, views the
175
internal dynamics of small states, their policies, processes and personalities, to explain 
the varying outcomes for different small states. For instance, a visionary leader may use 
astute statecraft to generate strategic autonomy in a small state despite its vulnerability, or 
the domestic institutional development and political maturity may explain the ability of 
some states to overcome their seeming vulnerability. Finally, the perspective of 
developmental studies and economics focuses on the inherent economic vulnerability of 
small states due to their low population levels and production capacities. These features 
make them price-takers in the global market system, swinging with the global market 
forces with no autonomic policies. The related view of critical international political 
economy (IPE) centers on the methods and ways to help small states build resilience by 
capturing niche markets or using global norms of fairness against the impersonal, 
hegemonic forces of the global capitalist system.
Each of these theoretical orientations implies and privileges the importance of 
certain factors and expectations regarding wedge states and wedging behavior. The 
evolving state system perspective identifies the two independent variables: type of state 
system and extent of sovereignty norms. The structural IR perspective posits the 
following IVs: the distribution of power, level of institutionalism and level of 
interdependence in the system. The societal actors perspective find these IVs to be 
important: the type of domestic political system, level of political stability, and the role of 
non-state actors in the wedge state. Finally, the developmental economics perspective 
highlights the importance of these IVs: level of trade dependence and level of economic 
development in the wedge state. While each of these IVs could be intensely analyzed, 
heeding the methodological advice of Arend Lijphart,4 this study selects the following 
three IVs to generate test hypotheses: the type of domestic political system, whether it is 
authoritarian or democratic; the level of systemic interdependence, or political and 
economic globalization; and the level o f trade dependence o f the wedge state on either or 
both of the rival powers. The hypotheses from these IVs posit that the direction of the 
level of strategic autonomy (and material gains) is positive for democracy (HI); higher 
systemic interdependence (H2); and lower trade dependence (H3). The design of this
4 Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method."
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study uses a single-unit comparative case study method5 to analyze the impact of the 
independent variables (IVs) on the outcome of wedge state behavior.
COMPARATIVE CASES: FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
The empirical case chosen is that o f Nepal, which is posited to be a typical wedge 
state between the two major competitive powers, India and China. These three 
neighboring countries share centuries of history that involves trade, social and personal 
exchanges, and political interaction, and Nepal has historically sought to maintain a 
balanced relationship with both its powerful neighbors. The system of government in 
Nepal changed from an autocratic monarchical system to a parliamentary constitutional 
democracy in 1990. Subsequently, in 2008, Nepal abolished the monarchy to become a 
republic; however, this study considers the entire period after 1990 as parliamentary 
because no new republican constitution has yet been adopted.
In Nepal’s wedge interaction with India and China, three empirical cases are 
identified for analysis: the Tibetan refugee case; the case of competitive investment 
strategies in Nepal’s hydropower sector; and the case of environmental policy 
cooperation between the three states, which share the Himalayan geography highly 
vulnerable to climate change impacts. The detailed findings from the individual cases 
have been discussed in their respective chapters. Table 7.1 below summarizes the major 
findings related to the three hypotheses in each of the comparative cases, which is 
followed by a synthesis of the findings and implications.
5 Gerring, "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?."
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Case 1: Tibetan 
Refugees











continued after 1990 
during democracy.
HI : Affirmed
Type of government 
did not matter; but the 
ideological orientation 
of the governing party 
proved quite important.
HI: Inconclusive
The climate change 
debate began only 
after the 1990 change 








meant that India 
became indifferent to 
the Tibet issue paving 
the path for Nepal 
policy direction with 
the attendant material 
gains.
H2: Affirmed
Indian and Chinese 
globalized firms and 
state organs have been 
aggressively pursuing 
foreign investments, 




Global and regional 
forums not functional 
but transnational non­
state actors have 
begun tripartite 
conservation efforts, 
which benefit Nepal 












The effect is reversed; 
amid Nepali concerns 
of growing trade 
imbalance, China tries 
to placate with 
investment and aid.
H3: Refuted
No effect of trade 
relations in the 
budding conservation 
policies.
Table 7.1: Comparative Summary of Case Findings
On the narrow question of Nepal’s tripartite relationship with India and China, the 
complex processes of global political and economic interdependence seem to have had 
the most salient impact on the material gains in all three cases. This finding broadly
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confirms the implication of the structural liberal theories o f interdependence on small 
states, while the developmental economics view of their enduring vulnerability is not 
supported. If a small wedge state has niche areas of comparative advantage, it may be 
able to receive higher level of material benefits from the rival powers in an 
interdependent system. Furthermore, the transnational perspective about the utility of 
non-state actors is also supported by the example of ICIMOD in the environmental 
cooperation case. The important role played by transnational non-state actors also 
supports the expectation of the societal actors perspective, which claims independent 
effects of non-state actors on small state gains. Therefore, economic and political 
globalization may be the necessary conditions for wedge states to derive higher benefits 
from the rival powers, while transnational non-state actors may be the intervening 
variables that catalyze such outcomes.
Another broad finding is that, in comparing the three cases Nepal has been able to 
maximize its material gains in the case of hydropower developments. Although the 
aggregate of approved projects are nowhere near the country’s natural potential in 
absolute terms, the evolution of Nepal’s policies towards attracting Indian and Chinese 
capital as well as the heavy courting by successive political leaders to entice those 
sources of financing shows Nepal’s wedge behavior. These types of wedging activities 
are forestalled by China’s sensitivity in the case of Tibetans, and are still nascent and 
nebulous in the case of environmental cooperation, which is the one distributive problem 
with high costs of inaction for all the parties involved. The reason for the latter may just 
be the difficulty of the global problem and the unsettled nature of policies and practices 
of interstate interaction on climate change in general. The hydropower investment issue is 
an instance of the body of well-established practices o f capital-poor countries using 
appealing terms to attract foreign direct investments, which suggests that other wedge 
states might be able to negotiate beneficial bargaining arrangements in their natural 
resources sector.
The highly sensitive issue on Tibetan refugees shows that, despite the moral 
objections of state and non-state international friends of Tibetans everywhere, Nepal is 
pursuing a policy that accrues higher material gains, at least in the short-term. The
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evidence is not perfectly conclusive whether the shift in policy is a direct result of 
Chinese pressure or due to the indifference of India. The study finds some evidence for 
the latter. Thus, a critical implication may be that acquiescing to Chinese wishes does not 
show Nepal’s expansion of strategic autonomy. That criticism assumes that the official 
Nepalese position on morality and national interests is strictly aligned with the interests 
o f Tibetans. This study uses the evidence of wedging behavior to see if there are higher 
levels of material gains, which Nepal definitely enjoys not only from the largess of China 
but paradoxically also by the fact that India is not withholding benefits because of the 
Nepal’s Tibetan policy. The structuralist position may be bolstered by this outcome in 
that for these cases, which really matter to the powerful states, the outcome favors their 
positions. Yet, to reiterate, the function of Indian indifference complicates the picture. 
Therefore, for wedge states generally, we may need to analyze the interests and 
preferences both rival powers, even in issues that are politically sensitive to one of the 
powers.
The one finding that contradicts the expected outcome is the case of hydropower 
investments in relation to the trade dependence factor, the third hypothesis. As of the 
present, at least, Nepal’s growing dependence on Chinese exports and the resulting 
escalation of the trade imbalance has produced the effect that China considers the 
prospects o f investments in Nepal as a form of compensation. The investments and aid 
that China has made is not close to matching the aggregate of the balance of trade for the 
last decade. But in the case of hydropower investments, Nepal seems to be accruing 
higher material gains despite increasing trade dependence. A similar dynamic governs 
Nepal’s dependent trade relationship with the other power, India. This finding is 
interesting but it may not be generally applicable to small states. In the sub-set o f small 
states, this line of analysis may be necessary to further understand these phenomena.
A single study may not be adequate to confirm the theory of wedge states or make 
maximalist claims, but it does find some evidence that Nepal is able to engage in 
wedging interactions with the two rival powers, India and China. Also, it finds that the 
wedging may be more pronounced in some cases, less in other cases, and maybe not
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present at all in still others. Three cumulative implications from these findings on the 
larger theoretical questions regarding wedge and small states are noteworthy.
The first major implication o f this analysis is that interdependence and 
globalization may have quite fundamentally changed the interstate dynamic between 
small and major rival powers. Curiously, the connecting thread is the possibility of 
interdependent relationship between the major powers themselves, which allows the 
wedge state to seek positions that generates better material outcomes. In other words, 
now when the words “rival powers” are used, it does not signify the all-encompassing 
nature of the rivalry prevalent between the US and USSR during the Cold War. In this 
age, shared economic interests interconnect both China and India, although that doesn’t 
prevent either of those states from pursuing its national interests vis-a-vis the wedge state.
The second broad implication is that the wedge state has the autonomy define its 
own national interests in order to use wedging strategies to pursue them. Be it the shifting 
policy on Tibetan refugees or the particular policy evolution on hydropower investments, 
Nepal adopted the policies in that direction, although its long-term success in 
accumulating high material gains is still to be seen. The final major implication is that the 
role of societal or non-state actors cannot be overstated, although it is difficult to quantify 
if they are able to affect the wedging dynamics in a consequential and sustainable way. 
Either way, transnational and domestic non-state actors operating in small states may be 
able to produce cooperative outcomes along with material gains for those states.
An important qualification regarding these findings and implications is that the 
variation between the three cases, which are in different realms of tripartite engagement, 
should alert us to a definitional problem of small states discussed earlier in the study.
That qualification is the need of using relational definitions of small states in their 
“spatio-temporal context,” which means to allow the “contextual, temporal and issue- 
specific” consideration of the interaction between small states and major powers.6 Small 
states may be able to overcome their vulnerabilities only in certain issues and under
6 These concepts are considered in detail in the theoretical discussion in chapter II, and 
are derived from the work o f Thorhallsson and Wivel, "Small States in the European 
Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?."
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supportive circumstances. This qualification may seem predictable and superfluous, but 
as the cases of Tibetan refugees and hydropower investment show, the major powers are 
much more amenable to beneficial cooperation in economic, trade and technical issues 
while their positions are hardened on the more sensitive, political and geostrategic 
interests. It would not be prudent to expect maximal strategic space on the latter category 
of cases.
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LIMITATIONS
In terms of research design for robust testing of the proposed theory, a limitation 
of this study is that whatever depth it gains by the choice of the single-unit o f study is 
compromised by the lack of breadth that a research design with more than one unit of 
study would consider. For an exercise in nascent theory building, that methodological 
limitation is to be expected. The study sought to broaden the applicability of its claims by 
choosing three disparate cases for analysis, each of which highlighted a unique 
interactive issue between the three states upon which the external and national forces 
acted at different levels. Despite these correctives, the findings of this study alone are not 
enough to make categorical claims regarding the theory of wedge states or the factors that 
mitigate the interactions between small states and major powers. A subsequent section on 
further research avenues suggests possible extension of this research program, which may 
ultimately lead to claims that are more robust. Here I discuss some limitations.
Only the effects of three IVs were explicitly analyzed in this study. Certainly, 
there may be rival explanations that would explain the wedge state problematic more 
elegantly. The literature review identified seven such prospects, including the 
independent effects of systematic influence o f the emerging global system of states; the 
level of political instability; and the level of development in the wedge state, among 
others. The comprehensive case studies also highlighted the need to consider some such 
possibilities. Although not tested explicitly, the other societal actor variable—the level of 
domestic instability—must be acknowledged in all three cases to be of salience because 
for the duration of the study there have been countless government changes in Nepal as 
well as a couple major changes to the system of government itself. Although, political
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instability must have had important effects, the cases were not able to isolate those 
effects.
Another explanation for the behavior of Nepal in its interaction with India and 
China may be the rational actor model in that each of the successive governments may 
have been compelled by circumstantial pressures to engage with either India or China in 
the manner they did. Yet, that position may only bolster the case of increased strategic 
autonomy on the part o f internal political processes and competitions o f wedge states, 
although it may not say much about the actual phenomenon of “the power of the small” 
itself.
A major design concern may be that the operational metric of material gains does 
not really capture the essence of the concept of strategic autonomy. It can simply be said 
that observers need to allow the states themselves to name their strategic space of 
independent action. Also, the measurement unit of the concept and the actual observation 
of material gains against the effect of the independent factors are to a degree subjective in 
a qualitative study. So it would be better if in future research endeavors a quantitative 
research design could be applied to the operationalization of the variables to verify the 
validity and the robustness of the findings from this study.
Other significant limitations of this research do not have to do with such 
theoretical or methodological concerns. The more arresting limitations are entirely based 
on empirical reality. During the period of this study, political developments in the real 
world seemed poised to overtake the results. On the larger claim o f sacrosanct norms of 
small state sovereignty, the events in Ukraine that began in March 2014, and slowly took 
shape in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, showed the limits of the evolution of a calcified 
state system. The Russian power seems to have punctured, what Stephen Krasner so 
memorably termed, the “organized hypocrisy” of the institution of sovereignty.7 Yet, the 
fact that Kiev remains independent and not under the thumb of the Kremlin may suggest 
that even a small regional state situated under the shadow of a superpower may possess a 
modicum of strategic autonomy, albeit at great cost. O f course, Ukraine is not going to be
7 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy.
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able to join the European Union or NATO anytime soon, but the newly elected 
government in Kiev remains staunchly pro-European in the face of suffocating pressure 
from the Kremlin. Also, the Western condemnation and sanctions against Russian acts of 
“aggression” show that those principles of international laws on state boundaries are not 
totally a sham. Therefore, at present, the Ukrainian example is still in flux and does not 
completely shatter the claims of small state sovereignty and security.
In regards to the empirical cases, the Tibetan refugees issue has been stuck in an 
intractable state. But in the other two cases, recent developments in the political realm 
began to influence the tripartite dynamic from what was observed in period o f this study, 
although the direction of change suggested more wedging dynamics and not less. In those 
cases, new developments will have to be considered in future studies of the tripartite 
interaction.
In August 2014, the new Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid a state visit 
to Nepal, 17 years after the last time an Indian PM came to Nepal. The visit showed that 
Mr. Modi’s mass popularity transcends the border as he came bearing gifts and gave a 
highly publicized speech in the parliament. One of the most important matters on the 
agenda was Indian investment in large-scale hydropower projects in Nepal, many of 
which had been proposed more than two decades prior. These projects, including the 
6500 MW jumbo-project of Pancheswor, have languished because of political distrust 
and instability as well as technical disagreements on the rates of sale of the produced 
electricity. The Indian Prime Minister gladdened the hearts of Nepali hydro-dreamers 
when he said, “Nepal can free India of its darkness with its electricity. But we don’t want 
free electricity, we want to buy it. Just by selling electricity to India, Nepal can find a 
place in the developed countries of the world.”8 The actual material outcome of the visit 
was that the two states agreed to expedite the stalled power trade and power development 
agreements, which would govern expanded Indian investment in Nepal and allow the 
proposed projects to move forward. However, the breakthrough may yet be some time
8 Rama Lakshmi, "Modi's Speech in Nepal Shows India Is Paying Attention to Its 




away. Mr. Modi also sweetened the deal by announcing to offer Nepal a $1 billion 
concessional line of credit.9
If the promised projects materialize, this important visit and the aftermath may be 
seen as just another chapter of the two powers engaging in their rivalry to the benefit of 
Nepal. Clearly the subtext of the Indian promise of economic largesse was, of course, the 
new administration’s goal of exceeding the intensified Chinese economic role in Nepal’s 
energy and infrastructure sector in the last two decades.10 Nepalese leaders sought to gain 
as much Indian support and financing from Mr. Modi, given the subtext that Beijing was 
already doing so much in the past two decades of what S. D. Muni, a famed analyst of 
Indian foreign policy, called “alienation between India and Nepal.”11 Predictably, a 
slightly mocking headline in the Chinese official news agency emphasized the fact that 
no actual hydropower deals were signed during the visit, despite glittering rhetoric from 
Mr. Modi.12
There were two additional regional and global developments towards the end of 
2014, each of which may influence the third case of climate change cooperation. The 18th 
SAARC Summit was held in Kathmandu in November, and was expected to bring the 
member states into closer cooperation on environment. However, the summit ended 
without any such accord, sidetracked by the latest India-Pakistan row. Another 
development o f note was the fact that some leaders from Pakistan and Nepal discussed 
granting full membership to China in the South Asian regional body to which India 
remained entirely unsympathetic. The calls from loyal partners for China, which has been 
an observer in SAARC since 2006, to be promoted to full member suggests Chinese
9 Paavan Mathema, "Narendra Modi Announces $1 Billion Line of Credit for Nepal,"
Live Mint, India{August 3, 2014),
http://www.livemint.com/Politics/vWAKyIbE2DHu3EHxN0vU5L/Narendra-Modi-
embarks-on-Nepal-visit.html.
10 Agence France-Presse (AFP), "China-India Energy Rivalry in Spotlight as Modi Visits 
Nepal," (August 2, 2014), http://www.afp.com/en/news/china-india-energy-rivalry- 
spotlight-modi-visits-nepal.
1 Mathema, "Narendra Modi Announces $1 Billion Line of Credit for Nepal".




intentions of deeper, multi-dimensional interest in the South Asian region. Therefore, it 
can be surmised that the rivalry between China and India in the subcontinent has only just 
begun.
In the global climate change policy front, UNFCCC held the 20th Conference of 
Parties (COP) summit in Lima, Peru in early December 2014. Maybe owing to recent 
failures on achieving binding global agreements, expectations from the summit were low. 
Therefore, it was not that surprising that Lima COP was able to reach a global accord that 
is not a game-changer. States agreed to pledge to minimum voluntary emissions cuts, 
which is to say non-binding, so that all eyes are now trained in the next COP summit in 
Paris in 2015.13 The upshot is that the cooperative policies on climate change are still 
evolving. Thus, neither the regional nor the global framework on climate change 
cooperation has changed enough to have any discernible effect in the tripartite dynamic 
in the Himalayas.
FURTHER RESEARCH
This study has largely been concerned with theory building to expand the scope of 
scholarship on small states in the fields o f global politics. Subsequent studies could test 
the robustness of the proposed theory by applying the concept of wedge states to other 
states that exhibit wedging interaction with rivals that are more powerful and to historical 
instances of wedge states. Accumulation of a number of case studies of wedge states in 
their interactive behavior with their respective rival powers would help the cause of 
theory building. Just in the region of South Asia, states such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka 
and Myanmar maybe studied in the context o f their tripartite relationship with India and 
China. If those states, which do not directly border both the rival powers, exhibit wedging 
characteristics, it would also bolster the theoretical claim in that a wedge state need not 
necessarily be geographically located between two major powers. It may be pointed out 
that the case of Bhutan, which closely aligns with India would be the potential theory 
disconfirming case of a geographical wedge state that does not engage in wedging
13 BBC News, "Un Members Agree Deal at Lima Climate Talks," (December 14 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-30468048.
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behavior. However, since Bhutan and China have outstanding unresolved border 
disputes, the case is dissimilar to the other natural candidates of wedging.
Other wedging case studies might expand to other continents or circumstances. It 
would be productive to study the case o f South America, where a number of states are 
engaged in tripartite interaction with Brazil and Argentina. Europe is a difficult case at 
the moment, given the situation in Ukraine and the Russian actions, which as as discussed 
above seem to negate the claims made by the evolving state systems perspective of 
respect for boundaries and sovereignty norms leading to small states feeling secure within 
their borders. Yet, there may be many other cases of historical and present wedge 
situations in Europe, which has been the cradle of the founding international institutions 
of sovereignty that took centuries of advancements and setbacks to emerge. The 
scholarship would benefit from the study of historical cases, such as Poland or Finland, of 
wedge states in Europe and elsewhere. Also, cases involving wedge situations where 
there are more than two rival powers operating on the wedge state, such as the historical 
case of Belgium, may be found and analyzed.
Another avenue to further research on the theory of wedge states and the topic of 
small states in general, is to apply a quantitative approach. It would be beneficial to 
further theory building as well as robust testing, if  the various proposed independent 
variables (IVs) could be quantified and measured to explain the quantitative variance in 
the operational dependent variable (DV), the level of material gains from tripartite 
interaction, which would measure the effect of expanding strategic autonomy. In such a 
project, IVs other than the three used in this study could be researched for their 
independent effects to explain more the wedge dynamics. Ultimately, a global 
quantitative study of all possible small states to discern their outcomes in the measures of 
various IVs and the variance of their material gains and strategic autonomy would be the 
defining study in this research program on wedge states.
The present study is just one strand on the question of the power of small states in 
a system dominated by big powers that should animate IR for a long time. The additional 
webs of global and regional institutions, regimes and transnational actors should further 
complicate the small-large interaction. The increasing salience of cross-boundary arenas
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of cooperation such as the environment, global finance and migration and many more, 
suggest expanding role and power of decisions for small states. The implications o f this 
study of one small, wedge state indicates as much. As long as the global system of states 
contains both yams and boulders, they will be forced to interact resourcefully and 
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